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SPARE THE ROD, EMBRACE OUR HUMANITY: 
TOWARD A NEW LEGAL REGIME PROmBITING 
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF CmIDREN 
Susan H. Bitensky* 
This article proceeds from the simple premise that hitting children 
hurts them-even when the hitting does not rise to the level of child 
abuse as traditionally conceived. There is convincing evidence that 
corporal punishment is a hidden cruelty in child rearing that has se-
rious adverse consequences for its victims and society at large. Yet 
forty-nine states permit parental corporal punishment of children 
and approximately half of the states permit such punishment in ele-
mentary and secondary schools. The main purpose of this Article is to 
question the advisability of continuing the legalized status of corpo-
ral punishment of children in the United States, especially when the 
punishment is administered by parents or guardians. The Article 
presents a new framework for analysis by surveying the laws of those 
countries and the one state that have prohibited all corporal pun-
ishment of children and by examining international human rights 
instruments that may be interpreted to support such laws. The Article 
also explores the psychological, sociological, and ethical considera-
tions warranting prohibition and presents a new proposal for law 
reform on the subject. 
* Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law at Michigan State University. B.A 
1971, Case Western Reserve University; J.D. 1974, University of Chicago Law School. 
This Article would not have been possible without a grant from the Detroit College of 
Law at Michigan State University. I am indebted to Dr. Cynthia Price Cohen, Peter 
Newell, and Nicholas J. Stasevich for their assistance in helping me to obtain infor-
mation concerning the status of corporal punishment of children in foreign countries. I 
wish to thank the following foreign attorneys for assisting me in obtaining such in-
formation: Finn Erik Engzelius of Thommessen Krefting Greve Lund in Oslo, Norway; 
Kurt Heller of Lober, Bahn & Partners in Vienna, Austria; Katja Leven of LagerlOf & 
Leman in Stockholm, Sweden; Klaus Juel Rasmussen of Kromann & Munter in Co-
penhagen, Denmark; and Isabella Riska of Roschier-Holmberg & Waselius in 
Helsinki, Finland. I am especially grateful to the following foreign government offi-
cials for granting me lengthy interviews concerning the latest legal developments on 
corporal punishment of children in their respective countries: Judge Francesco Ip-
polito of the Supreme Court of Cassation of Italy; Gtiran Hakansson, Permanent 
Undersecretary of the Swedish Ministry of Health and Social Affairs; and Dr. Michael 
Stormann, Executive Public Prosecutor and Section Head of the Section on National 
Family Law, Austrian Ministry of Justice. In addition, I am most appreciative of the 
comments and advice given on earlier drafts of this Article by Howard A Davidson, 
Gtiran Hakansson, Robert A McCormick, Peter Newell, Werner Schiitz, Barbara Ben-
nett Woodhouse, and Franklin E. Zimring. The research assistance of law students 
Ralph Colasuonno, Christine Greig, Susan Kilbourne, Kostan Kostopolous, and Lori 
Talsky was truly invaluable as was the secretarial assistance of Amy Persson. Of 
course, any errors in this Article are the author's sole responsibility. 
This Article is dedicated to my son, William N. Meyrowitz. 
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INTRODUCTION 
"Childhood"-the word readily conjures up sunlit pictures of 
little souls boisterously bounding in play or quietly absorbed in 
whimsical imaginings. But childhood also moves in dark shad-
ows that loom large with fear and pain. These are the shadows 
cast by an adult world that wields the power and legal preroga-
tive to subject its young to "reasonable" corporal punishment in 
the name of discipline and guidance. Blows, no matter what 
their purpose, bring pain and dread of pain even if they are 
administered with moderation; and these are blows against 
which there is no recourse, regardless of how often they are 
repeated. This is the somber side of childhood, overhanging 
days of play and whimsy with a helpless distress that operates 
at the level of normalcy. 
It may be that the more charming images of childhood come 
to mind first or exclusively not only because childhood is in-
deed a time of bustling activity and idle reverie but also 
because it is too uncomfortable to summon up sensations of 
pain and attendant feelings of fear, sorrow, and anger. Such 
summoning can make unbearable demands on us both as pre-
sent parents and as former children. For, if the reader has 
spanked his or her own child, the summoning is apt to produce 
unease at having administered a spanking that may have 
caused these sensations and feelings in another;l and, if the 
reader was spanked as a child, unpleasant memories of it may 
require an acknowledgment that a beloved parent had short-
comings and caused one's own suffering.2 
This reflexive resistance to a critical contemplation of 
corporal punishment of children is compounded by the fact 
that spanking is common in the United States. Most American 
1. See NANCY SAMALIN, LoVING YOUR CHILD IS NOT ENOUGH: POSITIVE DIS-
CIPUNE THAT WORKS 73 (1987); WILLIAM SEARS & MARTHA SEARS, THE DISCIPUNE 
BOOK: EVERYTHING YoU NEED TO KNOW TO HAVE A BE'ITER-BEHAVED CHILD-FROM 
BIRTH TO AGE TEN 148 (1995). 
2. See MURRAY A. STRAUS, BEATING THE DEVIL OUT OF THEM: CORPORAL 
PuNISHMENT IN AMERICAN FAMILIES 163 (1994); Dean M. Herman, A Statutory Pro-
posal to Prohibit the Infliction of Violence upon Children, 19 FAM. L. Q. 1, 18-21 
(1985); see also ALICE MILLER, THou SHALT NOT BE AWARE: SOCIETY'S BETRAYAL OF 
THE CHILD 161, 209-10, 299 (1984) (describing generally the way children react to 
trauma caused by their parents). 
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children have been hit by an adult in one venue or another.3 
Indeed, corporal punishment of children in the schools is, as of 
this writing, legal in about half the states.4 "Reasonable" 
3. See STRAUS, supra note 2, at 3 ("[MJore than 90 percent of American parents 
hit toddlers and most continue to hit their children for years. In short, almost all 
American children have been hit by their parents-usually for many years."). A 1989 
Harris poll showed that 86% of the respondents representing "a random, representa-
tive sample of 1,250 Americans" supported parental spanking. See IRWIN A. HYMAN, 
READING, WRITING, AND THE HICKORY STICK: THE APPALLING STORY OF PHYSICAL AND 
PSYCHOWGICAL ABUSE IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 56 (1990) [hereinafter HYMAN, 
READING, WRITING, AND THE HICKORY STICK]. An even more recent assessment is that 
four out of five Americans who were spanked as children approve of spanking. See 
Interview by Katie Couric with Heidi Murkoff, author of child care books, on Today 
(NBC television broadcast, Nov. 19, 1996). Indeed, "[elven in their late teens (ages 15 
to 17), about a quarter of American children still experience some sort of corporal 
punishment." STRAUS, supra note 2, at 32. But see Larry Reibstein & Susan Miller, 
The Debate over Discipline, NEWSWEEK Special Edition, Spring/Summer 1997, at 64 
(reporting that "[f]or this generation of educated middle-class parents, spanking is as 
politically incorrect as smoking," and that a Newsweek poll shows that only 31 percent 
of parents spank their children sometimes or often). 
With respect to corporal punishment of children in public elementary and secon-
dary schools, see infra note 13 and accompanying text. "[Sltudies of corporal 
punishment in schools indicate that it is not used as a 'last resort.' It is too often the 
first punishment for nonviolent and minor misbehaviors." Irwin A. Hyman, Corporal 
Punishment, Psychological Maltreatment, Violence, and Punitiveness in America: Re-
search, Advocacy, and Public Policy, 4 APPLIED & PREVENTIVE PSYCHOL. 113, 117 
(1995) (citations omitted) [hereinafter Hyman, Corporal Punishmentl (summarizing 
the findings of studies of corporal punishment in schools). In addition, "[mlost of the 
corporal punishment in America occurs in states in the South and Southwest-
Florida, Texas, Arkansas, and Alabama have consistently been among the leaders in 
the frequency of hitting school children." [d. at 17 (citations omitted). 
4. Some statutes, either expressly or by inference, prohibit the use of corporal 
punishment on students in elementary and secondary schools. Some of these statutes 
also contain language stating that force may be used for other specified purposes 
besides punishment. See, e.g., ALAsKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 07.010(c) (1996) (stating 
an express prohibition); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49001 (West 1993) (stating an express 
prohibition with the caveat that force may be used for the specified purpose other 
than punishment); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-18(6) (West 1994) (implying a 
prohibition by permitting the use of force for specified purposes other than punitive 
ones); HAw. REV. STAT. § 298-16 (1993) and HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 703-309(2) 
(Michie 1994) (expressly prohibiting the use of force for punishment, but allowing its 
use for other specified purposes such as the maintenance of school discipline); 105 ILL. 
COMPo STAT. 5/24-24 (West 1996) (stating an express prohibition with the caveat that 
force may be used for specified purposes other than punishment); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 280.21 (West 1996) (stating an express prohibition with the caveat that force may be 
used for specified purposes other than punishment); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-306 
(1996) (stating an express prohibition); MAss. ANN. LAwS ch. 71, § 37G (Law. Co-op. 
1991) (stating an express prohibition with the caveat that force may be used for 
specified purposes other than punishment); MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 380.1312 (West 
1997) (stating an express prohibition with the caveat that force may be used for 
specified purposes other than punishment); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 127.45 (West 1996) 
(stating an express prohibition); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-4-302 (1997) (stating an 
express prohibition with the caveat that force may be used for specified purposes such 
as "maintain[ingl the orderly conduct of a pupil"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-295 (1996) 
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corporal punishment of children by their parents or guardians 
is legal in every state except Minnesota;5 even so, recently 
(stating an express prohibition); NEV. REV. STAT. § 392.465 (1995) (stating an express 
prohibition with the caveat that force may be used for specified purposes other than 
punishment); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6·1 (West 1989) (stating an express prohibition 
with the caveat that force may be used for specified purposes other than punishment); 
N.Y. COMPo CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 19.5 (1995) (stating an express prohibition with 
the caveat that force may be used for specified purposes other than punishment); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 15-47-47 (1993) (stating an express prohibition with the caveat that 
force may be used for specified purposes such as "quell[ing] a verbal disturbance" or 
"preserv[ing] order"); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.250(2),(11) (1995) (stating an express 
prohibition with the caveat that force may be used for the specified purpose of 
maintaining order); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-U-802 (1997) (stating an express 
prohibition unless the child's parent or guardian has given written permission for 
corporal punishment to be administered and otherwise allowing use of force for 
specified purposes besides punishment); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § U61a (1989) (stating 
an express prohibition with the caveat that force may be used for specified purposes 
other than punishment); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1·279.1 (Michie 1997) (stating an express 
prohibition with the caveat that force may be used for specified purposes such as 
"maintain[ing] order and control"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A 150.300 (West 1997) 
(stating an express prohibition); W. VA. CODE § 18A-5-1 (Supp. 1997) (stating an 
express prohibition); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.31 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997) (stating an 
express prohibition with the caveat that force may be used for specified purposes such 
as maintaining order and control). Rhode Island does not expressly forbid corporal 
punishment in its schools, but all school districts are directed to devise a discipline 
policy and no districts have permitted the use of corporal punishment on students. See 
Jerry R. Parkinson, Federal Court Treatment of Corporal Punishment in Public 
Schools: Jurisprudence that is Literally Shocking to the Conscience, 39 S.D. L. REV. 
276, 279 n.30 (1994) (citing Telephone Interview with Mr. Vila, Legal Office, Rhode 
Island Department of Education (Mar. 23, 1994». According to the Legal Counsel for 
the Commissioner of Rhode Island's Department of Education, 
There's no policy manual provision in the State of Rhode Island which author-
izes the use of corporal punishment in the schools. School districts can only do 
what is authorized in the state policy manual. Corporal punishment is looked 
down upon and a law authorizing its use would never pass the state legislature. 
Telephone Interview by Christine Greig with Thomas Vila, Legal Counsel for the 
Commissioner of Rhode Island's Department of Education (Jan. 6,1997). 
Also, "[c]orporal punishment is no longer practiced in most Catholic schools .... " 
Karen W. Arenson, Parochial School Mystique, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1996, § 4 (Week in 
Review), at 14. 
5. For commentators referring to the fact that all states permit parents or 
guardians to administer "reasonable" corporal punishment upon children, see Leonard 
P. Edwards, Corporal Punishment and the Legal System, 36 SANTA ClARA L. REV. 983, 
984-85 (1996); Mary Kate Kearney, Substantive Due Process and Parental Corporal 
Punishment: Democracy and the Excluded Child, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1,22 & n.125, 
29 (1995). Cf. Franklin E. Zimring, Legal Perspectives on Family Violence, 75 CAL. L. 
REV. 521, 526 (1987) (stating that "the physical discipline of children is typically in-
sulated from legal review if it does not represent a gross threat to the child"). 
Some states have enacted statutory language specifically authorizing corporal 
punishment of children by their parents or guardians. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A·3-
24(1) (1993); ALASKA STAT. § U.81.430(a)(1) (Michie 1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
403(1) (West 1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5·2-605(1) (Michie 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-
1-703(1)(a) (1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-18 (West 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
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there was an unsuccessful attempt in Congress to enact 
legislation that would have given parents an express federal 
right to mete out such punishment.6 
11, § 468 (1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-15-1(3)(A) (Supp. 1997); HAw. REv. STAT. § 703-
309(1) (1993); IDAHO CODE § 16-2002 (1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-34-1-15 (West Supp. 
1997); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 503.110(1) (Michie 1990); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:18(4) 
(West 1997); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 106(1) (West 1983); MD. CODE ANN., 
FAM. LAw § 4-501(b)(2) (Supp. 1997); MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 750.136b (West 1991); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-105 (Supp. 1997); Mo. REv. STAT. § 210.110(1) (1994); N.H. 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 627:6(1) (1996); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 35.10(1) (McKinney 1998); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-05(1) (1985); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.03.1(B) (Anderson 
Supp. 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 844 (West 1983); OR. REv. STAT., § 161.205(1) 
(1995); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 509(1) (West Supp. 1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-
490(3)(a) (West Supp. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 22-18-5 (Michie Supp. 1997); TEx. 
FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.001(1)(C) (West 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-401(3) (1995); 
WASH. REv. CODE § 26.44.015 (1996); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.45 (West 1996 & Supp. 
1997). 
Some states have also indicated acceptance of "reasonable" parental corporal pun-
ishment by judicial decision. See, e.g., State V. Arnold, 543 N.W.2d 600, 602-03 (Iowa 
1996) ("[P]arents have a right to inflict corporal punishment on their child, but that 
right is restricted by moderation and reasonableness."); Carpenter V. Commonwealth, 
44 S.E.2d 419, 423 (Va. 1947) ("Courts are agreed that a parent has the right to ad-
minister such reasonable and timely punishment as may be necessary to correct 
faults in his growing children."). 
Minnesota also appears to have a statute allowing parental corporal punishment of 
children. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.06, subd. 1(6) (West Supp. 1998) (allowing rea-
sonable force "when used by a parent, guardian, teacher or other lawful custodian of a 
child or pupil, in the exercise of lawful authority, to restrain or correct such child or 
pupil"); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.379 (West 1987) (same). For this reason, 
commentators often incorrectly include Minnesota among the states authorizing such 
punishment. See Letter from Victor I. Vieth, Senior Attorney, National Center for 
Prosecution of Child Abuse, to Nadine Block, Director, Center for Effective Discipline 
(Oct. 29, 1997) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). How-
ever, Minnesota precludes the use of reasonable force, including corporal punishment, 
as a defense to assault charges. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.379 (West 1987 & Supp. 
1998) (allowing for the use of reasonable force as a defense for certain criminal of-
fenses, not including assault); see also Victor I. Vieth, Corporal Punishment in the 
United States: A Call for a New Approach to the Prosecution of Disciplinarians, 15 J. 
JUV. L. 22,41-45 (1994) !hereinafter Vieth, Corporal Punishment] (detailing Minne-
sota's statutory scheme vis-A-vis corporal punishment of children); infra Part I.H. The 
result is that "it is a crime to employ physical discipline in Minnesota." Vieth, Corpo-
ral Punishment, supra, at 42 n.160. 
It is interesting to note that in 1991, a bill was introduced in the Wisconsin legisla-
ture which, had it been enacted, would have prohibited any person responsible for a 
child's welfare from subjecting the child to corporal punishment. See H.R. 799, 1991-
92 Leg. (Wis. 1991). 
6. See Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act of 1995, S. 984, 104th Congo § 3 
(1995) (providing for parents' right to direct the upbringing of their children and sub-
suming therein a parental right of "disciplining the child, including reasonable 
corporal discipline"). The bill died in the Senate Judiciary Committee. See Telephone 
Interview with Bryce Sandler, Finance Director for Congressman Joseph Knollenberg 
(Sept. 18, 1997). 
Over the past two and one-half years, a movement has also been under way to per-
suade 28 state legislatures to adopt a parental rights amendment that would give 
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Because parentally administered corporal punishment is a 
long-standing and pervasive practice, it, in particular, is as-
sumed to be sacrosanct. Until recently, it did not even occur to 
many Americans that a practice so ingrained and common-
place could be misguided.7 Indeed, while most psychologists, 
pediatricians, social workers, and other experts in child devel-
opment have questioned the wisdom of corporal punishment of 
children,8 the legal community has tended to string with the 
lay mainstream and has remained virtually impervious to the 
debate insofar as it involves punishment in the family. Legal 
scholarship in particular has been, with a few exceptions, re-
markably silent.9 This Article is intended to throw down the 
intellectual gauntlet, not just to recruit converts to this 
author's point of view, but also, more humbly, to nudge the 
academy into giving the subject fuller and more objective scru-
tiny. 
Reassessment of corporal punishment of children is 
politically sensitive and evocative of related controversial issues, 
circumstances which make it easy to ascribe an unintended 
breadth to the ~pic undertaken here. Before proceeding further, 
parents a seemingly absolute right to raise and educate their children without state 
governmental interference. See Mark Frankel & Larry Reibstein, Family: Who's 
Hands-On, Who's Hands-Off? The Parental Rights Amendment, NEWSWEEK, July 8, 
1996, at 58. Adding such a right to state constitutions would, no doubt, further 
strengthen parents' prerogative to physically punish their offspring. However, as of 
July, 1996, the parental rights amendments had not yet been adopted in any state and 
had been defeated in Kansas, North Dakota, and Virginia. See id. It was also more 
recently defeated in Colorado. See Robert Kowalski, Voters Reject Parental-Rights 
Measure, DENY. POST, Nov. 6, 1996, at Al. 
7. See STRAUS, supra note 2, at 11 ("Corporal punishment is so commonly ac-
cepted that it is taken for granted, an unremarkable and almost imperceptible part of 
the lives of parents and children."); see also Herman, supra note 2, at 2 (describing 
Americans as desensitized to the use of corporal punishment on children). But see 
STRAUS, supra note 2, at 33 (discussing surveys showing some decline in the frequency 
and severity of such punishment from 1975 to 1985). 
8. See infra notes 347-48 and accompanying text. 
9. Credit is due to Dean M. Herman who wrote a ground breaking law review 
article in 1985 critiquing the legality of parental corporal punishment of children. 
Herman, supra note 2. The Herman piece was ahead of its time and represents a ma-
jor contribution. There are very few other American law review articles dealing 
primarily with the legal status of parental corporal punishment of children from the 
perspective of law professionals. See Edwards, supra note 5; Kearney, supra note 5; 
Vieth, Corporal Punishment, supra note 5; Scott A. Davidson, Note, When Is Parental 
Discipline Child Abuse?-The Vagueness of Child Abuse Laws, 34 U. LoUISVILLE J. 
FAM. L. 403, 405-19 (1996); Dennis Alan Olson, Comment, The Swedish Ban of Cor po-
ral Punishment, 1984 BYU L. REv. 447 passim (1984); cf Murray A Straus & Carrie 
L. Yodanis, Corporal Punishment by Parents: Implications for Primary Prevention of 
Assaults on Spouses and Children, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. RoUNDTABLE 35 (1995) 
(discussing parental corporal punishment from the sociologist's point of view). 
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therefore, it is essential to avoid any misunderstanding by 
distinguishing what this Article does and does not profess to do. 
First, this Article does not presume to attribute all of the ills of 
childhood or of society at large to corporal punishment of 
children. The world is too complex to assign anyone cause as 
the sole source of adversity. Instead, the approach here is to 
treat such punishment as a highly significant and frequently 
unacknowledged factor contributing to humanity's more 
destructive characteristics and tendencies. 10 
Second, this is not an article advocating permissiveness in 
raising or educating children. Like many experts on child psy-
chology, this author accepts the notion that adults must set 
limits for children and that children should be taught to ad-
here to those limits. ll The intent here is to examine policy and 
law reform with respect to only one form of discipline--
physical chastisement. 
Third, this is not an article about child abuse as that term is 
traditionally conceived. My concern instead is with subabuse 
corporal punishment. "Subabuse," as used here, is not meant 
to imply that there is nothing abusive about "reasonable" 
spanks or smacks; Part III of this Article, in fact, demonstrates 
the contrary. Rather, "subabuse corporal punishment" is used 
to signify attacks on the body of the child, in the name of dis-
cipline or guidance, that are not extreme enough to be 
prosecutable under child abuse or child cruelty statutes. The 
term "sub abuse corporal punishment," which will be employed 
interchangeably with "corporal punishment," may thus be de-
fined for purposes of this Article as follows: the currently 
nonprosecutable (in the United States) use of physical force 
with the intention of causing a child to experience bodily pain 
so as to correct, control, or punish the child's behavior. 12 
Fourth, the primary focus of this Article will be on corporal 
punishment administered by parents or other custodians of 
the child in the family context. One reason for this emphasis is 
that the legality of corporal punishment in the schools has 
10. See infra notes 391-405 and accompanying text. 
11. See PENELOPE LEACH, YoUR GROWING CHILD: FROM BABYHOOD THROUGH 
ADOLESCENCE 205-08, 211-13, 217 (1996) (defining the proper nature and role of dis-
cipline as affected by the variable of a child's age); SEARS & SEARS, supra note 1, at 
158-59; BENJAMIN sPOCK, DR. SPOCK ON PARENTING 145-53 (1988) (denying that lack 
of corporal punishment amounts to permissive parenting); ALICE MILLER, FOR YOUR 
OWN GoOD: HIDDEN CRUELTY IN CHILD-REARING AND THE RoOTS OF VIOLENCE 177 
(1990) (rejecting permissiveness in child rearing). 
12. This formulation is derived in large measure from Professor Murray A. 
Straus' definition of corporal punishment. See STRAUS, supra note 2, at 4. 
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already received substantial attention from American legal 
scholars. 13 The other reason for this delimitation is that 
banning corporal punishment of children by parents or 
guardians raises constitutional concerns that are unique to the 
family and that still await analytical study. However, this 
emphasis should not be taken to signal the acceptability, from 
a policy standpoint, of subabuse corporal punishment of 
children in the schools or in any other milieu. Most of the 
policy reasons elaborated in Part III of this Article for 
prohibiting corporal punishment of children in the family 
apply equally well to corporal punishment of children 
elsewhere. Indeed, this author advocates the abolition of all 
corporal punishment of children and proposes a model statute 
to that end. 
The main purpose of this Article, then, is to question the 
advisability of continuing the legalized status of subabuse 
corporal punishment of children in the United States, 
especially when that punishment is administered by parents 
or guardians. It is an undertaking that necessarily entails 
discussion of the relevant psychological, sociological, and 
ethical considerations as well as a proposal for legal reform, 
matters that have been covered in less depth in other law 
reviews. Perhaps more significantly, this Article also presents 
a new framework for analysis by providing a survey of how the 
13. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Alexander & Paul Horton, Ingraham v. Wright: A 
Primer for Cruel and Unusual Jurisprudence, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 1305, 1326-49, 1382-
93, 1399-1403 (1979); Gerard J. Clark, Ingraham v. Wright and the Decline of Due 
Process, 12 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1151 (1978); Cynthia Price Cohen, Beating Children Is 
as American as Apple Pie, HUM. RTS., May, 1978, at 24; Cynthia Price Cohen, Freedom 
from Corporal Punishment: One of the Human Rights of Children, N.Y.L. SCH. HUM. 
RTS. ANN. 95, 101-11 (1984) [hereinafter Cohen, Corporal Punishment); John Dayton, 
Corporal Punishment in Public Schools: The Legal and Political Battle Continues, 89 
Enuc. L. REp. 729 (1994); Cecelia M. Espenoza, Good Kids, Bad Kids: A Revelation 
About the Due Process Rights of Children, 23 HAsTINGS CaNST. L. Q. 407, 425-27 
(1996); Donald H. Henderson, Constitutional Implications Involving the Use of Corpp-
ral Punishment in the Public Schools: A Comprehensive Review, 15 J. L. & Enuc. 255 
(1986); Joan L. Neisser, School Officials: Parents or Protectors? The Contribution of a 
Feminist Perspective, 39 WAYNE L. REv. 1507, 1522-25, 1530, 1542, 1546-47 (1993); 
Parkinson, supra note 4; Cary W. Purcell, Limiting the Use of Corporal Punishment in 
American Schools: A Call for More Specific Legal Guidelines, 13 J. L. & Enuc. 183 
(1984); Irene Merker Rosenberg, A Study in Irrationality: Refusal to Grant Substan-
tive Due Process Protection Against Excessive Corporal Punishment in the Public 
Schools, 27 Hous. L. REv. 399 (1990); Irene Merker Rosenberg, Ingraham v. Wright: 
The Supreme Court's Whipping Boy, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 75 (1978); Jacqueline A. 
Stefkovich, Students' Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights After Tinker: A Half 
Full Glass?, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 481, 507-08 (1995); Michael Wells & Thomas A. 
Eaton, Substantive Due Process and the Scope of Constitutional 7brts, 18 GA. L. REv. 
201,216, 219-21, 252-57 (1984). 
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international community has addressed the issue and an 
examination of whether criminalizing corporal punishment of 
children would pass muster under the U.S. Constitution. 
The Article is divided into four parts that elaborate and de-
velop these themes. Part I surveys statutes enacted in Sweden, 
Denmark, Norway, Finland, Austria, and Cyprus, as well as a 
judicial decision by Italy's highest court, expressly prohibiting 
subabuse corporal punishment of children by their parents or 
other caretakers. 14 Part I also provides a discussion of Minne-
sota statutes precluding corporal punishment as a defense to 
assault charges. 15 Part II reviews various international human 
rights instruments that may be interpreted to support the 
prohibition of corporal punishment of children as a matter of 
international law. Part III describes the psychological, socio-
logical, and ethical reasons that make prohibition an advisable 
policy change. Part III includes a proposed statute criminaliz-
ing all use of corporal punishment on children and a 
discussion as to why criminal law measures, in tandem with 
prosecutorial restraint, posttrial or postplea diversion, and a 
society-wide education campaign, are likely to be the most effi-
cacious means of diminishing the use of such punishment. 
Finally, Part IV identifies and responds to objections that are 
likely to be raised under the U.S. Constitution against the pro-
posed statutory criminalization of corporal punishment of 
children in the family setting. 
I. LAws IN OTHER COUNTRIES AND IN MINNESOTA 
PROHIBITING CORPORAL PuNISHMENT OF CHILDREN 
Of the six countries that have enacted statutes prohibiting 
all corporal punishment of children, four countries have lived 
with these laws for ten years or more.16 Sweden's statute has 
been on the books for over seventeen years.17 The circum-
stances surrounding this longevity are cause for reassurance 
14. Judge Leonard Edwards has included Poland as among the countries that 
have legislatively prohibited all corporal punishment of children. See Edwards, supra 
note 5, at 1018. As of this writing, however, Poland has not yet taken such a step. See 
Letter from Professor Adam Lopatka, The Institute of Law Studies of the Polish 
Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland (Mar. 8, 1996) (on file with the University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
15. See infra notes 155-70 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 19, 51, 63-64, & 77 and accompanying text. 
17. See infra note 19 and accompanying text. 
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that such legal reform need not be viewed with trepidation. 
During these years, none of the enacting countries has re-
pealed its statute or experienced a backlash, even though the 
prohibition has governed tens of millions of parents and chil-
dren. Indeed, family life, parental authority, and the rule of 
law have continued to undergird the·social and political struc-
tures of these countries much as they do elsewhere in the 
absence of war or natural catastrophe. 
A. Sweden 
Sweden became the first country in the world to ban all cor-
poral punishment of children18 by enacting a statutory 
prohibition in 1979 that extended to parents and guardians, 
among others.19 The statute, as amended in 1983, provides as 
follows: "Children are entitled to care, security and a good up-
bringing. They shall be treated with respect for their person 
and their distinctive character and may not be subject to cor-
poral punishment or any other humiliating treatment.,,20 
School personnel also are forbidden by Swedish law from using 
corporal punishment on students.21 
Prior to the 1979 legislation, Sweden had a long tradition of 
corporal punishment in the family context.22 Although the 
Swedish Parliament had made steady progress toward 
restricting this tradition by legal reform during the 1950s and 
18. See PETER NEWELL, CHILDREN ARE PEoPLE Too: THE CASE AGAINST 
PHYsICAL PuNISHMENT 67 (1989); Dennis A Olson, Comment, The Swedish Ban of 
Corporal Punishment, 1984 BYU L. REv. 447, 447. 
19. 6 kap. 1§ para. 2 fOriildrabalken (Swed.) [Swedish Children and Parents Code 
ch. 6, § 1, 'I[ 21 (Swedish Ministry of Justice trans.) (stating that "[tlhe parent or 
guardian shall exercise necessary supervision in accordance with the child's age and 
other circumstances" and that "[tlhe child may not be subjected to physical punish-
ment or other injurious or humiliating treatment"), quoted in NEWELL, supra note 18, 
at 73. 
20. 6 kap. 1§ foriildrabalken [Swedish Children and Parents Code ch. 6, § 11 
(Swedish Ministry of Justice trans.). 
21. See Letter from Goran Hakansson, Permanent Undersecretary, Swedish 
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, to the author (May 6, 1997) (on file with the 
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Letter from Katja Leven, attorney 
with the law firm of Lagerlof & Leman, Stockholm, Sweden, to Nicholas J. Stasevich 6 
(May 30, 1996) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) 
!hereinafter Leven Letterl. 
22. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 70-73; Olson, supra note 9, at 447-52; Adri-
enne Ahlgren Haeuser, Swedish Parents Don't Spank, 63 MOTHERING 42, 42, 44 
(1992). 
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1960s, including repeal of a statutory provision allowing 
reprimands, the perception continued among a substantial 
number of Swedes that their laws condoned such punishment.23 
In 1977, the Swedish Parliament established the Commission 
on Children's Rights comprised of lawyers, psychologists, 
psychiatrists, politicians, and others, that undertook to study 
the feasibility of adopting an express prohibition of all corporal 
punishment of children so as to clarify the law.24 The Com-
mission found subabuse corporal punishment to be deleterious 
to children's well-being and recommended an explicit ban.25 
When the bill which ultimately became the 1979 law was 
submitted to the Parliament, it was supported by all political 
parties and passed by a vote of 259 to Six.26 
The ban on corporal punishment of children by parents and 
others acting on the parents' behalf does not, on its face, provide 
for any legal sanctions in case of violation. It appears that the 
Swedish Parliament enacted the law without express reference 
to sanctions because the lawmakers conceived of the prohibition 
as having its primary effect by influencing societal attitudes 
rather than by more immediately deterring individuals with the 
threat of penalties or liability.27 Literature distributed to the 
public by the Swedish government emphasizes that ''while the 
purpose of the new legislation is indeed to make it quite clear 
that spanking and beating are no longer allowed, it does not 
aim at having more parents punished than hitherto.,,28 
23. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 71; Olson, supra note 9, at 448-51. For a fuller 
history of the legal status of corporal punishment of children in Sweden before the 1979 
reform, see NEWELL, supra note 18, at 70-73; SIMONE EK, RAnDA BARNEN [SWEDISH SAVE 
THE CHILDREN], THE FIRST ANTI-SPANKING LAw IN THE WORLD 1-5 (1994) (presented as a 
paper before the UN. Committee on the Rights of the Child on Oct. 10, 1994 in Geneva, 
Switzerland); Klaus A Ziegert, The Swedish Prohibition of Corporal Punishment: A Pre-
liminary Report, 45 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 917,919 (1983); Adrienne A Haeuser, Reducing 
Violence Towards US. Children: Transferring Positive Innovations from Sweden 1~17 
(1988) (unpublished report of study visit to Sweden May 14 through June 16, 1988 in 
fulfillment of a grant award from the US. Department of Health and Human Services) 
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
24. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 71; Olson, supra note 9, at 451; Ziegert, supra 
note 23, at 919. 
25. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 71-73; Olson, supra note 9, at 451; Ziegert, supra 
note 23, at 919. 
26. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 73. 
27. See id. at 74-75, 80; SWEDISH MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, CAN You BRING UP 
CHILDREN SUCCESSFULLY WITHOUT SMACKING AND SPANKING? (1979) (example of an 
attempt to influence social attitudes towards corporal punishment); Haeuser, supra note 
22, at 44; Olson, supra note 9, at 453-54; Ziegert, supra note 23, at 920. 
28. SWEDISH MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 27. 
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Nevertheless, the possibility exists that violators of the ban 
on corporal punishment may be prosecuted under the provi-
sion of Sweden's penal code criminalizing assaults.29 This is 
true even if the corporal punishment is not severe-even if it 
is a solitary smack-provided that the punishment results in 
some bodily injury, illness, or bodily pain for the child. 30 
Moreover, if a parent is prosecuted for assaulting the child, it 
is conceivable that the child could state a viable claim for 
damages under the penal code if injury accompanies breach of 
the child's bodily integrity.31 It should be emphasized, however, 
that although prosecuting parents or other caretakers for cor-
porally punishing children under the assault statute is a real 
option in Sweden, prosecutors almost invariably exercise re-
straint by electing not to prosecute.32 
29. The assault provision of Sweden's criminal code provides: 
A person who inflicts bodily injury, illness or pain upon another or renders him 
unconscious or otherwise similarly (sic] helplessness, shall be sentenced for as-
sault to imprisonment for at most two years or, if the crime was petty, to pay a 
fine or to imprisonment for at most six months. 
3 kap. 5 § brottsbalken (Swed.) [Chapter 3 Sec. 5 of the Swedish Penal Code] (Nat'l 
Swedish Council for Crime Prevention & Katja Leven trans.) (quoted in Leven Letter, 
supra note 21); see also Herman, supra note 2, at 16-17 (stating that if a parent in-
flicts pain of more than a "very minor and temporary nature" on a child through 
corporal punishment, "the parent is subject to prosecution under Sweden's criminal 
assault statute"). 
30. See Telephone Interview with Goran Hakansson, Permanent Undersecretary, 
Swedish Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (July 19, 1996); Herman, supra note 2, 
at 16-17; cf NEWELL, supra note 18, at 81 (describing Swedish authorities' assault 
prosecution of a father for spanking his son); Ziegert, supra note 23, at 920 (noting 
that the threat of prosecution hangs over parents who would spank in Sweden). Some 
writers have had the evident misconception that parents in Sweden may not be prose-
cuted for inflicting subabuse corporal punishment on their children because the ban 
on corporal punishment mentions no possibility of criminal penalties. See Haeuser, 
supra note 23, at 18; Olson, supra note 9, at 453-55; Straus & Yodanis, supra note 9, 
at 65. 
31. See Interview with Goran Hakansson, Permanent Undersecretary, Swedish 
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, in Dublin, Ireland (Aug. 21, 1996). The relevant 
section of the Swedish Penal Code states: "Aside from sanction, and in accordance 
with appropriate statutory provisions, a crime may incur forfeiture of property, a com-
pany fine or some other special consequence defined by law and may also incur 
liability for the payment of damages." 1 kap. 8§ brottsbalken [Swedish Penal Code ch. 
I, § 8] (Nat'l Swedish Council of Crime Prevention trans.). Indeed, Mr. Hakansson 
raised the possibility that in the future Swedish law may be construed to allow the 
child monetary recovery under Swedish Penal Code ch. I, § 8 for breach of bodily in-
tegrity where there has been no injury. See Interview with Goran Hakansson, supra. 
32. See Elizabeth Ann Gibbons, Note, Surveying Massachusetts' Child Abuse 
Laws: The Best Protection for Children?, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 107, 144 (1992) 
(mentioning that prosecution of parents for corporally punishing their children is 
rare in Sweden); Interview with Goran Hakansson, supra note 31; Leven Letter, 
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The legal repercussions for a parent who violates the ban on 
corporal punishment are not necessarily limited to prosecution 
for assault. An offending parent also could run the risk of los-
ing custody of the child in a divorce case if the parent's use of 
corporal punishment entails a lasting danger to the child's 
health or development.33 A parent would not be denied custody 
solely on the basis that the parent corporally punished his or 
her child, but the fact that a parent used such punishment 
would be a serious consideration in awarding custody. 34 
supra note 21 (reporting that her research turned up only one prosecution of a par-
ent for mild corporal punishment of a child). 
33. The pertinent language of the Swedish Child and Parent Code provides in 
relation to the custody of the child: 
If; when exercising custody of a child, a parent is guilty of abuse or neglect or is 
otherwise wanting in his or her care of the child in a manner which entails an 
enduring risk to the child's health or development, the court shall make a deci-
sion changing the custody position. 
Questions concerning a change of custody position as provided in this section 
shall be considered on the application of the social welfare committee or, of the 
court's own motion, in a divorce case between the parents or some other case 
referred to in Section 5 or 6. 
6 kap. 7§ forlildrabalken [Swedish Children and Parents Code ch. 6, § 7) (Swedish 
Ministry of Justice trans.). 
The Swedish Social Welfare Committee, referred to in the above quoted statutory 
provision, is obliged to act so as to ensure that children are brought up in a safe and 
good environment, as follows: 
The social welfare committee shall endeavor to ensure that children and young 
persons grow up in good and secure conditions, act in close co-operation with 
families to promote the comprehensive personal development and the favour-
able physical and social development of the children and young persons, and 
ensure that children and young persons in danger of developing in an undesir-
able direction receive the protection and support they need and, if their best 
interests so demand, are cared for and brought up away from their own homes. 
12§ socialtjanstlagen [The Social Services Act § 12, Swedish Code of Statutes) (Int'l 
Secretariat of the Swedish Ministry of Health and Social Affairs & Katja Leven trans.) 
[hereinafter Swedish Social Services Act). 
Accordingly, the Committee is empowered to initiate judicial proceedings to arrange 
for the care of a child whose health or development is jeopardized by physical pun· 
ishment. Swedish statutory law states that, "A care order is to be made it; due to 
physical abuse, exploitation, deficiencies of care or some other circumstance in the 
home, there is a palpable risk of the young person's health or development being im-
paired." 2§ lagen med slirskilda bestlimmelser om vArd av unga [Swedish Care of the 
Young Persons Act (Special Provisions) § 2) (lnt'l Secretariat of the Swedish Ministry 
of Health and Social Affairs trans.). 
34. See Telephone Interview with GOran HAkansson (July 19, 1996), supra note 30. 
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The Swedish experience with the legal prohibition of 
corporal punishment of children is more interesting and 
perhaps more significant than that of any other country 
because the prohibition has been law for so long-for over 
seventeen years. Contrary to some expectations, Swedish 
prosecutors have not hauled hordes of parents into court at the 
behest of children alleging illegal corporal punishment. As 
mentioned above, the Swedish policy in relation to such 
parental conduct is one of prosecutorial restraint. It appears 
that during the entire period since 1979 less than a handful of 
prosecutions have involved situations where the corporal 
punishment was not severe, i.e., not what would normally be 
considered child abuse in the United States.3S In keeping with 
the apparent legislative intent, the Swedish government has 
primarily relied upon the pedagogic effect of the legal 
prohibition of corporal punishment, enhancing the law's 
effectiveness with a massive education campaign36 and with 
extensive support services designed to minimize family stress 
and conflict. 37 
Data is available tracking the effect of the prohibition and 
education campaign on the incidence of corporal punishment 
of children. Statistics Sweden, on contract with the Swedish 
Department of Social Welfare, conducted one survey in the 
spring of 1994, and another during the spring of 1995, on 
adults' and middle school-age children's opinions, knowledge, 
. and experience of corporal punishment in the familial 
context.38 Taken together, the surveys show that 70% of middle 
school-age children and 56% of adults oppose all forms of 
physical punishment of children.39 Another 22% of adults 
oppose all forms of physical punishment in principle but admit 
to using such punishment if they are overwrought.40 Thus, 78% 
35. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 81; Haeuser, supra note 22, at 44. For exam-
ple, among the few isolated prosecutions one 1986 case involved a father charged with 
punishing his son by whipping him with a bundle of twigs. The whipping caused some 
redness on the boy's hips and buttocks. The father was found guilty of assault, but, 
because the court considered the crime to be petty, the father was fined rather than 
imprisoned. See RH 1986: 163 (Swedish Court of Appeal), cited in Leven letter, supra 
note 21, at 3. 
36. See EK, supra note 23, at 1; NEWELL, supra note 18, at 73-77; Haeuser, supra 
note 23, at 18-19; Ziegert, supra note 23, at 922-23. 
37. See Haeuser, supra note 23, at 26, 28-29. 
38. See STATISTICS SWEDEN, DEMOGRAPHY, THE FAMILY AND CHILDREN, SPANKING 
AND OTHER FORMS OF PHYsICAL PuNISHMENT: A STUDY OF ADULTS' AND MIDDLE 
SCHOOL STUDENTS' OPINIONS, ExPERIENCE, AND KNOWLEDGE (1996). 
39. See id. at 7, 8. 
40. See id. at 8. 
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of all Swedish adults have become convinced that corporal 
punishment of children is unacceptable. The policy against 
corporal punishment appears to have been most persuasive 
with those proportionally longest under its sway, since the 
surveys show that more young adults (between the ages of 18 
and 34) are against spanking than older adults (between the 
ages of 55 and 74),,1 In keeping with this attitudinal shift, the 
surveys found overall "a strong decrease in the use of physical 
punishment" in Sweden.42 Specifically, the surveys found that 
roughly 30% of middle school-age students reported having 
been exposed to parental corporal punishment before they 
became teenagers.43 In contrast, a 1979 survey shows that 
about half of all Swedish parents surveyed spanked their 
children. 44 
What makes these findings particularly intriguing is that 
the decreasing use of corporal punishment has occurred even 
as Swedes have rejected the permissive child rearing with 
which they apparently experimented from the late 1940s to 
the early 1980s.45 It appears that at least since 1988, Swedish 
parents have shown a greater predilection for disciplining 
their children, but mainly by methods other than corporal 
punishment.46 For example, Swedish parents are encouraged to 
control their children by talking and reasoning.47 Other 
favored techniques include sending a child to his or her room 
or depriving the child of privileges.48 The 199411995 surveys 
found that most people think that deprivation of privileges, 
such as a weekly allowance, is the preferable form of 
punishment.49 For preverbal infants and toddlers, Swedes do not 
generally believe in punishment and avoid the need for 
restraints by "childproofing" the home into a safe environment. 50 
41. See id. at 7. 
42. See id. at 15. 
43. See id. 
44. See id. 
45. See Haeuser, supra note 23, at 22-24. 
46. See id. at 24; STATISTICS SWEDEN, supra note 38, at 12. 
47. See Haeuser, supra note 23, at 31-33. 
48. See id. at 32. 
49. See STATISTICS SWEDEN, supra note 38, at 13. 
50. See Haeuser, supra note 23, at 33. 
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B. Finland 
The prohibition of corporal punishment of children in the 
family was enacted in 1983 as part of a general overhaul of 
Finnish law governing children. 51 The prohibition states: ''A 
child shall be brought up with understanding, security and 
gentleness. He shall not be subdued, corporally punished or 
otherwise humiliated. The growth of a child towards inde-
pendence, responsibility and adulthood shall be supported and 
encouraged. "52 The ban was adopted unanimously and almost 
without debate, and went into effect on January 1, 1984.53 It 
should be noted that corporal punishment of children in the 
schools had long been outlawed when the 1983 law was passed 
and continues to be impermissible under modern Finnish laws 
governing education. 54 
Matti Savolainen, a member of the Finnish Ministry of Jus-
tice who was responsible for drafting the 1983 prohibition, has 
made clear that three strategies for stopping corporal punish-
ment are contemplated by virtue of the prohibition, including 
criminal penalties: 
Firstly the Act attempts to establish certain "positive" 
guidelines for the upbringing of the child. Secondly the 
Act makes it absolutely clear that all violations against 
the child's integrity (whether "physical" or "spiritual") 
which would constitute a criminal offence if committed by 
a third person (e.g. assault, unlawful imprisonment, libel, 
51. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 87. 
52. Laki lapsen huollosta ja tapaamisoikeudesta, 1 luku, 1§, 3 mom. [Finnish 
Child Custody and Right of Access Act, ch. 1, § 1, subsec. 3] (Finnish Dep't of Legisla-
tion, Ministry of Justice trans.). 
53. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 86--87 (stating that the lack of controversy 
may have been due to the fact that the new prohibition was part of a comprehensive 
overhaul of children's law and that public attention was diverted by other controver-
sial measures in the proposed reform legislation). 
54. The legal prohibition of corporal punishment in Finnish schools dates back to 
the nineteenth century. See id. at 87. In the twentieth century, the prohibition was 
again made law in 1914. See NAdig Forordning hvarigenom anvandandet afkroppslig 
bestraffning vid liiroverken fcjrbjudes, 6 juni 1914124. [Finnish Gracious Ordinance, 
whereby the use of corporal punishment in the schools is banned, June 6, 1914124] 
(replaced by Kansakoululaki, 1.7.1957/247 [Finnish Act on Primary Schools, July 1, 
1957/247] (Isabella Riska trans.), which continued the ban). In the 1980s, Finland 
reenacted the school ban, stating that "[c]orporal punishment in comprehensive 
schools is forbidden." See Peruskoululaki, 5 luku, 42§. [Finnish Act on Comprehensive 
Schools ch. 5, § 42] (Isabella Riska trans.). 
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slander, etc.) are equally punishable even when commit-
ted by a parent with the intent to discipline the child. And 
under the Criminal Code even a petty assault committed 
against a child under 15 is subject to public prosecution 
when committed by a parent at home. Thirdly the Act ex-
plicitly forbids also any degrading treatment ... even 
where such an act would not constitute a criminal offence 
and even if there are no other direct legal remedies avail-
able.55 
In accordance with this intent, it is understood that if par-
ents violate the ban they may be prosecuted for assault under 
Finland's penal code.56 For example, in one case, Finland's Su-
preme Court found a guardian to be guilty of petty assault 
because the guardian corporally punished a child by pulling 
his hair and slapping his fingers. 57 The Court stated that 
[T]he purpose of the provision [the prohibition of corporal 
punishment of children] was to confirm that the guardian 
has no longer a right to corporally punish his child and 
that the provision on petty assault in the Penal Code, 
Chapter 21, Section 7, shall be applied when parents or 
55. NEWELL, supra note 18, at 87 (quoting Matti Savolainen of the Ministry of 
Justice in Helsinki, Finland). 
56. See id. at 89. Parents or guardians who corporally punish their children also 
violate the following provisions of Finland's penal code: 
A person who employs physical violence on another or, without such violence, 
damages the health of another, causes pain to another or renders another un-
conscious or to a comparable condition, shall be sentenced for assault to a fine 
or to imprisonment for at most two years. 
An attempt shall be punished. 
Rikoslaki, 21 luku, 5§ [Finnish Penal Code ch. 21, § 5) (Finnish Ministry of Justice 
trans.). 
Even petty assaults by parents upon the child in the name of childrearing will con-
travene the Penal Code, which states: "If the assault, when assessed as a whole and 
with due consideration to the minor character of the violence, the violation of physical 
integrity, the damage to health or other relevant circumstances, is of minor character, 
the offender shall be sentenced for petty assault to a fine." See Finnish Penal Code ch. 
21, § 7 (Finnish Ministry of Justice trans.). In this regard, the Penal Code also pro-
vides that "[t)he Public Prosecutor shall not bring charges for petty assault, if the 
victim has attained the age of fifteen years, nor for negligent injury, unless the com-
plainant reports the offence for the bringing of charges." See id. ch. 21, § 16. 
57. See Memorandum from Isabella Riska, Attorney, Roschier-Holmberg & 
Waselius, Helsinki, Finland, to Nicholas J. Stasevich 4 (June 25, 1996) (on file with the 
Uniuersity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (describing Korkeimman oikeuden 
ratkaisuja [Decision of the Highest Court of Finland) 1993: 151, Helsinki 1994, at 685). 
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guardians employ physical violence on their child, even if 
they consider it a means of upbringing. 58 
Parents who violate the prohibition of corporal punishment 
may also be sued for damages either in conjunction with an 
assault prosecution or in an independent action when the par-
ent is not the subject of criminal charges. 59 In addition, it is 
possible under Finnish law that parental use of corporal pun-
ishment on children may be a factor that influences judicial 
awards of custody. 60 
The Finnish government has not been content to rely only 
upon the law to effectuate reform. The government has also 
conducted a nationwide campaign to educate adults about 
better ways to correct children than by using corporal 
punishment.61 For example, Finnish authorities have utilized 
television spots to urge parents to use reasoned discussion as a 
substitute for physical chastisement.62 
58. See id. 
59. A child who has suffered corporal punishment at a parent's hands may, in 
conjunction with pressing criminal charges, bring a civil suit for damages against the 
parent under the following statutory provisions. First, "[a] civil law claim based on an 
offence may be presented in the same connection where punishment or a confiscatory 
sanction is demanded on the basis of the offence. If such a civil law claim is presented 
in a separate action, the provisions on proceedings in civil law shall apply." 
Oikeudenkaymiskaari 1734/4, 14 luku, 8§ [Finnish Code of Judicial Procedure ch. 14 
§ 8] (Finnish Ministry of Justice trans.). Second, 
If it becomes evident in the investigation of a criminal case that the act referred 
to in the charges is not an offence, or if for another reason no punishment is 
imposed for the act, a civil law claim presented in the case may nonetheless be 
considered or the consideration of the claim be continued in the manner stipu-
lated for the consideration of civil cases. 
[d. § 11. 
Conceivably a child subjected to corporal punishment by a parent could also have 
monetary redress alone under a statutory provision that states: "Any person who, 
either wittingly or through negligence, causes prejudice to any other person shall pay 
compensation for the prejudice so caused, save as otherwise provided in this Act." See 
Vahingonkorvauslaki,2 luku, 1§, 1 mom. [Finnish Compensation for Damages Act ch. 
2, § 1, subsec. 1] (English translation obtained from Legislative Series 1974 of the 
Finnish Int'l Labour Office). 
60. See Letter from Isabella Riska, Attorney, Roschier-Holmberg & Waselius, 
Helsinki, Finland, to the author 3 (July 26, 1996) (on file with the University of Michi-
gan Journal of Law Reform). 
61. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 87-89. 
62. See id. at 88-89. 
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C. Denmark 
In 1985, Denmark became the third Scandinavian country 
to enact a law directed against corporal punishment of chil-
dren in the family context.63 The law, which became effective 
on January 1, 1986,64 provided that "Parental custody implies 
the obligation to protect the child against physical and psy-
chological violence and against other harmful treatment.,,65 On 
May 28, 1997, the law was amended to delete that language 
and substitute the following: "The child has the right to care 
and security. It shall be treated with respect for its personality 
and may not be subjected to corporal punishment or any other 
offensive treatment."66 Denmark has also banned corporal 
punishment in the schools.67 
Unlike its Swedish and Finnish counterparts, the earlier 
Danish statute dealing with parental corporal punishment 
was geIterally understood to be precatory.68 It did not totally 
abolish parents' right to inflict corporal punishment as a child 
63. The measure against corporal punishment of children in the family was 
originally contained in an amendment to the Danish Majority Act. See Myndighed-
sloven nr. 443 af. 3 Sept. 1985,jf. § 7, stk. 2 [Danish Majority Act no. 443, § 7, subsec. 2 
(Sept. 3, 1985)] (Kromann & Miinter trans.); NEWELL, supra note 18, at 91. 
64. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 91. 
65. Lov nr. 387 af 14. juni 1995 om foraeldremyndighed og samvaer, jf. § 2, stk. 2 
[Danish Act on Parental Custody and Conviviality no. 387, § 2, subsec. 2 (June 14, 
1995)] (revision of 1985 law) (Kromann & Miinter trans.), quoted in NEWELL, supra 
note 18, at 91. 
66. Lov nr. 416 om aendring af lov om foraeldremyndighed og samvaer § 1 
[Danish Act to Amend the Act on Parental Custody and Conviviality no. 416 § 1] 
(Kromann & Miinter trans.). 
67. See Bekendtg~relse nr. 276 af 14. juni 1967, om fremme af god orden i skol-
erne, jf. § 8 [Danish Order No. 276 Concerning the Promotion of Order in the Schools 
§ 8 (June 14, 1967)]. The current ban provides: 
Subsection 1. Corporal punishment may not be used. Subsection 2. To avoid 
that students lay violent hands on others or destroyO or damage gods [sic], it is 
permitted to use force to such an extent as the circumstances may require. 
Bekendtgorelse nr. 27 om foranstaltninger til fremme af god orden i folkeskolerne, jf. 
§ 8, stk 1 og 2 [Danish Order No. 27 Concerning Measures for the Promotion of Order 
in the Public Schools § 8] (Kromann & Miinter trans.). 
68. "In principle, the meaning of the statute is 'only' to signalize [sic] to the pub-
lic, that parents ought rather to refrain from corporally punishing their kids." Letter 
from J~rn Vestergaard, Assoc. Professor, Inst. of Criminology and Criminal Law, Uni-
versity of Copenhagen to author 2 (July 1996) (on file with the University of Michigan 
Journal of Law Reform). 
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rearing technique.69 Indeed, the defense of "lovig revselse"-
legally inflicted punishment-was still available in Danish 
courts to parents and other custodians of the child for adult 
conduct which might otherwise have come within penal code 
provisions on assault.70 Nor was this simply a matter of judi-
cial interpretation since the explanatory remarks to the 1985 
bill manifest a legislative intent to refrain from intruding on 
the parental right to inflict "minor" or "light" corporal punish-
ment.7l 
This equivocality engendered a continuing debate among 
Danish politicians and academics as to whether their country 
should strengthen the 1986 law. 72 The result is the 1997 
amendment, which is regarded by its authors and other 
experts as completely prohibiting all corporal punishment of 
children. 73 Similar to the situations in Sweden and Finland, 
violators of the law may be prosecuted under the Danish 
Criminal Code for assault and battery or other related 
crimes. 74 Nevertheless, "[t]here will be no intensified or 
69. See id. passim. 
70. See id. at 1. 
71. See id. Professor Vestergaard notes that a minority in the Danish Parliament 
sought abolition of the parental right to use corporal punishment on children; he 
characterizes the parliamentary debate as "rather confused." See id. at 2. 
72. See id.; see also Telephone Interview with Goran Hakansson, supra note 30. 
73. The legislators who introduced the bill which became the 1997 amendment 
indicate, in the accompanying explanatory remarks submitted to the Danish Parlia-
ment, that the amendment is intended to have a prohibitory effect. See Margrethe 
Auken, Anne Baastrup, Steen Gade & Villy Sllvndal, Explanatory Notes to Bill No. 
213 passim (Apr. 2, 1997) (Kromann & Miinter trans.); see also Letter from Jllm 
Vestergaard, Assoc. Professor, Inst. of Criminology and Criminal Law, University of 
Copenhagen, to author 1 (July 3, 1997) (on file with the University of Michigan Jour-
nal of Law Reform) [hereinafter Vestergaard Letter 7/3197] (interpreting the new 
provision as forbidding parents from "smacking" their children). 
74. Parents may be prosecuted under the following provisions: 
Sec. 213. Any person who, by neglect or degrading treatment, insults his 
spouse, his child or any of his dependants under the age of 18 or any person to 
whom he is related by blood or marriage in lineal descent, or who by deliber-
ately evading his duties to maintain or contribute to the maintenance of any 
such persons, exposes them to distress shall be liable to imprisonment for any 
term not exceeding 2 years or, in mitigating circumstances, to simple detention. 
Sec. 244. Any person who commits violence against, or otherwise attack[sl the 
person of others shall be liable to a fme, simple detention or imprisonment not 
exceeding 1 year and 6 month[sl. 
Sec. 245. Subsec. 1. Any person who commits assault or battery which is excep-
tionally brutal, cruel or dangerous or are [sicl guilty of maltreatment is liable to 
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excessive action taken by law enforcement or social welfare 
authorities to monitor ordinary families['] private lives.,,75 
Apparently, the Danes expect that the 1997 revision will be 
used primarily for its educational impact in gradually 
persuading parents to relinquish corporal punishment as a 
disciplinary technique.76 
D. Norway 
Joining the other Scandinavian countries in the effort to end 
corporal punishment of children, in 1987 Norway passed a 
statute providing that "[t]he child shall not be exposed to 
physical violence or to treatment which can threaten his 
physical or mentai health.,,77 This more general measure is 
complemented by a statute forbidding corporal punishment of 
students in Norwegian schools. 78 
The 1987 law is prohibitory rather than precatory,79 al-
though it also appears to be subject to certain limited 
imprisonment not exceeding 4 years. Subsec. 2. The same applies for any per-
son who outside subsection 1 injures the body or health of others. 
Sec. 246. Where the act of violence covered by Section 245 has been of such se-
rious character or has entailed (such] serious consequences that there are 
particularly aggravating circumstances the penalty may be increased to impris-
onment for 8 years. 
Straffelov Dr. 886, §§ 213, 244, 245, 246 (Danish Criminal Code no. 886, §§ 213, 244, 
245, 246] (Kromann & Munter trans.); see also Letter from Jl!lrn Vestergaard, Associ-
ate Professor, Institute of Criminology and Criminal Law, University of Copenhagen, 
to author 1 (July 22, 1997) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law 
Reform) (agreeing that "corporal punishment is now criminalized as an assault and 
battery, according to exactly the same criteria as if the victim were somebody else 
than the child"). 
75. Vestergaard Letter 7/3/97, supra note 73, at l. 
76. See id. 
77. Endring i 1987 av barnelovens § 30,3. ledd (Lov av 6.februar 1987 nr 11 om 
endring i barneloven § 30) (Norwegian Parent and Child Act art. 30, § 3, as amended 
by the Amending Act no. 11, Feb. 6, 1987] (Finn Erik Engzelius trans.). 
78. Lov om grunnskolen nr. 24, § 16, 4. ledd !Norwegian School Act no. 24, art. 
16, § 4]. 
79. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 95; Telephone Interview with Mlilfrid Grude 
Flekkl!ly, Interim Director, Division of Families and Global Change, Institute for Fami-
lies in Society, University of South Carolina (July 9, 1996). But cf Letter from Johan 
Felix Lous, Executive Officer, Norwegian Royal Ministry of Children and Family Af-
fairs, to author 4 (Oct. 30, 1995) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of 
Law Reform) ("The provision does not authorise sanctions. Beyond defining a mini-
mum norm for parental responsibility, the rule can therefore hardly be said to have 
any direct judicial significance."). It should be noted that Mlilfrid Grude Flekkl!lY was 
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exceptions.80 The prohibition is conceived primarily as peda-
gogical in operation-as achieving its objective by shaping 
Norwegian norms on the subject.81 That conception is reflected 
in the language of the act which does not prescribe any penal-
ties or liability for those who might violate its terms. 
It is understood, though, that until parental attitudes and 
behavior conform to the ban, children may have recourse to 
legal remedies under certain of Norway's other laws. For ex-
ample, parents who corporally punish their children may be 
prosecuted for assault and related crimes under Norway's 
Criminal Act if the punishment results in bodily manifesta-
tions such as bruises.82 The Norwegian government may 
additionally prosecute such parents under a statutory prohibi-
tion against neglect or maltreatment (mental or physical) of 
persons belonging to the parents' household, including chil-
dren.83 A basis also exists in Norwegian law for a tort action to 
be brought on behalf of a child against his or her parent for 
serious bodily injuries, if any, or for pain and suffering in con-
nection with an injury caused by parentally administered 
the Norwegian Ombudsperson for Children from 1981 to 1989, the period during 
which Norway's statute prohibiting parental corporal punishment of children was 
debated among Norway's legislators and ultimately enacted. See Telephone Interview 
with Miilfrid Grude Flekk0y, supra. She was a key figure in lobbying the Norwegian 
Parliament to adopt the statute. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 94-95. 
80. The various sources which I consulted were at some variance concerning 
whether there are any exceptions to Norway's ban on corporal punishment of chil-
dren. Compare NEWELL, supra note 18, at 95 (intimating that the ban is absolute) and 
Telephone Interview with Miilfrid Grude Flekk0y, supra note 79 (advising that the 
only exception is that parents are allowed to physically restrain children from harm-
ing themselves or others) with Letter from Finn Erik Engzelius, of the law firm of 
Thommessen Krefting Greve Lund, Oslo, Norway, to Nicholas Stasevich 4 (May 21, 
1996) [hereinafter Engzelius Letter 5/21196] (on file with the University of Michigan 
Journal of Law Reform) (suggesting that the ban does not preclude a parent from 
giving "light slaps" or from physically restraining children to prevent harm to them-
selves or others). 
81. See Telephone Interview with Miilfrid Grude Flekk0y, supra note 79; Letter 
from Johan Felix Lous, supra note 79, at 4. 
82. The provision on assault states that "[a]ny person who commits violence 
against the person of another or otherwise assails him bodily, or is [an] accessory 
thereto, is guilty of assault and shall be liable [for] fines or imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding six months." See Straffeloven av 22.mai 1902 nr. 10, § 228 [Norwegian 
Criminal Act art. 228, § 1] (Finn Erik Engzelius trans.). A related provision states: 
"Any person who injures another in body or health or reduces any person to helpless-
ness, unconsciousness or any similar state, or who is [an] accessory thereto, is guilty 
of occasioning bodily harm and shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceed-
ing three years .... " Straffeloven av 22.mai 1909 nr. 10, § 229 [Norwegian Criminal 
Act art. 229] (Finn Erik Engzelius trans.); see also Interview with Miilfrid Grude 
Flekk0y, Chief Psychologist, Nic Waals Institute for Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 
Oslo, Norway, in New Orleans, La. (Feb. 15, 1997). 
83. See Letter from Johan Felix Lous to author, supra note 79, at 2-3. 
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corporal punishment.84 As of spring, 1996, this possibility has 
been of only academic interest; no tort cases have actually 
been brought in Norwegian courts on behalf of children 
against their parents to recover damages for parental corporal 
punishment.85 Finally, parental use of corporal punishment, 
even if it is mild, may be a factor influencing the outcome of 
custody disputes.86 
E. Austria 
In 1989, the Austrian Parliament, by unanimous vote,87 en-
acted a law which provides that "[t]he minor child must follow 
the parents' orders. In their orders and in the implementation 
thereof, parents must consider the age, development and per-
sonality of the child; the use of force and infliction of physical 
or psychological harm are not permitted."88 Although the law 
itself provides no legal remedies for the physically punished 
child,89 the intent behind the enactment is to bar all corporal 
84. The language of Norway's tort laws makes it possible that children could sue 
their parents to recover damages for corporal punishment under certain circum-
stances. See Engzelius Letter 5/21/96, supra note 80, at 3; Letter from Finn Erik 
Engzelius, of the law firm of Thommessen Krefling Greve Lund, Oslo, Norway, to 
author 3 (June 6, 1996) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Re-
form) [hereinafter Engzelius Letter 6/6/96]. A pertinent statute provides: 
Whoever, acting willfully or by gross negligence has (a) caused injury to a per-
son ... may be sentenced to pay the offended party such a lump sum that the 
court will hold to represent a just compensation ... for the pain and suffering 
and other aggrievances or harm of non-economic nature that was inflicted upon 
him .... 
Lov om skadeserstatning av 13. juni 1969 nr. 26, § 3-5 [Norwegian Tort Act no. 26, 
arts. 3-5] (Finn Erik Engzelius trans.). For example, if in administering physical disci-
pline the parent willfully or by gross negligence were to cause injury to the child, it is 
conceivable that a tort suit would lie against the parent. 
85. See Engzelius Letter 5/21/96, supra note 80, at 3; Letter from Johan Felix 
Lous to author, supra note 79, at 1. 
86. See Letter from Finn Erik Engzelius, of the law firm of Thommessen Krefting 
Greve Lund, Oslo, Norway, to author 1-2 (July 24,1996) (on file with the University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
87. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 68. 
88. § 146a ABGB [Austrian Civil Code § 146a] (Berlitz Translation Services 
trans.). 
89. See Interview with Dr. Werner Schutz, Executive Public Prosecutor and Sec-
tion Head of the Section on Int'l Family Law, Austrian Ministry of Justice, in Vienna, 
Austria (June 24, 1996); Interview with Dr. Michael Stormann, Executive Public 
Prosecutor and Section Head of the Section on Nat'l Family Law, Austrian Ministry of 
Justice, in Vienna, Austria (June 24, 1996). 
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punishment of children by parents or guardians.90 As in the 
Scandinavian countries, Austria also has legislation prohibit-
ing corporal punishment of students in the schools.91 
To a large extent, the 1989 law represents a logical progres-
sion rather than a sudden departure from statutory precedents. 
In 1977, Austria repealed an explicit authorization of parents 
to corporally punish their children. Austrian civil law experts 
believed that this repeal meant that all parental corporal 
punishment of children had been forbidden except to restrain 
a child in an emergency situation.92 However, other experts 
disagreed that the repeal had had such an effect, and the 1989 
express prohibition was, in part, a response to this confusion;93 
it was hoped that the 1989 reform would produce consistency 
in judicial decisions on this issue.94 There have, however, been 
no reported decisions applying the 1989 law except a decision 
by the Supreme Court of Austria which interpreted the prohi-
bition to deny continuation of custody to a divorced parent who 
had been using corporal punishment that caused no bodily in-
jury as a child rearing method.95 Interestingly, in that case the 
father who lost custody was found to have been involved with 
his children and otherwise to have attended to their needs.96 
However, he "believes in strict discipline, expects respect and 
absolute obedience from his sons and demands that they not 
engage in self-pity, but bear pain like men. He ... struck them 
on several occasions when they 'made trouble.,,097 The court 
found that this repeated striking of the children, combined 
with an authoritarian and exacting approach to child rearing, 
90. See Interview with Dr. Werner Schutz, supra note 89; Interview with Dr. Mi-
chael Stormann, supra note 89. 
91. See § 47/3 Schulunterrichtsgesetz [Austrian Teaching Act § 47/3] (Berlitz 
Translation Services, trans.) (declaring that "[c]orporal punishment . .. [is] forbid-
den"); see also Interview with Dr. Michael Stormann, supra note 89 (stating that the 
Teaching Act is good law). 
92. See Interview with Dr. Michael Stormann, supra note 89. 
93. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 68; Interview with Dr. Michael Stormann, su-
pra note 89. 
94. See Interview with Dr. Michael Stormann, supra note 89. 
95. OGH 6/2411992, 1 Ob 573/92 (Berlitz Translation Services trans.); see also 
Erwin Bernat, Austria: Legislation for Assisted Reproduction and Interpreting the Ban 
on Corporal Punishment, 32 U. LoUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 247, 252-53 (1993-94) 
(describing this decision). Some jurists are of the opinion that the high court did not 
apply the 1989 law correctly in this case. See Interview with Dr. Michael Stormann, 
supra note 89. 
The Austrian legal system does not require that other Austrian courts follow deci-
sions by the Austrian Supreme Court. See id. 
96. See OGH 6/2411992, 1 Ob 573/92. 
97. Id. 
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violated Austria's ban on corporal punishment and, therefore, 
warranted awarding custody to the mother. 98 
Despite the dearth of reported cases, there is still the possi-
bility that a parent who violates the 1989 prohibition may be 
subject to prosecution under a number of provisions of the 
Austrian penal code for the equivalent of assault and battery 
and related crimes.99 This is more of a possibility than a reality 
for Austrian parents because, like many of the Scandinavian 
countries, Austria enacted the prohibition mainly for its edu-
cational effect.l°O In any event, prosecution will not be initiated 
unless the corporal punishment is serious and produces some 
evidence on the child's body of perpetration.101 There is also a 
98. See id. 
99. See DMSION FOR CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, AUSTRIAN FED. MINISTRY FOR YOUTH 
AND FAMILY AFFAIRS, INITIAL REPORT OF AUSTRIA IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 44 OF 
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 66,68-70 (1996) (on 
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); see also Interview with 
Dr. Michael Stormann, supra note 89; Letter from Dr. Kurt Heller, of the law firm of 
Heller, Lober, Bahn & Partners, Vienna, Austria, to Nicholas J. Stasevich 2-3 (May 28, 
1996) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter 
Heller Letter 5/28/961. 
For example, a parent violating the 1989 law could be prosecuted under a penal 
code provision which states: 
1. Any person who physically injures another or harms his [or her1 
health shall be sentenced to a prison term of up to six months or a 
fine of up to 360 days pay. 
2. Any person who physically abuses another and negligently injures 
him as a result or harms his health shall also be sentenced. 
§ 83 Abs 1-2 StGB [Austrian Penal Code § 83 parts 1-21 (Berlitz Translation Services 
trans.). 
Such a parent could also face possible prosecution under another penal code provi-
sion, which states in pertinent part: 
1. Any person who inflicts physical or psychological suffering on an-
other, who is under his care or custody and who has not yet 
completed his 18th year or who is defenseless because of infirmity, 
illness or mental deficiency, shall be sentenced to a prison term of 
up to three years. 
2. Any person who grossly neglects his duty of custody or care for 
such a person and as a result, even when also only negligent, con-
siderably harms his health or his physical or mental development 
shall also be sentenced. 
§ 92 Abs 1-2 StGB [Austrian Penal Code § 92 parts 1-21 (Berlitz Translation Services 
trans.). 
100. See Interview with Dr. Michael Stormann, supra note 89. 
101. DMSION FOR CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, supra note 99, at 66; Interview with Dr. 
Werner Schutz, Executive Public Prosecutor and Section Head of Section on Int'l 
Family Law, Austrian Ministry of Justice, in New Orleans, La. (Feb. 15, 1997). 
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statutory basis for bringing a civil suit against offending par-
ents for causing physical injury or mental anguish.102 
Austrian policy against corporal punishment of children re-
lies heavily upon social services and education as well as upon 
the law. In order to assist parents who have difficulty refrain-
ing from corporal punishment or otherwise properly meeting 
their child rearing obligations, the government has instigated 
the establishment, among other support services, of child rear-
ing counseling in Youth Welfare Departments, child protection 
centers, a "child helpline," and a children's ombudsman. lOS Both 
children and adults may contact the ombudsman "to make 
suggestions and lodge complaints" about mistreatment of chil-
dren, including the use of corporal punishment. 104 While the 
emphasis is on the prevention of any violence against chil-
dren,105 steps also have been taken to ensure that children who 
are exposed to violence receive medical and psychological care.106 
Since the enactment of the prohibition on corporal punish-
ment of children "there has been no rush of children reporting 
their parents to the police for smacking them. State interven-
tion in family life has certainly not increased as a result of the 
new law ... .',107 Instead, the 1989 ban on corporal punishment 
and concomitant social services network appear to be under-
mining the social acceptability of such punishment without 
prosecutorial intervention. A study commissioned by the Aus-
trian Federal Ministry of the Environment, Youth and the 
Family indicates that as of the early 1990s, "67.5% of mothers 
and 68.8% of fathers categorically reject serious corporal pun-
ishment (beatings) as a means of education.,,108 
102. The action would be brought under a statute providing that "[a]nyone in-
jured is entitled to demand reparations from the injuring party for damage that the 
latter is guilty of having inflicted." § 1295 Abs 1 ABGB [Austrian Civil Code § 1295/1] 
(Inter-Lingua trans.); see DMSION FOR CmLDREN'S RIGHTS, supra note 99, at 70; see 
also Heller Letter 5/28/96, supra note 99, at 2. The word "injured" is used in the stat-
ute to mean physical injury and/or mental anguish. See Letter from Dr. Kurt Heller, of 
the law firm of Heller, LOber, Bahn & Partners, Vienna, Austria, to author 1-2 (July 
11, 1996) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
103. DMSION FOR CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, supra note 99, at 67-69. 
104. See id. at 68. 
105. See id. 
106. See id. at 70. 
107. Dr. Werner Schiitz, Lecture at the Conference to End Physical Punishment of 
Children (EPOCH) Worldwide (Mar. 30, 1992) (transcript on file with the University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
108. DMSION FOR CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, supra note 99, at 67. 
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F. Cyprus 
Cyprus is the sixth nation to have outlawed corporal pun-
ishment of children in the home. In June, 1994, the Cypriots 
passed a bill entitled, "Prevention of Violence in the Family 
and Protection of Victims Law.,,109 The Cypriot law not only 
prohibits parental use of any force against children but also 
makes it an offense for violent behavior to take place in the 
presence of minor members of the family: 
3.(1) For the purposes of this Law violence means any 
unlawful act or controlling behavior which results in di-
rect actual physical, sexual or psychological injury to any 
member of the family and includes violence used for pur-
poses of sexual intercourse without the consent of the 
victim as well as for [the] purpose of restricting its liberty. 
(3) Any act or behavior constituting violence within the 
meaning of subsections (1) and (2) above or constituting 
an offense under sections 174, 175 and 177 of the Crimi-
nal Code, if it takes place in the presence of minor 
members of the family shall be considered as violence ex-
ercised against the said minor members of the family 
likely to cause them psychological injury and such act or 
behavior constitutes an offense punishable under subsec-
tion (4) of this section. 110 
The 1994 law makes clear that parents or other family 
members who engage in the proscribed conduct may be prose-
cuted and, if convicted, may be sentenced to fines and/or 
incarceration. 111 
109. Act of June 17, 1994, Law 147(1), OFFICIAL GAZETI'E OF THE REpUBLIC OF 
CYPRUS NO. 2886 (Leonidas Markides, Embassy of the Republic of Cyprus trans.). 
110. [d. at § 3(1), (3). 
111. See id. § 4(1) ("When violence is used by one member of the family against 
another, [it) shall be considered for purposes of this Law as particularly aggravated, 
and the Court ... may impose increased penalties ... ."). 
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G. Italy 
On May 16, 1996, Italy's highest court, the Supreme Court 
of Cassation, issued a decision prohibiting all parental use of 
corporal punishment on children as a child rearing tech-
nique. U2 In this decision the court announced as a new 
juridical principleu3 that "the use of violence for educational 
purposes can no longer be considered lawful. "U4 
The case arose when Natalino Cambria took to repeatedly 
subjecting his ten-year-old daughter, Danila, to heavy beat-
ings, purportedly to correct her behavior. us He would hit or 
kick the girl for lying, for getting bad grades, or for almost any. 
failure to live up to her father's standards.u6 Cambria's prose-
cution was heard in the first instance by the Magistrate of 
Como-Menaggio who found the accused guilty of the crime of 
abuse of the means of correction-"abuso dei mezzi di correzi-
one"-under article 5 71 of the Italian Penal Code.117 On 
112. Cambria, Cass., sez. VI, 18 marzo 1996, [Supreme Court of Cassation, 6th 
Penal Section, Mar. 18, 1996], Foro It. II 1996, 407 (Italy) (Translation by Triangle 
Translations on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Susan 
H. Bitensky, Final Straw: 7b Spank or Not to Spank?, Cm. TRm., July 25, 1996, § 1, at 
25; Italian Court: Don't Hit Kids, DET. FREE PRESS, May 20, 1996, at 4A [hereinafter 
Italian Courtl. 
113. Judge Francesco Ippolito, who wrote the opinion for the court in this case, 
explained that the principle that parents or other custodians of the child may not use 
corporal punishment is a juridical principle having the force of law; putting the point 
in American legal terminology, the court's statement of principle is not merely dictum. 
See Interview with Judge Francesco Ippolito, Judge of the Corte Suprema di Cassazi-
one, Republica Italiana, in Rome, Italy (June 11, 1996). 
114. Cambria, Foro It. II 1996 at 411, Translation at 4; see also Bitensky, supra 
note 112, at 25. 
115. See Cambria, Foro It. II 1996 at 409, Translation, at 2-3; see also Interview 
with Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra note 113; Bitensky, supra note 112, at 25; Italian 
Court, supra note 112. 
116. See Cambria, Foro It. II 1996 at 409, Translation at 2; see also Interview with 
Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra note 113; Bitensky, supra note 112, at 25. 
117. See Cambria, Foro It. II 1996 at 408, Translation, at 1, '11. Article 571 states 
as follows: 
Whoever misuses means of correction or discipline to harm a person subject to 
his authority, or entrusted to him for purposes of education, instruction, treat-
ment, supervision or custody, or by reason of his practice of a profession or 
craft, shall be punished, if the act results in the risk of physical or mental ill-
ness, by imprisonment for up to six months. 
If the act results in personal injury, the punishments prescribed in Articles 582 
and 583 shall be applied, reduced by one-third; if it results in death, imprison-
ment for from between three and eight years shall be imposed. 
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November 23, 1995, the Milan Court of Appeals convicted 
Cambria for ill-treatment-"maltrattamenti in famiglia 0 
verso fanciulli"--of his daughter under article 572 of the Ital-
ian Penal Code1l8 rather than for abuse of the means of 
correction. 119 
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Italy, Cambria argued, 
among other things, that since the beatings did not cause "the 
danger of a physical or mental illness" as required for a convic-
tion under article 571, he should not have been found guilty of 
abuse of the means of correction at the first judicial level; 120 he 
further argued that the appeals court should not have con-
victed him of ill-treatment because he lacked the requisite 
intent to mistreat a child, having administered the beatings 
only with the purpose of correcting Danila's wayward behav-
ior.121 Indeed, Cambria accused the Milan Court of Appeals of 
"'rampant permissiveness.' ,,122 
The Supreme Court of Italy rejected Cambria's defenses and 
upheld his conviction for ill-treatment towards a child under 
article 572 of the Italian Penal Code.123 The Court explained 
that article 571 of the Italian Penal Code could not apply to 
Cambria's case because that provision is triggered only when a 
legitimate means of correction is used abusively. The Court 
CODICE PENALE [C.p.] art. 571 (Italy), translated in THE ITALIAN PENAL CODE 190-91 
(Edward M. Wise & Allen Maitlan trans., 1978). 
118. The provision making ill-treatment a crime states as follows: 
Whoever, apart from the cases specified in the preceding Article, maltreats a 
member of his family or a person under the age of fourteen years, or a person 
subject to his authority, or entrusted to him for purposes of education, instruc-
tion, treatment, or supervision or custody, or by reason of his practice of a 
profession or trade, shall be punished by imprisonment for from one to five 
years. 
If the act results in serious personal injury, imprisonment for from four to eight 
years shall be imposed; if it results in very serious injury, imprisonment for 
from seven to fifteen years; if it results in death, imprisonment for from twelve 
to twenty years. 
C.p. art. 572. 
119. See Cambria, Foro It. II 1996 at 408, Translation at 1; see also Interview with 
Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra note 113. 
120. See Cambria, Foro It. II 1996 at 409, Translation, at 2; see also Interview 
with Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra note 113. 
121. See sources cited supra note 120. 
122. Cambria, Foro It. II 1996 at 409, Translation at 2. 
123. See id. at 409, 412, Translation at 3, 6. 
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reasoned that corporal punishment, regardless of how it is 
used, cannot be a legitimate means of correction. 124 
"The Cambria case involved the systematic use of serious 
violence against a child."l25 However, the court's ruling was by 
no means confined to those facts. According to Judge Ippolito, 
who wrote the opinion on behalf of the Italian Supreme Court, 
the judges "considered the case as an opportunity to establish 
the legal principle that parents in Italy are absolutely forbid-
den from using any violence or corporal punishment to correct 
their children's conduct."126 That is why, in addition to affirm-
ing Cambria's conviction for ill-treatment, the Court laid down 
as a juridical principle, effective throughout Italy, that violence 
may never be used on children for educational purposes. 127 The 
ruling is most significant as it relates to familial corporal 
punishment since even before the Cambria case Italy had 
outlawed corporal punishment in the schools. 128 
What considerations prompted the Court to take this dra-
matic step? Judge Ippolito explained that the Cambria case 
represents the culmination of ongoing legal reforms and politi-
cal and cultural changes since the end of Benito Mussolini's 
fascist dictatorship over Italy in 1945.129 Judge Ippolito ob-
served that in the 1930s and early 1940s, Italian courts, as a 
matter of course, interpreted the country's penal code based on 
the authoritarian and hierarchical structure of the family that 
124. See id. at 411, Translation at 4 ("[T]he crime committed cannot be said to be 
the one described in article 571 because the means of correction used were unlawful 
both in terms of their nature and in terms of the potential damage they could in-
flict."); see also Interview with Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra note 113 (noting that 
the Supreme Court wanted to make the point that physical punishment absolutely 
cannot be used to correct or educate a child). 
125. Bitensky, supra note 112; see Interview with Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra 
note 113. 
126. See Bitensky, supra note 112 (quoting from Interview with Judge Francesco 
Ippolito, supra note 113); see also Italian Court, supra note 112. 
127. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. Judge Ippolito explained that 
lower courts in Italy are theoretically free to ignore the Supreme Court's enunciation 
of the new juridical principle forbidding all corporal punishment of children. (The 
Italian judiciary does not formally observe stare decisis.) However, the judge empha-
sized that as a practical matter the new principle is considered the law throughout 
Italy because the other Italian courts adhere to the rulings of the Supreme Court 
unless the lower courts can give very strong reasons for distinguishing the cases be-
fore them. See Interview with Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra note 113. 
128. See Interview with Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra note 113. 
129. See id. Benito Mussolini's dictatorship brought fascism to Italy during the 
period from 1922 to 1945 and made Italy a member of the Axis in World War II. See 
David I. Kertzer, Italy, in 10 THE WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 496, 517 (1993) 
[hereinafter WORLD BOOK]; R. John Rath, Mussolini, Benito, in 13 WORLD BOOK, 
supra, 967, 967. 
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prevailed at that time. 1so During this period, the father was the 
head of the family and almost completely dominated his wife 
and children.131 In keeping with this model of family relations, 
the courts interpreted article 571 of the Penal Code as allow-
ing the father to use virtually any means of "correcting" his 
.~ d hild 132 wIle an c reno 
Judge Ippolito noted that as Italy moved away from fascism, 
it also moved away from the concept of the authoritarian 
father. 133 This movement was reflected in legal innovations 
such as the inclusion in Italy's 1948 Constitution of various 
provisions protecting the dignity of the individual as an 
inalienable right. l34 Likewise, the Constitution also contains 
provisions assuring equal protection, 135 including provisions 
specifically recognizing that marriage must be "based on the 
moral and legal equality of husband and wife."136 Judge 
Ippolito stated that the Justices in the Cambria case 
understood these legal and historical trends also in light of the 
fact that the Italian Constitution repudiates war or the use of 
violence to settle international disputes. 137 
In the 1950s, Italy's Supreme Court decided that the Consti-
tution's provisions on equality in the marital relationship 
barred the use by husbands of any means of correction, physi-
calor otherwise, against their wives. 138 In 1975, Italy's 
Parliament enacted measures to conform the nation's family 
laws to the provisions of the Constitution protecting each per-
son's dignity, equality, and right to be free of violence. 139 In 
addition, between 1975 and 1995, the Supreme Court of Italy 
130. See Interview with Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra note 113. 
131. See id. 
132. See id. 
133. See id. 
134. See, e.g., COST. [Constitution) arts. 2, 3, 32, 36, 41 (Italy), translated in Gis-
berth H. Flanz, Italy, in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. 
Blaustein & Gisberth H. Flanz eds., 1987) [hereinafter COST.); Interview with Judge 
Francesco Ippolito, supra note 113 (discussing constitutional provisions). 
135. See, e.g., COST. arts. 3, 37; Interview with Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra 
note 113 (discussing constitutional provisions). 
136. COST. art. 29. See also Interview with Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra note 
113 (discussing constitutional provisions). 
137. See COST. art. 11; Interview with Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra note 113 
(discussing constitutional provisions). 
138. See Interview with Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra note 113. 
139. See, e.g., CODICE CIVILE [C.C.) art. 147 (Italy), translated in 1 THE ITALIAN 
CIVIL CODE AND COMPLEMENTARY LEGISLATION 44 (Mario Beltramo et al. trans., 1991) 
(defining the duties of parents to their children, including the duty to "maintain, 
educate and instruct the children ... taking into account their ability, natural 
inclinations and aspirations"). 
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issued a series of decisions that had the effect of further limiting 
the use of force against children in institutional settings. 140 
These domestic reforms were paralleled by developments in 
the international law that governs Italy. In Italy, the constitu-
tional court has long recognized treaties as superior to the 
Italian Constitution and other Italian laws. 141 Thus, the judges 
who decided the Cambria case were influenced not only by the 
Italian Constitution and the evolution of Italian family law, 
but also by human rights treaties--especially the U.N. Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child142 to which Italy is a party.143 
Judge Ippolito reported that, in interpreting Italy's penal code, 
he and the other judges of the Supreme Court were especially 
swayed by the preamble and articles 2, 3, 18 and 19 of the 
Convention.1« Specifically, the court's opinion relies upon the 
preamble's recognition of children's need to develop "full[y] 
and harmonious[ly]" and to be brought up "in the spirit ... of 
peace, dignity, tolerance, freedom, equality, and solidarity";145 
upon article 2's nondiscrimination principle;146 upon article 3's 
140. See Interview with Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra note 113. 
141. See id. 
142. U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, G.A Res. 44125, 
U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. AlRESl44I25 (1989) !hereinafter Convention of 
the Child]. 
143. See Interview with Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra note 113. Italy entered 
into the Convention of the Child on September 5, 1991. See Status of u.N. Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, 30 I.L.M. 1780 (1991). 
144. See Interview with Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra note 113. Indeed, the 
Court's opinion specifically names article 2, article 3(1) and article 18(1), quotes from 
the preamble, and paraphrases article 2, article 3(1), article 18(1) and article 19(1) of 
the Convention of the Child. See Cambria, Foro It. II 1996 at 410, Translation at 3-4. 
145. Cambria, Foro It. 111996 at 410, Translation at 3 (omissions in original). The 
full language of the relevant portions of the preamble to the Convention of the Child 
are as follows: 
The States Parties to the present Convention 
Recognizing that the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or 
her personality, should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of 
happiness, love and understanding, 
Considering that the child should be fully prepared to live an individual life in 
society, and brought up in the spirit of the ideals proclaimed in the Charter of 
the United Nations, and in particular in the spirit of peace, dignity, tolerance, 
freedom, equality and solidarity. ... 
Convention of the Child, supra note 142, pmbl., at 3. 
146. Cambria, Foro It. II 1996 at 410, Translation at 4. The full language of this 
portion of the Convention of the Child is as follows: 
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and article 18's insistence on the primacy of the best interests 
of the child;147 and upon article 19's prohibition on the use of 
. I . t hild 148 VIO ence agams c reno 
Judge Ippolito stated that the Court in the Cambria case 
looked to all of these sources-the Italian Constitution, Italian 
civil law, and the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child-
to interpret Italy's penal code in a way that would undo the 
basis of violence against children.149 In the judges' view, all of 
these sources as well as modern Italian values made it clear to 
the Court that in order finally to address the problem in a 
meaningful way it would be necessary to forbid any violence 
against children as a method of instruction or child rearing. 150 
Judge Ippolito admitted that, in spite of the Court's ruling 
in the Cambria case, enforcement could prove difficult because 
Italian children do not presently have the right of "denouncing" 
to authorities so as to initiate prosecution; rather, an adult 
States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Con-
vention to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any 
kind, irrespective of the child's or his or her parent's or legal guardian's race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or so-
cial origin, property, disability, birth or other status. 
Convention of the Child, supra note 142, art. 2(1), at 5. 
147. Cambria, Foro It. II 1996 at 410, Translation at 3-4. The full language of the 
article 3, paragraph 1 of the Convention of the Child is as follows: "In all actions con-
cerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, 
courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the 
child shall be a primary consideration." Convention of the Child, supra note 142, art. 
3(1), at 5. The full language of article 18, paragraph 1 of the Convention of the Child is 
as follows: 
States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle 
that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and devel-
opment of the child. Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, have the 
primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child. The 
best interests of the child will be their basic concern. 
Convention of the Child, supra note 142, art. 18(1), at 9. 
148. Cambria, Foro It. II 1996 at 410, Translation at 3. The full language of this 
portion of the Convention is as follows: 
States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and 
educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental 
violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or ex-
ploitation including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal 
guardian(s) or any other person who has the care ofthe child. 
Convention of the Child, supra note 142, art. 19(1), at 10. 
149. See Interview with Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra note 113. 
150. See id. 
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must denounce for the child as the child's legal representa-
tive. 151 However, the judge was optimistic about the overall 
effect of the Cambria decision insofar as it will influence fu-
ture judgments by lower courts in prosecutions that are 
brought in connection with parental corporal punishment of 
children and insofar as the Supreme Court has set an example 
for Italian jurists. 152 The judge predicted that the new juridical 
principle would "filter into society"153 as a new norm and create 
an atmosphere in which physical chastisement of children is 
not socially acceptable. 154 
H. Minnesota 
Minnesota does not have a single statute that explicitly pro-
hibits parental corporal punishment of children. Rather, the 
state's ban on such punishment must be teased out of four 
statutory provisions read together. 
Section 609.06, subdivision 1(6) of the Minnesota statutes, 
when considered by itself, actually appears to authorize paren-
tal corporal punishment of children: 
Except as otherwise provided in subdivision 2, reasonable 
force may be used upon or toward the person of another 
without the other's consent when the following circum-
stances exist or the actor reasonably believes them to 
exist: 
(6) when used by a parent, guardian, teacher or other law-
ful custodian of a child or pupil, in the exercise of lawful 
authority, to restrain or correct such child or pupiL ISS 
However, this provision must be understood in conjunction 
with section 609.379 of the Minnesota statutes, the statute 
governing reasonable force as a defense. 156 Section 609.379, 
subdivision 1(a), in its essential elements, tracks the language 
of section 609.06(6), thereby indicating that both statutes refer 
151. See id. 
152. See id. 
153. [d. 
154. See id. 
155. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.06, subd. 1(6) (West Supp. 1997). 
156. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.379 (West 1978 & Supp. 1997). 
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to the same "reasonable force.,,157 Section 609.379, subdivision 
2 further lists the crimes to which reasonable force may be as-
serted as a defense. 15s Subdivision 2 does not include assault 
among those crimes.159 Therefore, in Minnesota, reasonable 
force is not a defense to assault. 160 
This analysis still leaves the question of whether 
"reasonable" corporal punishment of children is an assault 
under Minnesota law. Section 609.224, subdivision 1(1)(2) of 
the Minnesota statutes defmes assault as an act committed 
"with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm 
or death,,161 or the actual infliction of bodily harm.162 Section 
609.02, subdivision 7 of the Minnesota statutes defmes bodily 
harm as "physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of 
physical condition.,,163 As one expert on the foregoing 
Minnesota statutes observed, "[a]pplying these statutes to acts 
of corporal punishment, it is clear that such discipline 
constitutes an assault. This is because physical punishment, at 
a minimum, involves the infliction of pain or placing the child 
in fear of pain."l64 
157. The language of Section 609.06, subdivision 1(6) should be compared to that 
of section 609.379, subdivision l(a). The latter section provides as follows: 
Subdivision 1. Reasonable force. Reasonable force may,be used upon or toward 
the person of a child without the child's consent when the following circum-
stance exists or the actor reasonably believes it to exist: 
(a) when used by a parent, legal guardian, teacher, or other caretaker of a 
child or pupil, in the exercise of lawful authority, to restrain or correct the child 
or pupil .... 
Id. § 609.379, subd. l(a). 
158. The text of section 609.379, subdivision 2, provides: "Subd. 2. Applicability. 
This section applies to sections 260.315, 609.255, 609.376, 609.378, and 626.556." 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.379, subd. 2 (West Supp. 1997). 
159. Indeed, section 260.315 concerns contributing to the need for protection or 
services or to the delinquency of a child, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.315 (West 1987); 
section 609.255 deals with false imprisonment, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.255 (West 
1987 & Supp. 1997); section 609.376 defines the terms child, caretaker, and complain-
ant, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.376 (West 1987); section 609.378 covers neglect or 
endangerment of a child, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.378 (West Supp. 1997); and section 
626.556 addresses the reporting of maltreatment of minors, MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 626.556 (West Supp. 1997). See also Vieth, Corporal Punishment, supra note 5, at 42 
& n.160 (stating that subdivision 2 of section 609.379 does not list the crime of as-
sault). 
160. See Vieth, Corporal Punishment, supra note 5, at 42 & n.160. 
161. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.224, subd. 1(1) (West 1987). 
162. See id. § 609.224, subd. 1(2). 
163. Id. § 609.02, subd. 7. 
164. Vieth, Corporal Punishment, supra note 5, at 44. 
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Thus, the reasonable force defense provided in section 
609.06, subdivision 1(6) and 609.379, subdivision l(a) is made 
inoperative by subdivision 2 of section 609.379 when parents 
are charged with assault for corporally punishing their chil-
dren. That is, if parents use "reasonable force" on a child as a 
disciplinary tactic, they may be prosecuted by Minnesota for 
assault and may not hide behind the excuse that they were 
just using "reasonable" corporal punishment. "[C]orporal pun-
ishment is considered a crime to the same extent as any 
assault" in Minnesota. 165 
Although Minnesota has lived with this prohibition on cor-
poral punishment of children for many years,l66 there are no 
reported cases of a parent being prosecuted for administering 
mild corporal punishment to children.167 As in the European 
countries that have banned corporal punishment of children, 
Minnesota has exercised prosecutorial restraint in relation to 
"minor" instances of corporal punishment. l66 
Minnesota's law on corporal punishment of children is not 
widely known either by commentators, practitioners, or the 
general pUblic. 169 This is probably due to the relative complex-
ity and obtuseness of the prohibition's provisions. 17o 
II. LEGAL STATUS OF CORPORAL PuNISHMENT 
OF CHILDREN UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw 
There is a traditional view that international human rights 
instruments should be interpreted according to a pub-
lic/private distinction. l7l Under this view, such instruments 
apply to human rights deprivations by governments and their 
agents against individuals but not to deprivations by private 
165. Letter from Victor I. Vieth to Nadine Block, supra note 5. 
166. See id. 
167. See id. 
168. See id. 
169. See Telephone Interview with Victor I. Vieth, Senior Attorney, National Cen-
ter for Prosecution of Child Abuse (Dec. 11,1997). 
170. See id. 
171. See ANDREW CIAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE 91-94 (1993) 
(discussing the traditional view of the public/private distinction in interpreting inter-
national human rights instruments); see also Celina Romany, Women as Aliens: A 
Feminist Critique of the Public I Private Distinction in International Human Rights 
Law, 6 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 87, 97-106 (1993) (describing and critiquing the pub-
lic/private distinction in human rights law from a feminist perspective). 
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individuals against other individuals. 172 For example, the tradi-
tional view would interpret language lending itself to a 
prohibition on corporal punishment as only reaching judicially 
imposed or public school corporal punishment but not paren-
tally administered corporal punishment. 
The traditional view, however, has lost much of its credibil-
ity and influence by virtue of the inclusive language of many 
post-World War II international human rights instruments.173 
The phenomenon is perhaps most strikingly manifested in the 
U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child (Convention of the 
Child) which uses language throughout the document ex-
pressly indicative of an intent to impose human rights 
obligations protective of children on both states parties and 
private actors.174 The other human rights treaties and declara-
tions discussed in Part II.B of this Article also employ 
language that, either explicitly or implicitly, obligates both the 
public and private sectors to observe human rights-an inter-
pretation reflected in the comments of the respective official 
bodies monitoring treaty compliance175 and in the scholarly lit-
erature.176 The only arguable exception is the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convention),177 but, as will 
172. See CLAPHAM, supra note 171, at 91 nn.10-11 (citations omitted). 
173. See id. at 95-104 (discussing the evolution of international human rights in-
struments from the 1946 Charter of the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg to the U.N. conventions on discrimination of the 1990s); MYRES S. 
MCDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PuBLIC ORDER 350-57 (1980); Jordan 
J. Paust, The Other Side of Right: Private Duties Under Human Rights Law, 5 MARv. 
HUM. RTS. J. 51 passim (1992). 
174. See, e.g., Convention of the Child, supra note 142, arts. 3(1) (best interests of 
the child), 18(1) (best interests of the child), 19(1) at 5, 9 (protection from abuse); see 
also CLAPHAM, supra note 171, at 101 (referring to articles 3(1) and 16 of the Conven-
tion of the Child as examples of human rights obligations imposed on the private 
sector). 
175. See infra Part II.B; see also CLAPHAM, supra note 171, at 107-11 (surveying 
the positions announced by the Human Rights Committee with respect to the applica-
tion of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to human rights 
duties of private actors). 
176. See CLAPHAM, supra note 171, at 93-133; LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A POLICy-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE 
76-78 (1989); MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 173, at 350-57; Louis Henkin, Interna-
tional Human Rights and Rights in the United States, in 1 HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 25, 36 (Theodor Meron ed., 1984); 
Paust, supra note 173, passim; Romany, supra note 171, at 97-12l. 
177. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture Convention] (entered into force for the United States 
Nov. 20, 1994). 
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be shown, even that convention is being interpreted in some 
circles as extending to private individuals' transgressions. 178 
In light of the broadly inclusive language of the provisions 
under discussion here and of the fact that there is scholarly and 
other authoritative support for repudiating the public/private 
distinction with respect to these provisions, this Article 
proceeds upon the assumption that each instrument applies to 
corporal punishment of children by parents and other private 
actors as well as to state inflicted corporal punishment. 
Indeed, a contrary reading would do violence to the very 
language and essence of these instruments. 
A. UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
Of the numerous international human rights instruments 
that may be understood to prohibit corporal punishment of 
children, the Convention of the Child presents the strongest 
case for such an interpretation. The Convention of the Child 
was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations 
on November 20, 1989.179 To date, 191 countries have become 
parties. l80 The President of the United States signed the Con-
vention of the Child on February 16, 1995,181 but, to date, 
Congress has not ratified it; thus, the United States is pres-
ently not a party to the Convention of the Child.182 
It should be pointed out that lack of ratification is not 
necessarily dispositive as to whether the Convention of the 
Child should govern the United States. Even treaties to which 
a country is not a party or particular principles set forth in 
those treaties may, under certain circumstances, constitute 
evidence of binding customary international law. l83 Factors 
178. See infra notes 263-69 and accompanying text. 
179. See UNITED NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE 
SECRETARy-GENERAL: STATUS AS AT 31 DECEMBER 1995, at 198 (1996). 
180. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, United Nations, 
N.Y. STILEGISER. E. (visited July 24, 1997) <http://www.un.org/Deptstrreaty/finallts2/ 
newfiles/part_hooliv_booliv_ll.html> [hereinafter Multilateral Treaties) (on file with 
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
181. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 179, at 199. 
182. See id. at 199; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the U.S. Presi-
dent power "to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur"). 
183. See MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 173, at 266-72; Louis Sohn, "Generally Ac-
ceptedD International Rules, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1073, 1073-74, 1077-79 (1986); Sarah 
Ramsey & Daan Braveman, "Let Them StarveD: Government's Obligation to Children 
in Poverty, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1607, 1639-42 (1995). 
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serving to signify that a treaty manifests customary 
international law include ''virtually universal participation of 
states in the preparation and adoption of international 
agreements recognizing human rights principles generally, or 
particular rights ... ."184 The Convention of the Child has 
arguably become customary international law,185 applicable 
even to non-parties such as the United States,18G because it was 
adopted by consensus of the U.N. General Assembly187 and has 
been ratified by an overwhelming majority of nations. 188 
However, even if the Convention of the Child does not gov-
ern the United States as either treaty law or customary 
international law, discussion of corporal punishment of chil-
dren would be incomplete without an analysis of highly 
pertinent provisions of the Convention. Because the Conven-
tion of the Child is regarded as applicable international law 
for most countries and is an authoritative expression of world 
opinion, it is a resource that should serve to enrich and em-
bolden consideration of the issue in the United States. 
The Convention established the Committee on the Rights of 
the Child for the purpose of monitoring compliance by the 
Customary international law is considered binding federal common law. See The 
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); Richard B. Lillich, The Constitution and 
International Human Rights, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 851, 856--58 (1989); Karen Parker & 
Lyn B. Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 HAsTINGS INT'L 
& COMPo L. REv. 411, 417 (1989). But see Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional 
Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and International Law, n VA. L. REv. lOn, 
1072 (1985) (contending that although customary international law is, as a theoretical 
matter, the law of the land, domestic courts have held that Congress has authority to 
disregard such law). 
184. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 701 rep. note 2 (1987). 
185. See Ramsey & Braveman, supra note 183, at 1641; see also Elizabeth M. Cal-
ciano, United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Will It Help Children in 
the United States?, 15 HAsTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 515, 531 (1992) (suggesting 
that while many of the rights set forth in the Convention of the Child will not be con-
sidered customary international law, some of the rights contained therein could be 
elevated to that status when considered in combination with other evidence that those 
rights constitute customary international law). 
186. See Ramsey & Braveman, supra note 183, at 164l. 
187. See GERALDINE VAN BUEREN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAw ON THE RIGHTS OF 
THE CHILD 15 (International Studies in Human Rights Vol. 35, 1995). 
188. See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 180; (asserting that by mid-1997, 191 
countries had become parties to the Convention of the Child); see also Ramsey & 
Braveman, supra note 183, at 1641 (characterizing the number of nations that have 
ratified the Convention of the Child as "a large majority"). Only the United States and 
Somalia have yet to ratify the Convention of the Child. See Multilateral Treaties, 
supra note 180. 
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treaty's parties.1s9 The Committee is considered the "authori-
tative source" with respect to interpretation of the Convention 
of the Child,190 and the Committee's understanding of the Con-
vention's meaning is, therefore, decisive. The Committee has 
.expressly taken the position that the Convention as a whole is 
inconsistent with corporal punishment of children. In an offi-
cial report issued in November, 1994, the Committee declared: 
In the framework of its mandate, the Committee has paid 
particular attention to the child's right to physical integ-
rity. In the same spirit, it has stressed that corporal 
punishment of children is incompatible with the Conven-
tion and has often proposed the revision of existing' 
legislation, as well as the development of awareness and 
education campaigns, to prevent child abuse and the 
physical punishment of children. 191 
The Committee has had occasion to articulate and elaborate 
upon this position during 1994-97 in its concluding observa-
tions following examination of progress reports submitted by 
various countries to the Committee.192 The Committee, invok-
ing a variety of the Convention's provisions or sometimes none 
in particular, has stated repeatedly in these observations that 
banning corporal punishment of children in families is essential 
in order for reporting countries to achieve treaty compliance.193 
189. See Convention of the Child, supra note 142, arts. 43(1), 44-45, at 20-22; 
Marta Santos Pais, Address at the International Seminar on Worldwide Strategies 
and Progress Towards Ending All Physical Punishment of Children (Dublin, Ireland, 
Aug. 22, 1996) (transcript on file with University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
Marta Santos Pais was one of the ten experts who served as a member of the Commit-
tee on the Rights of the Child and was also the Committee's rapporteur. 
190. See Cynthia Price Cohen, A Guide to Linguistic Interpretation of the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child: Articles 1, 4, 41 and 45, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN 
AMERICA: U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD COMPARED WITH UNITED 
STATES LAw 33, 33 (Cynthia Price Cohen & Howard A. Davidson eds., 1990). 
191. U.N. Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, Report on the Seventh Session, U.N. Doc. 
CRC/C/34, Annex IV, at 63 (Nov. 1994). 
192. See Convention of the Child, supra note 142, art. 44, at 21-22 (requiring 
states parties to submit progress reports on their compliance with the treaty's terms). 
193. See, e.g., Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child: Ethiopia, 14th Sess., 'lI 27, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.67 (1997) (recommending 
that Ethiopian legislation allowing "light bodily punishment" of children within the 
family should be abrogated "as a matter of priority"); Concluding Observations of the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child: Nepal, 12th Sess., 'lI19, U.N. Doc. 
CRC/C/15/Add.57 (1996) [hereinafter Concluding Observations on Nepal] (voicing 
concern that Nepal had not yet taken measures to prevent corporal punishment of 
children within the family); Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child: Zimbabwe, 12th Sess., 'lI18, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.55 (1996) 
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With respect to the specific provisions of the Convention of 
the Child, article 19, paragraph 1 most readily lends itself to 
[hereinafter Concluding Observations on Zimbabwe] (expressing dismay that Zim-
babwe's law tolerates corporal punishment of children in the family); Concluding 
Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Republic of Korea, 11th 
Sess., '115, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15 Add.51 (1996) (articulating concern that in the Re-
public of Korea corporal punishment is still widely regarded by parents as an 
educational measure); Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child: Germany, 10th Sess., 130, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.43 (1995) (proposing that 
Germany consider adding an absolute ban on corporal punishment to its civil code); 
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Portugal, 10th 
Sess., '115, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.45 (1995) (recommending that Portugal should 
take measure to prevent corporal punishment of children, especially in the family); 
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Senegal, 10th 
Sess., '124, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.44 (1995) [hereinafter Concluding Observations 
on Senegal] (stating that Senegal's domestic law should include a specific provision 
outlawing "any form of corporal punishment within the family"); Concluding Observa-
tions of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Ukraine, 10th Sess., 129, U.N. Doc. 
CRC/C/15/Add.42 (1995) (suggesting that the Ukraine should enact a ban on corporal 
punishment in the family); Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of 
the Child: Thnisia, 9th Sess., '117, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.31 (1995) (proposing that 
Tunisia should employ measures against corporal punishment in the family); Con-
cluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Belgium, 9th Sess., 
'I 15, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15 Add.3S (1995) (encouraging Belgium to consider legislative 
reforms ensuring the prohibition of corporal punishment within the family); Conclud-
ing Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child.: Canada, 9th Sess., 
'1'1 14, 25, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.37 (1995) (recommending that Canada prohibit 
physical punishment in the family); Concluding Observations of the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child.: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Sth Sess., 
'131, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15 Add.34 (1995) [hereinafter Concluding Observations on the 
United Kingdom] (recommending that the United Kingdom should prohibit physical 
punishment of children in families); Concluding Observations of the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child.: Poland, Sth Sess., 'I 30, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.31 (1995) 
(suggesting that Polish legislation should be reformed to reflect a prohibition on cor-
poral punishment in the family); Concluding Observations of the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child: Honduras, 7th Sess., 1 27, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.24 (1994) 
(advising Honduras to improve family education on child rearing, "including the im-
portance of avoiding the physical punishment of children"). 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child has also made statements in its con-
cluding observations that generally condemn corporal punishment of children, but 
without any special reference to the family context. See, e.g., Concluding Observations 
of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Sri Lanka, 9th Sess., I'll 15, 32, U.N. Doc. 
CRC/C/15/Add.40 (1995); [hereinafter Concluding Observations on Sri Lanka] Con-
cluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child.: Jamaica, Sth Sess., 
'17, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.32 (1995); Concluding Observations of the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child.: France, 6th Sess., 'II 24, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.20 (1994). 
Some concluding observations also criticize continued allowance of corporal punish-
ment in the schools or commend its disallowance in educational institutions, as the 
case may be. See, e.g., Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child.: Guatemala, 12th Sess., '133, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.5S (1996); Concluding 
Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child.: Lebanon, 12th Sess., 'I 37, 
U.N. Doc. CRc/C/15/Add.54 (1996); Concluding Observations on Zimbabwe, supra, at 
'I IS; Concluding Observations on Sri Lanka, supra, at '1'1 15, 32. 
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interpretation as prohibiting corporal punishment of children. 
Article 19, paragraph 1 provides: 
States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, ad-
ministrative, social and educational measures to protect 
the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, 
injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, mal-
treatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in 
the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other per-
son who has the care of the child.1M 
That article 19, paragraph 1 prohibits parental corporal 
punishment of children would seem evident as a semantic 
matter since the provision requires nations to protect children 
against "all forms of physical ... violence."195 If one adult hits 
another-even once and not so as to cause any significant in-
jury-the slap would be considered a form of violence. For, a 
''violent" action may be defmed as one "marked by extreme 
force or sudden intense activity."l96 If the slap is administered 
by a parent to his or her child, pure logic would seem to re-
quire that the inherent nature of the act does not change from 
violent to nonviolent simply because the victim is smaller, less 
powerful, and the aggressor's own flesh and blood. l97 Why else 
would article 19, paragraph 1 refer to "all forms of physical ... 
violence" in addition to "injury or abuse" unless the former 
phraseology was meant to include violent conduct that does 
not necessarily cause injury or rise to the level of conventional 
conceptions of abuse? 
While such an interpretation seems to be the plain meaning 
of the provision's text, it is not necessary to rely on dictionary 
definitions and logic to interpret article 19, paragraph 1 as 
194. Convention of the Child, supra note 142, art. 19(1), at 10. 
195. Id.; see Parkinson, supra note 4, at 278-79; Kerri A. Law, Note, Hope for the 
Future: Overcoming Jurisdictional Concerns to Achieve United States Ratification of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1851, 1858 (1994). 
196. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1316 (9th ed. 1988). The 
concept of violence also is capable of other connotations. The term may also be defined 
as "exertion of physical force so as to injure or abuse" or "injury by or as if by distor-
tion, infringement, or profanation." Id. As used in article 19, paragraph 1 of the 
Convention of the Child, however, definitions of violence that require an injury appear 
less appropriate because they make the article's reference to "forms of ... injury" a 
redundancy. See Convention of the Child, supra note 142, art. 19(1), at 10; see also 
Peter Newell, Respecting Children's Right to Physical Integrity, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE POUCY AND PRACTICE 215, 222 (Bob Franklin ed., 
1995) (stating that article 19(1) protects children from all forms of violence). 
197. See Newell, supra note 196, at 222. 
HeinOnline -- 31 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 395 1997-1998
WINTER 1998] Corporal Punishment of Children 395 
prohibiting all corporal punishment of children. The periodic 
reports which states parties are required to submit to the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child are supposed to conform 
to the Committee's General Guidelines Regarding the Form 
and Content of Periodic ReportS. 198 The guidelines, drawing 
upon the language of article 19, provide: 
Reports should indicate, in particular: 
whether legislation (criminal and/or family law) includes 
a prohibition of all forms of physical and mental violence, 
including corporal punishment, deliberate humiliation, 
injury, abuse, neglect or exploitation, inter alia within the 
family, in foster and other forms of care, and in public or 
private institutions, such as penal institutions and 
h 1 199 sc 00 s .... 
In addition, some of the Committee's concluding observations 
single out article 19 in particular as a basis for admonishing 
countries to take measures against corporal punishment of 
children. 200 
198. See General Guidelines Regarding the Form and Contents of Periodic Reports 
to Be Submitted by States Parties Under Article 44, Paragraph 1(b), of the Convention, 
U.N. GAOR, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 343d mtg., U.N. Doc. CRC/C/58 (1996). 
199. 1d. at 'I 88. 
200. See, e.g., Concluding Observations on Zimbabwe, supra note 193, at 'lI18; 
Concluding Observations on Sri Lanka, supra note 193, at 'i 32; Concluding Observa-
tions on Canada, supra note 193, at 'I 25; Concluding Observations on the United 
Kingdom, supra note 193, at 'I 3l. 
It may be predicted that proponents of corporal punishment of children will argue 
that article 5 of the Convention of the Child justifies reasonable physical chastise-
ment. Article 5 provides: 
States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights, and duties of parents or, 
where applicable, the members of the extended family or community as pro-
vided for by local custom, legal guardians or other persons legally responsible 
for the child, to provide, in a manner consistent with the evoiving capacities of 
the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the 
rights recognized in the present Convention. 
Convention of the Child, supra note 142, art. 5, at 6. 
When the United Kingdom raised this argument with the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child, a Committee member stated: 
It must be borne in mind, however, that article 19 of the Convention required 
all appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to be taken to protect 
the child against, inter alia, physical violence. A way should thus be found of 
striking the balance between the responsibilities of the parents and the rights and 
evolving capacities of the child that was implied in article 5 of the Convention. 
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Although such authoritative interpretations of article 19, 
paragraph 1 by the Committee make that provision the most 
obvious and justifiable home for an international law banning 
parental corporal punishment of children, the Committee has 
found that other discrete provisions of the Convention of the 
Child serve this purpose as well. In a lecture on the subject in 
August, 1996, Marta Santos Pais, one of the ten members of 
the Committee on the Rights of the Child at that time and the 
Committee's then rapporteur, detailed the relevance of several 
of these provisions.201 Her explanations are offered as a 
glimpse into the legal reasoning of the Committee and as a re-
flection of the purposiveness with which the Committee has 
proceeded on the issue of corporal punishment. 
The Committee has repeatedly relied on articles 28 and 37 
of the Convention of the Child as a basis for criticizing 
countries that have not repudiated corporal punishment of 
children.202 According to Ms. Santos Pais, articles 19,28 and 37 
make "a clear statement against the use of any form of 
violence" in the treatment of children.203 Article 37, paragraph 
(a) provides, in pertinent part, that "States Parties shall 
ensure that no child shall be subjected to torture or other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."204 Ms. 
Santos Pais explained that while nations commonly identify 
torture with "extremely serious and massive cases," this is too 
narrow a reading of the term as it is used in the Convention of 
the Child.205 Rather, "torture may cover a wide degree of 
situations," even those which cause "unperceivable mental 
suffering" or those involving "a disciplinary measure which may 
be degrading or inhuman."206 What is more, this prohibition 
There was no place for corporal punishment within the margin of discretion ac-
corded in article 5 to parents in the exercise of their responsibilities. 
Summary Record of the 205th Meeting, U.N. GAOR, Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, 
8th Sess., 205th mtg. at 17, U.N. Doc. CRC/c/sR.205 (1995). 
Thus, there is a basis for the view that, due to the operation of article 19, article 5 
should not be read to allow parental corporal punishment of children. 
201. Santos Pais, supra note 189. 
202. See, e.g., Concluding Observations on Zimbabwe, supra note 193, at '118; 
Concluding Observations on Canada, supra note 193, at 'I 25; Concluding Observa-
tions on the United Kingdom, supra note 193, at '131. 
203. See Santos Pais, supra note 189; see also Law, supra note 195, at 1858. 
204. Convention of the Child, supra note 142, art. 37(a), at 17. 
205. See Santos Pais, supra note 189. 
206. [d. 
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applies in "all circumstances of the life of a child, including in 
family life or in the school system."207 
Article 28, paragraph 2 of the Convention of the Child states 
that "States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to 
ensure that school discipline is administered in a manner 
consistent with the child's human dignity and in conformity 
with the present Convention."208 The Committee on the Rights 
of the Child and the commentators have understood article 28, 
paragraph 2 as requiring states parties to take measures 
proscribing corporal punishment in the schools,209 an under-
standing reiterated by Ms. Santos Pais.210 Indeed, such an 
interpretation is all but inescapable when it is considered that 
if school discipline is to be administered "in conformity with 
the present Convention," the discipline must conform to the 
authoritative interpretation discussed above that the Con-
vention as a whole and certain of its individual provisions 
forbid corporal punishment of children.211 
Article 28, paragraph 2's prohibition of corporal punishment 
in the schools is significant not only in itself but also because 
of its bearing on other provisions of the Convention of the 
Child. That is, while article 28, paragraph 2 states that school 
discipline must be "administered in a manner consistent with 
the child's human dignity," there are also numerous other ref-
erences to preserving the child's dignity throughout the 
Convention of the Child.212 For example, the preamble to the 
Convention of the Child refers to "the inherent dignity . . . of 
all members of the human family,"213 the "dignity ... of the 
human person,"214 and the need for children to be brought up 
207. [d. 
208. Convention of the Child, supra note 142, art. 28(2), at 14. 
209. See Concluding Observations on Zimbabwe, supra note 193, at 'lI 18; Conclud-
ing Observations on Canada, supra note 193, at 'I 25; Concluding Observations on the 
United Kingdom, supra note 193, at '131; VAN BUEREN, supra note 187, at 249; Susan 
H. Bitensky, Educating the Child for a Productive Life: Articles 28 and 29, in 
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN AMERICA: U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 
COMPARED WITH UNITED STATES LAw 167, 174 (Cynthia Price Cohen & Howard A. 
Davidson eds., 1990); Law, supra note 195, at 1858; Telephone Interview with Cynthia 
Price Cohen, former member of the Ad Hoc Nongovernmental Group on the Drafting 
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Aug. 13, 1996). 
210. See Santos Pais, supra note 189. 
211. See supra notes 193-210 and accompanying text; infra notes 219-30 and ac-
companying text. 
212. See, e.g., Convention of the Child, supra note 142, pmbl., at 3; id. arts. 37(c), 
39,40(1), at 17-18. 
213. [d. pmbl., at 3. 
214. [d. 
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"in the spirit of ... dignity.,,215 Similarly, article 39 directs that 
states parties shall take all apPI:opriate measures to promote 
the physical and psychological recovery of children who have 
been the victims of any form of cruel or degrading treatment 
such that "recovery ... shall take place in an environment 
which fosters the . . . dignity of the child.,,216 As a matter of 
logic and linguistics, these provisions, when read in light of the 
received meaning of article 28, paragraph 2, support the notion 
that the spirit of the Convention of the Child in protecting the . 
child's dignity is inconsistent with allowing parental or other 
corporal punishment of children.217 As Marta Santos Pais put 
it, "the right not to be subject to any form of physical punish-
ment . . . flows as a consequence of the consideration [in the 
Convention of the Child] of the child as a person whose human 
dignity should be respected.,,218 
In addition to finding the right in the Convention's 
provisions on dignity, the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
and its former rapporteur have advised that at least three 
other principles of the Convention of the Child may also imply 
a child's right to be free of corporal punishment. First, the 
right is protected by the Convention's nondiscrimination 
principle.219 This principle is set forth in article 2, paragraph 1 
which states that, "States Parties shall respect and ensure the 
rights set forth in the present Convention to each child ... 
without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child's 
... status.,,220 Ms. Santos Pais elaborated that the principle of 
nondiscrimination "means that no child should be 
punished ... on the ground of his or her ... status."221 The idea 
215. [d. 
216. [d. art. 39, at 18. 
217. Cf. VAN BUEREN, supra note 187, at 249 (noting that international human 
rights instruments predating the Convention of the Child use the phrase "human 
dignity" in a way that implies repudiation of corporal punishment). In fact, when the 
Italian Supreme Court ruled in May 1996 that no corporal punishment may be used 
on children in Italy, the Court's opinion relied heavily on the fact that both the Italian 
Constitution and the Convention of the Child mandate respect for human dignity. See 
Cambria, Cass., sez. VI, 18 marzo 1996, Foro It. II 1996, 407, 410, Translation, supra 
note 112, at 3-4; Interview with Judge Francesco Ippolito, supra note 113. See supra 
notes 112-37, 142-54 and accompanying text for a full discussion and analysis of the 
Italian decision. As one commentator has observed, "[a) child cannot grow up in 
'dignity' if it is not guaranteed bodily integrity." Cohen, Corporal Punishment, supra 
note 13, at 130. 
218. Santos Pais, supra note 189. 
219. See Concluding Observations on Nepal, supra note 193, at '11 10 (1996); Con-
cluding Observations on Senegal, supra note 193, at 'lI 24; Santos Pais, supra note 189. 
220. Convention ofthe Child, supra note 142, art. 2(1), at 5. 
221. Santos Pais, supra note 189. 
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is that article 2 forbids justifying corporal punishment of 
children simply because they are children. Second, the 
Committee has taken the position that the legality of corporal 
punishment is affected by the Convention of the Child's 
insistence on the primacy of the best interests of the child. 
Article 3, paragraph 1 states that, "[i]n all actions concerning 
children, whether undertaken by public or private social 
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities 
or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a 
primary consideration.,,222 Ms. Santos Pais elucidated that the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child has considered article 3, 
paragraph 1 as setting a framework that is incompatible with 
corporal punishment of children.223 Third, the Committee has 
also found the child's right to be free from violence in the 
assurance of article 12, paragraph 1 that the child should be 
allowed to participate in all matters affecting his or her life.224 
Ms. Santos Pais explained that "[p]articipation implies 
dialogue, mutual respect and tolerance. It facilitates the 
negotiation of solutions and promotes the growing respon-
sibility of children. Similarly, participation in family life is a 
form of dialogue which leads to the ability for negotiation and 
peaceful conflict resolution.,,225 The inference is that if 
participation leads to peaceful conflict resolution it should 
necessarily exclude the violent conflict resolution of which 
corporal punishment is a form. 
While the above analysis of the Convention of the Child as 
prohibiting all corporal punishment of children is based on 
222. Convention of the Child, supra note 142, art. 3(1), at 5. The Convention of the 
Child invokes the standard of the best interests of the child in several provisions. See, 
e.g., id. art. 9(1), at 6 ("States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated 
from his or her parents against their will, except when competent authorities subject 
to judiCial review determine ... that such separation is necessary for the best inter-
ests of the child."); id. art. 18(1), at 9 ("Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, 
have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child. The 
best interests of the child will be their basic concern."); id. art. 21, at 10 ("States Par-
ties that recognize and/or permit the system of adoption shall ensure that the best 
interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration .... "). 
223. See Santos Pais, supra note 189; see also Concluding Observations on Sene-
gal, supra note 193, at 'II 24; Concluding Observations on Canada, supra note 193, at 
'II 25; Concluding Observations on the United Kingdom, supra note 193, at'll 3l. 
224. See Concluding Observations on Senegal, supra note 193, at 'l! 24. The provi-
sion states in full that, "States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of 
forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters 
affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with 
the age and maturity of the child." Convention of the Child, supra note 142, art. 12(1), 
at 8. 
225. Santos Pais, supra note 189. 
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authoritative sources, there is at least one other provision of 
the Convention which may be interpreted to the same purpose 
as a matter of simple logic. Article 24, paragraph 3 of the Con-
vention of the Child provides that "States Parties shall take all 
effective and appropriate measures with a view to abolishing 
traditional practices prejudicial to the health of children."226 
"Health" may be defined as "the condition of being sound in 
body, mind, or spirit."227 As Part III of this Article will demon-
strate, there is data indicating that even corporal punishment 
of children which does not cause physical injury may still do 
harm to the child's mental health,228 and that such punishment 
can lead to child abuse resulting in physical harm as well. 229 
This reasoning would support an interpretation of article 24, 
paragraph 3 as requiring states parties to take measures 
abolishing the traditional practice of spanking or other corpo-
ral punishment of children because these practices are 
"prejudicial to the health of children." The drafting history of 
the Convention also arguably supports such a reading of the 
provision: at the insistence of the Senegalese delegation, the 
drafters refused to limit "traditional practices" to female cir-
cumcision and equally severe practices and opted instead for 
broader language.23o 
226. Convention of the Child, supra note 142, art. 24(3), at 13. 
227. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 558 (9th ed. 1988). 
228. See infra notes 349-50, 355-63 and accompanying text. 
229. See infra notes 366-67 and accompanying text. 
230. During discussions that led to the formulation of article 24, paragraph 3 of 
the Convention of the Child, the United Kingdom's and United States' representatives 
took the position that the language proscribing traditional practices should expressly 
designate female circumcision as such a practice. The U.S. representative advocated 
that such specification would demonstrate that the practices to be abolished were 
those of a serious nature. See THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF 
THE CHILD: A GUIDE TO THE "TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES" 352 (Sharon Detrick ed., 1992) 
[hereinafter GUIDE TO THE "TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES"j. The delegations of Canada, 
Japan, Sweden, and Venezuela stated that the term "traditional practices" should be 
understood to include all those practices outlined in the 1986 report of the Working 
Group on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children. See id. 
(citing Report of the Working Group on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of 
Women and Children, U.N. Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human 
Rights, 42d Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 19, U.N. Doc. E/CN.411986142 (1986». The 
report lists practices to be given priority consideration and as topics of discussion and 
does not mention corporal punishment. See Working Group on Traditional Practices, 
supra, at '1'1 22-24. However, neither the positions of the Canadian et al. delegations 
nor the report of the Working Group purport to exclude corporal punishment as a 
traditional practice affecting the health of children. In any event, Senegal's represen-
tatives sought more general language that would not specify the precise practices 
prohibited thereby. The Finnish delegation also advocated that the word "health" must 
be used in its broadest sense. The final language reflects the Senegalese preference. 
See GUIDE TO THE "TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES," supra, at 352. 
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B. Other International Human Rights Instruments 
Marta Santos Pais, in her capacity as a member of the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, observed that the Con-
vention of the Child brought together different norms 
previously set forth in earlier international instruments and 
further improved these norms as a means to effectively ensure 
the fundamental rights of the child, "including the one not to 
be subject to any form of violence, treatment or punishment 
inconsistent with hislher dignity and integrity."231 Even before 
the Convention of the Child, then, there were international 
instruments arguably protecting children against corporal 
punishment. 
From an American perspective, it may be of special interest 
to explore the ramifications of this observation that the 
Convention of the Child incorporates and draws upon the 
standards of earlier international instruments. For purposes of 
this Article, the interest lies in the fact that if this body of law 
applies to children and implicitly prohibits corporal 
punishment, then the international consensus against corporal 
punishment is even more weighty and influential than might 
be supposed from only consulting the Convention of the Child. 
Quite apart from the ongoing controversy over whether any of 
these instruments are domestically enforceable, their status as 
international consensus is a compelling reason to look to them 
for guidance as additional credible exemplars of legal regimes 
evolving in relation to this issue. In this regard, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration),232 the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(Economic Rights Covenant),233 the International Covenant on 
231. See Santos Pais, supra note 189; see also BEVERLY C. EDMONDS & WILLIAM R. 
FERNEKES, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 2-3, 27 n.1 (1996) 
(observing that the Convention of the Child was preceded by various international 
human rights instruments that provided protections for children); Anders Riinquist, 
Counselor, Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations, Speech at United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Prospects for the Year 2000, Loyola 
University New Orleans School of Law (Feb. 14, 1997) (making the point that the 
Convention of the Child develops principles that were already applicable to children 
through earlier international human rights instruments). 
232. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, (III), U.N. GAOR, 
3rd Sess., pt. 1, U.N. Doc. Al810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declarationl. 
233. International Covenant on Econolnic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for 
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter 
Econolnic Rights Covenantl. 
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Civil and Political Rights (Civil and Political Rights 
Covenant),234 the American Convention on Human Rights 
(American Convention),235 the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(European Convention),236 and the Torture Convention237 are 
particularly relevant. 
A considerable number of commentators are of the view that 
these instruments generally apply to children, regardless of 
whether or not they also have provisions specifically address-
ing children's rights.238 This analysis is based on the fact that 
these documents contain language safeguarding rights for all 
human beings as well as provisions that are obviously meant 
only for adults.239 The Universal Declaration uses inclusive 
234. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 UN.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1967) (ratified by the 
United States on June 8, 1992, see UNITED NATIONS, supra note 179, at 122) 
!hereinafter Civil and Political Rights Covenant). 
235. American Convention on Human Rights, done on Nov. 22,1969,1144 UN.T.S. 
123 (entered into force July 18, 1978) !hereinafter American Convention). 
236. European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, done on Nov. 4,1950,213 UN.T.S. 221 !hereinafter European Convention). 
237. Torture Convention, supra note 177. 
238. See VAN BUEREN, supra note 187, at 17, 19-23 (indicating that the Universal 
Declaration, the Economic Rights Covenant, the Civil and Political Rights Covenant, 
the European Convention, and the American Convention apply generally to children); 
Fernando Volio, Legal Personality, Privacy, and the Family, in THE INTERNATIONAL 
BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CML AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 185, 186--88, 205--08 
(Louis Henkin ed., 1981) (contending that the Civil and Political Rights Covenant 
applies generally to children); Walter H. Bennett, Jr., A Critique of the Emerging Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child, 20 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 25-29 (1987) (noting that 
the Universal Declaration, the Economic Rights Covenant, the Civil and Political 
Rights Covenant, the European Convention, the American Convention, and the Tor-
ture Convention apply generally to children); Calciano, supra note 185, at 518 & n.25 
(1992) (arguing that the Universal Declaration, the Economic Rights Covenant, and 
the Civil and Political Rights Covenant apply generally to children); Christine A. Cor-
cos, The Child in International Law: A Pathfinder and Selected Bibliography, 23 CASE 
W. REs. J. INT'L L. 171, 172 (1991) (suggesting that the Universal Declaration applies 
generally to children); ROnquist, supra note 231 (stating generally that many interna-
tional human rights instruments predating the Convention of the Child apply to 
children). But see Cynthia Price Cohen, The Human Rights of Children, 12 CAP. U L. 
REV. 369, 376 (1983) (remarking that except for certain articles which expressly refer 
to juveniles, nothing in either the Economic Rights Covenant or in the Civil and Po-
litical Rights Covenant clearly states that these instruments apply generally to 
children). 
239. See Bennett, supra note 238, at 27 (explaining that although the rights con-
tained in the Universal Declaration, the Economic Rights Covenant, and the Civil and 
Political Rights Covenant apply generally to children, there are some rights "obviously 
intended exclusively for adults, such as the rights to vote and hold public office"); Co-
hen, supra note 238, at 378 (asserting that there are provisions of the Economic 
Rights Covenant and the Civil and Political Rights Covenant which obviously do not 
apply to children, such as the right to form trade unions and the right to vote). 
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language such as article l's statement that "[a]ll human be-
ings are born free and equal in dignity and rights,,,240 and 
article 2's promise that "[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights 
and freedoms set forth in this Declaration .... ,,241 In a similar 
vein, the Torture Convention indicates that it is meant to pro-
tect "all members of the human family.,,242 Likewise, the 
Economic Rights Covenant, the Civil and Political Rights 
Covenant, and the European Convention all employ the term 
"everyone" in guaranteeing various rights.243 The latter two 
covenants also use the phrase "no one" as a term of general 
applicability in protecting all persons,244 including children, 
against the infringement of certain rights.245 The American 
240. Universal Declaration, supra note 232, art. 1; see VAN BUEREN, supra note 
187, at 17 (pointing out that the Universal Declaration "proclaims a catalogue of hu-
man rights which apply to 'all human beings' and therefore implicitly to children") 
(citation omitted). . 
241. Universal Declaration, supra note 232, art. 2; cf Bennett, supra note 238, at 
27-28 (suggesting that the word "everyone" as used in the Economic Rights Covenant 
and in the Civil and Political Rights Covenant should be taken to include children); 
Volio, supra note 238, at 186 (stating that the term "everyone" as used in article 16 of 
the Civil and Political Rights Covenant encompasses both adults and children). 
242. Torture Convention, supra note 177, pmbl., S. TREATY Doc. NO. 100-20 at 19, 
1465 U.N. T.S. at 113; cf Bennett, supra note 238, at 25 (stating that the convention 
protects children as members of the human family from torture). 
243. For instance, the Economic Rights Covenant requires that States Parties rec-
ognize the rights of "everyone" to an adequate standard of living and to be free from 
hunger. See Economic Rights Covenant, supra note 233, art. 11, at 7. That instrument 
also recognizes the right of "everyone" to partake "of the highest attainable standard 
of physical and mental health." [d. art. 12(1), at 8. The Civil and Political Rights 
Covenant provides that "everyone" has the right to "security of person." See Civil and 
Political Rights Covenant, supra note 234, art. 9(1), at 175. That covenant further 
states that "everyone" shall have a right to "recognition ... as a person before the 
law." See id. art. 16, at 177; cf Bennett, supra note 238, at 27-28 (suggesting that the 
word "everyone" as used in the Economic Rights Covenant and in the Civil and Politi-
cal Rights Covenant should be understood to include children); Volio, supra note 238, 
at 186 (asserting that "everyone" as used in article 16 of the Civil and Political Rights 
Covenant encompasses both adults and children). The European Convention uses the 
same terminology, such as its guarantee that "[elveryone's" right to life will be pro-
tected. See European Convention, supra note 236, art. 2(1), at 224. Indeed, the case 
law which has developed under the European Convention "shows that all rights 
phrased in terms of general application apply" to children. See Bennett, supra note 
238, at 29. 
244. The Civil and Political Rights Covenant declares in article 7 that "[nlo one 
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment." Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 234, art. 7, at 175. Similarly, 
the European Convention provides in article 3 that "[nlo one shall be subjected to 
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." European Convention, 
supra note 236, art. 3, at 224. 
245. Cf Bennett, supra note 238, at 27-28 & n.176 (remarking that in referring to 
"no one," article 7 of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant means no children as well 
as no adults). 
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Convention even specifies in article 1, paragraph 2 that 
"person," as used in that treaty, means every human being246_ 
demonstrating an unmistakable statement of intent to include 
children. 247 
Having concluded that these international instruments are 
generally protective of children's human rights, the next ana-
lytical problem is to identify those provisions that implicitly 
prohibit corporal punishment and that have served as the 
normative and conceptual basis for the Convention of the 
Child. 
1. Provisions Protective of Dignity-As noted above in Part 
II.A, the Convention of the Child assumes an inherent 
irreconcilability between fostering dignity and administering 
corporal punishment to children.248 Article 1 of the Universal 
Declaration provides that "[a]ll human beings are born free 
and equal in dignity and rights."249 Article 11, paragraph 1 of 
the American Convention announces that "[e]veryone has the 
right to have ... his dignity respected."250 Insofar as preserving 
dignity is inconsistent with undergoing corporal punishment, 
these provisions may be interpreted to prohibit corporal 
punishment without reference to other sources. However, these 
provisions also appear to be precursors of those provisions of 
the Convention of the Child protecting children's dignity.251 As 
such, the provisions of the Convention of the Child represent a 
retrospective affirmation and further strengthening of the 
view that· article 1 of the Universal Declaration and article 11 
of the American Convention make corporal punishment of 
children unacceptable.252 
2. Provisions Against Torture or Cruel, Inhuman, or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment-The Convention of the 
246. See American Convention, supra note 235, art. 1(2), at 145. 
247. See Bennett, supra note 238, at 29. 
248. See supra notes 208-18 and accompanying text. 
249. Universal Declaration, supra note 232, art. l. 
250. American Convention, supra note 235, art. 11(1), at 148. 
251. Cf. Cohen, Corporal Punishment, supra note 13, at 112-14, 129-30 
(discussing the recognition in the Universal Declaration's preamble of "the inherent 
dignity ... of all members of the human family" and implying that the preservation of 
human dignity is incompatible with corporal punishment of children); Santos Pais, 
supra note 189 (stating that protection of human dignity in "a variety of international 
[human rights) instruments" preceding the Convention of the Child is tantamount to 
protection against corporal punishment). 
252. Cf. Santos Pais, supra note 189 (equating the term "dignity," as it is used in 
international human rights instruments predating the Convention of the Child, with 
freedom from corporal punishment). 
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Child's absolute prohibition of corporal punishment of children 
also builds upon and, indeed, represents a further progression 
from interpretations of article 7 of the Civil and Political 
Rights Covenant, which forbids subjecting anyone to torture or 
to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.253 In 
a recent reiteration of its 1982 comments, the Human Rights 
Committee, charged with monitoring compliance with the Civil 
and Political Rights Covenant,254 made the following observa-
tions about article 7 of that covenant: 
The aim of the provisions of article 7 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is to protect both 
the dignity and the physical and mental integrity of the 
individual. It is the duty of the state party to afford eve-
ryone protection through legislative and other measures 
as may be necessary against the acts prohibited by article 
7, whether inflicted by people acting in their official ca-
pacity, outside their official capacity or in a private 
capacity. 
The prohibition in article 7 relates not only to acts that 
cause physical pain but also to acts that cause mental suf-
fering to the victim. In the Committee's view, moreover, 
the prohibition must extend to corporal punishment, in-
cluding excessive chastisement ordered as a punishment 
for a crime or as an educative or disciplinary measure. It 
is appropriate to emphasize in this regard that article 7 
protects, in particular, children, pupils and patients in 
teaching and medical institutions.255 
253. See Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 234, art. 7, at 175. With 
respect to interpretations of article 7 by the Human Rights Committee, see infra notes 
254-55 and accompanying text. 
254. See Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 234, arts. 28, 40, at 238, 
240, 244; Cohen, Corporal Punishment, supra note 13, at 114. 
255. Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted 
by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, UN. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment 
20, 'lI'I 2, 5, UN. Doc. HRIlGEN/lJRev.2 (1996) (substantially restating the substance 
of General Comment 7, 12, UN. Doc. HRIlGEN/lJRev.2 (1996»; see also Tamela R. 
Hughlett, Comment, International Law: The Use of International Law as a Guide to 
Interpretation of the United States Constitution, 45 OKLA. L. REv. 169, 189 n.144 
(1992) (suggesting that article 7 of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant may apply 
to corporal punishment); Elizabeth M. Misiaveg, Note, Important Steps and 
Instructive Models in the Fight to Eliminate Violence Against Women, 52 WASH. & LEE 
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Thus, article 7 of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant may 
be understood to prohibit excessive corporal punishment in 
familial or other contexts. By inference, the Human Rights 
Committee's interpretation of article 7 of the Civil and Politi-
cal Rights Covenant as prohibitive of excessive corporal 
punishment may apply to the identical language of article 5 of 
the Universal Declaration since the Covenant is an outgrowth 
of the Universal Declaration. 256 
The Torture Convention also contains prohibitions against 
torture in article 1257 and against cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment in article 16.258 In light of the 
discussion above, this prohibitory language would seem to 
warrant the conclusion that the Torture Convention forbids at 
least excessive corporal punishment of children. There is, in 
addition, some support for the conclusion that the Torture 
Convention forbids all corporal punishment. The Committee 
Against Torture, the body which monitors compliance with the 
L. REV. 1109, 1130-31 (1995) (noting that article 7 may be interpreted to proscribe 
gender-based violence perpetrated by private persons). 
256. See MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 173, at 321-22, 327; Michael Scaperlanda, 
Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 WIS. L. REv. 965, 1012; Louis B. Sohn, The 
New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 
AM. U L. REV. 1, 19 (1982). 
257. The pertinent provision reads in full: 
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by which 
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted 
on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person informa-
tion or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has 
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him 
or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when 
such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent 
or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. 
It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental 
to lawful sanctions. 
Torture Convention, supra note 177, art. 1(1), S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 at 20, 1465 
UN.T.S. at 113-14. 
258. The relevant provision reads in part: 
Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdic-
tion other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which 
do not amount to torture as defined in article 1, when such acts are committed 
by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official 
or other person acting in an official capacity. 
Id. art. 16(1), S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20 at 23,1465 UN.T.S. at 116. 
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Torture Convention,259 has suggested that corporal punishment 
in general could be incompatible with the provisions of the 
Convention-without specifying that the offending punishment 
must be excessive.260 In any event, these interpretations may be 
somewhat weaker with respect to parental corporal punish-
ment of children than under other international human rights 
instruments. One reason is because both articles 1 and 16 
stipulate that the proscribed conduct must be inflicted "by or 
at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a 
public official or other person acting in an official capacity.,,261 
Some analysts have opined that the Torture Convention thus 
only reaches the conduct of government actors and not private 
perpetrators.262 Under this view, the Torture Convention may 
cover only corporal punishment meted out by or at the behest 
of governmental authorities-such as school personnel-but 
not that administered by parents. 
Nevertheless, some commentators have argued that articles 
1 and 16 of the Torture Convention should apply to private 
actors.263 For example, one commentator maintains that the 
259. See id. arts. 17-24, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 at 23-28, 1465 U.N.T.S. at 
116-21 (detailing the composition, procedures, and functions of the Committee 
Against Torture). 
260. See Report of the Committee Against 7brture, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. 
No. 44, 'II'lI169, 177, U.N. Doc. Al50/44 (1995); see also 7brture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Comm. on Human Rts. Res. 
1997/38, 'lI 9 (1997) (reminding governments that "corporal punishment can amount to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or even to torture"); Report of the Special 
Rapporteur, U.N. Comm. on Human Rts., 53d Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 8(a); 
'lI'I 3-11, U.N. Doc. ElCN.41199717 (1997) (stating that corporal punishment is incon-
sistent with the Torture Convention). 
261. Torture Convention, supra note 177, arts. 1(1), 16(1), S. TREATY Doc. No. 
100-20 at 19, 23,1465 U.N.T.S.at 113-14, 116. 
262. See Katherine M. Culliton, Finding a Mechanism to Enforce Women's Right to 
State Protection from Domestic Vwlence in the Americas, 34 HARv. INT'L L.J. 507, 554 
(1993); David P. Stewart, The Torture Convention and the Reception of International 
Criminal Law Within the United States, 15 NOVA L. REv. 449, 455-56 (1991); Kristen 
Walker, An Exploration of Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter as an Embodi-
ment of the Public/Private Distinction in International Law, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & 
POL. 173, 193-94 (1994); Andrew M. Wolfenson, The U.S. Courts and the Treatment of 
Suspects Abducted Abroad Under International Law, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 705, 717 
(1989-90). 
263. See Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic 
Vwlence as 7brture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 298-99, 308-53, 355-56 (1994); 
Jordan J. Paust, The Other Side of Right: Private Duties Under Human Rights Law, 5 
HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 51, 60-61 (1992); see also Matthew Lippman, The Development 
and Drafting of the United Nations Convention Against 7brture and Other Cruel, In-
human or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 27 B.C. INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 275, 
314 (1994) (stating that the Torture Convention may apply even if public officials do 
no more than tolerate an ongoing practice of torture). 
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Torture Convention's provisions should apply to situations of 
domestic violence against women.264 Essentially, she gives two 
reasons for this conclusion. First, the Torture Convention may 
be read not only to govern official behavior but also to "hold 
states responsible for ... failure to take steps to avert private 
violence.,,265 Second, domestic violence has many of the same 
characteristics as torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment at the hands of the state. Both 
domestic violence and governmental violence may produce 
equal degrees of physical and/or mental pain or suffering,266 
represent an intentional infliction against the will of the 
victim,267 and are legitimated by the victim's status.268 With 
respect to article 16, this argument is equally cogent in 
relation to parental corporal punishment of children since the 
pain or suffering and intentionality elements are similar 
where a child is the victim as where a woman is the victim and 
since the punishment is typically legitimated by the victim's 
status as a child. 269 
It may also be objected that corporal punishment of children 
typically falls short of the definition of "torture" in article 1 as 
"any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental" is caused to the victim.27o This problem with article 1's 
applicability is more readily resolved since, as shown in Part 
264. See Copelon, supra note 263, at 298-99, 352-53, 355-56. 
265. Id. at 299. 
266. See id. at 308-25. 
267. See id. at 325-29. 
268. See id. at 330-31. 
269. These aspects of corporal punishment of children are explored more fully in 
Part III of this Article. 
The argument set forth in the text above is perhaps less persuasive with respect to 
article 1 of the Torture Convention insofar as it provides that torture "does not in-
clude pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful 
sanctions." Torture Convention, supra note 177, art. 1(1), S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20 
at 19, 1465 UN.T.S. at 113-14. A country's "lawful sanctions" conceivably could en-
compass legal authorizations of parental corporal punishment. But see Report of the 
Special Rapporteur, supra note 260, 'I 8 (stating that flogging would not be permissi-
ble under article 1 of the Torture Convention simply because this punishment had 
been duly promulgated under the domestic law of a nation). Then again, the United 
States has enunciated an understanding to this part of article 1 to the effect that "a 
State Party could not through its domestic sanctions defeat the object and purpose of 
the Convention to prohibit torture." 136 CONGo REc. S17491 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) 
(statement of understandings to apply to the Senate's advice and consent to the ratifi-
cation of the Torture Convention). Thus, the "lawful sanctions" caveat cannot take 
corporal punishment outside of article l's prohibition if it is the object and purpose of 
the Torture Convention to outlaw such chastisement. 
270. Torture Convention, supra note 177, art. 1(1), S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20 at 
19,1465 UN.T.S. at 113-14 (emphasis added). 
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III, even "reasonable" corporal punishment may cause severe 
psychological sufferin~71 and is felt more acutely as physical 
pain by a child than an adult.272 Be this as it may, the difficul-
ties in applying article 1 probably make article 16 of the 
Torture Convention the more convincing source of an interna-
tional prohibition against parental corporal punishment of 
children. 
Article 5, paragraph 2 of the American Convention likewise 
contains a provision against torture or cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment.273 The Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights has urged that in order for 
countries to achieve full observance of the American Con-
vention, they should ratify the Convention of the Child and 
ensure that children "are not the targets of violence.,,274 Given 
the absolute prohibition against corporal punishment in the 
Convention of the Child, this commentary may mean that 
article 5 of the American Convention would be best understood 
as forbidding all corporal punishment of children and not just 
that which is excessive. 
Article 3 of the European Convention contains a further 
variation on this type of language to the effect that "[n]o one 
shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.,,275 The European Court of Human 
Rights and the European Commission of Human Rights have 
developed a distinct body of case law indicating that corporal 
punishment of children falls within the purview of article 3 of 
the European Convention and may violate that provision 
depending upon the particular circumstances.276 For example, 
271. See infra notes 355-60 and accompanying text. 
272. See infra note 368 and accompanying text. 
273. American Convention, supra note 235, art. 5(2), at 146. 
274. Areas in Which Steps Need to Be Taken Thwards Full Observance of the Hu-
man Rights Set Forth in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 
and the American Convention on Human Rights, 1994 INTER-AM. Y.B. ON H.R. (lNTER-
AM. COMM'N ON H.R.) 690, 704. 
275. European Convention, supra note 236, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. at 224. 
276. See, e.g., Y v. United Kingdom, 1992 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 196 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R.) (taking note of a settlement reached after the European Commission of Human 
Rights found that article 3 of the European Convention had been violated when school 
personnel caned a fifteen-year-old pupil four times on his clothed buttocks so as to 
cause bruises, bruising, and swelling); Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
A) at 6-9, 17 (1978) (holding that when authorities inflicted a judicially mandated 
birching on a fifteen-year-old, they violated the prohibition in article 3 of the Euro-
pean Convention against degrading treatment); A & B v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
25599/94, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 190, 194 (1996) (Commission Report) (on file with the 
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (ruling admissible an application of a 
boy claiming that his stepfather violated article 3 of the European Convention by 
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in Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom, the European Court of 
Human Rights ruled that when a headmaster hit a seven-year-
old student three times on his clothed buttocks with a rubber-
soled gym shoe, the punishment was not severe enough to 
constitute a violation of article 3;277 yet the court at the same 
time cautioned that its ruling should not be taken to mean 
that corporal punishment must have severe or long-lasting 
effects in order to violate article 3.278 The court even issued a 
disclaimer that it did not wish to be taken as having in any 
way approved of corporal punishment as part of the 
disciplinary regime of a schoo1.279 That this cautionary language 
was not a momentary slip of the pen is borne out by the 
European Commission of Human Rights having previously 
held, in Warwick v. United Kingdom, that just one cane stroke 
to a female student's hand by a male teacher, in the presence 
of another male teacher, violated the prohibition in article 3 
against degrading punishments.28o 
Until 1996, the cases arising under article 3 of the European 
Convention involved either judicially mandated corporal 
hitting the boy with a stick over the course of a week so as to cause bruises on the 
boy's legs and buttocks); App. No. 10592183 v. u.K., 9 Eur. H.R. Rep., 277, 278 (1987) 
(Eur. Comm'n on H.R.) (holding admissible a complaint that article 3 of the European 
Convention was violated when school personnel struck one student's palms and struck 
another student's buttocks twice with a leather strap); Warwick v. United Kingdom, 
App. No. 9471181 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R., July 18, 1986) (unreported) (holding on the 
merits that one cane stroke to a female student's hand by a male teacher so as to 
break a blood vessel violates the prohibition of Article 3 of the European Convention 
against degrading punishment), discussed in VAN BUEREN, supra note 187, at 251, 
and cited in Firouzeh Bahrampour, Comment, The Caning of Michael Fay: Can Singa-
pore's Punishment Withstand the Scrutiny of International Law?, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. 
& POLY 1075, 1093 n.118 (1995); Mrs. X & Ms. X v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
9471181, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 450, 450-51 (1985) (finding admissible a sixteen-year-old 
student's claim that article 3 of the European Convention was contravened when the 
headmaster caned her); cf. Campbell & Cosans v. United Kingdom, 1982 Y.B. Eur. 
Conv. on H.R. 3,4 (Eur. Ct. of H.R.) (holding that there was no violation of article 3 of 
the European Convention when school personnel threatened to strike two students' 
palms with a leather strap, but also noting that mere threats to administer corporal 
punishment could violate article 3 if the actual punishment would violate that arti-
cle). But see Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom, 1993 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. (Eur. 
Ct. of H.R.) 172, 172-74 (5-4 decision) (ruling that a headmaster did not violate arti-
cle 3 of the European Convention by hitting a seven-year-old student three times on 
his clothed buttocks with a rubber-soled gym shoe, but observing that a punishment 
which did not have any severe or long-lasting effects could still fall within the ambit of 
article 3). 
277. See Costello-Roberts, 1993 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 172-74. 
278. See id. at 174. 
279. See id. 
280. See VAN BUEREN, supra note 187, at 251 (discussing the Warwick decision); 
see also Bahrampour, supra note 276 (citing the holding of Warwick). 
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punishmene81 or corporal punishment in the school context.282 
Notably, in September 1996, the European Commission of 
Human Rights took cognizance in A & B v. United Kingdom283 
of a complaint arising in the familial setting2B4 under articles 3, 
8, 13, and 14 of the European Convention.285 The Commission 
concluded that a boy stated a viable claim pursuant to these 
provisions286 against his stepfather based on the complainant's 
allegation that the stepfather had administered degrading 
punishment by hitting the boy's buttocks and legs with a stick 
so as to cause bruises.287 The Commission issued a decision on 
the merits two years later finding that the stepfather's actions 
violated article 3.288 However, the Commission also stressed 
"that this finding does not mean that Article 3 is to be 
interpreted as imposing an obligation on States to protect, 
through their criminal law, against any form of physical 
rebuke, however mild, by a parent of a child.,,289 
In sum, article 3 of the European Convention has given rise 
to an adjudicative approach that may reflect normative 
tension and transition. The case law reveals that the European 
Court of Human Rights and the European Commission of 
Human Rights have read article 3 to tolerate some milder or 
less degrading corporal punishments. The. cases under the 
European Convention also reflect that at least some corporal 
punishment of children administered by either the authorities 
or parents violates article 3 of that treaty. The European Court 
28l. See, e.g., 1Yrer, 26 Eur Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 6-9. 
282. See, e.g., Costello-Roberts, 1993 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 172-74; Y, 1992 
Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 196; Campbell & Cosans, 1982 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 3; 
App. No. 10592183,9 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 277; Warwick, supra note 276; Mrs. X & Ms. X, 
7 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 450. 
283. App. No. 25599/94, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 190 (1996) (Commission Report). 
284. See id. at 190. 
285. See id. at 193. Article 8(1) of the European Convention provides that 
"[elveryone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence." European Convention, supra note 236, art. 8(1), at 230. Article 13 of 
the European Convention states that "[elveryone whose rights and freedoms as set 
forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national 
authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in 
an official capacity." Id. art. 13, at 232. Article 14 of the European Convention declares 
that "[tlhe enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national 
minority, property, birth or other status." Id. art. 14, at 232. 
286. See A & B, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 195. 
287. See id. at 19l. 
288. See A v. United Kingdom, App. No. 25599/94, Report of the Commission (Sept. 
18, 1997), at 15. 
289. Id. 
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has issued conflicting pronouncements on whether article 3's 
application should be keyed to the harshness of the 
punishment. It is, therefore, an open question whether the 
court will find in a future case that all corporal punishment of 
children violates article 3 regardless of the severity of the 
punishment. 
3. Provisions Protective of Personal Security-There are ar-
ticles guaranteeing "security of person" in the Universal 
Declaration,290 the Civil and Political Rights Covenant,291 and 
in the European Convention.292 Article 5 of the American Con-
vention expresses a similar assurance, providing that "[e]very 
person has the right to have his physical, mental, and moral 
integrity respected.,,293 It has been suggested that the security 
of one's person is necessarily transgressed by being subjected 
to corporal punishment.294 
4. Provisions Protective of Privacy-The American Conven-
tion, the Civil and Political Rights Covenant, the European 
Convention, and the Universal Declaration, protect against 
undue interference with personal privacy. 295 There is some 
authority for the proposition that "corporal punishment vio-
lates a child's right to privacy, because the concept of privacy 
encompasses the concept of bodily integrity.,,296 Although the 
European Court of Human Rights held in Costello-Roberts that 
a headmaster's punishment of a pupil by hitting the latter's 
290. Universal Declaration, supra note 232, art. 3, at 72. 
291. Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 234, art. 9(1), at 175. 
292. European Convention, supra note 236, art. 5(1), at 226. 
293. American Convention, supra note 235, art. 5(1), at 146. 
294. See Cohen, Corporal Punishment, supra note 13, at 119 (arguing that the 
commitment to "security of [every human being's] person" made in the American 
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man could be read to bar corporal punish-
ment of children if the Commission found Article I applicable to children); cf. Santos 
Pais, supra note 189 (offering the idea that the various provisions of the Convention of 
the Child implicitly outlawing corporal punishment of children affirm that a range of 
more broadly phrased norms in earlier international human rights instruments have 
the same effect). 
295. See American Convention, supra note 235, art. 11(2}-(3), at 148 (stating that 
"[n]o one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life 
[or] his family" and that "[e]veryone has the right to the protection of the law against 
such interference"); Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 234, art. 17(1}-(2), 
at 177 (providing that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interfer-
ence with his privacy [or] family" and that "[e]veryone has the right to the protection 
of the law against such interference"); European Convention, supra note 236, art. 8(1), 
at 230 (declaring that "[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family 
life"); Universal Declaration, supra note 232, art. 12, at 73 (asserting that "[n]o one 
shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy [or] family"). 
296. VAN BUEREN, supra note 187, at 251. 
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clothed buttocks three times with a soft-soled gym shoe did not 
violate the European Convention's guarantee in article 8 of 
respect for everyone's private life,297 the court observed that 
"[t]he possibility that circumstances might exist in which Arti-
cle 8 could be regarded as affording a protection which went 
beyond that given by Article 3 was not excluded. "298 In fact, in 
App. No. 10592183 v. United Kingdom, the European Commis-
sion of Human Rights concluded that child complainants 
stated an actionable claim for violation of their privacy under 
article 8 arising out of incidents where school personnel used a 
leather strap to strike one student on each palm and another 
student twice on the buttocks.299 As previously mentioned, in 
the recent case of A & B v. United Kingdom, the European 
Commission also held that a child complainant stated an ac-
tionable article 8 claim based on the allegation that his 
stepfather caned his lower body so as to leave visible marks.30o 
Thus, the European Court of Human Rights and the Euro-
pean Commission of Human Rights have left no doubt that 
corporal punishment of children may, in appropriate cases, im-
plicate juveniles' privacy rights. 301 By analogy and in the 
absence of contrary authority, this reasoning seems equally 
applicable to the privacy guarantees in article 12 of the Uni-
versal Declaration, article 17 of the Civil and Political Rights 
Covenant, and article 11 of the American Convention.302 In-
deed, the Human Rights Committee has taken the position 
that the nondiscrimination policy of the Civil and Political 
Rights Covenant set forth in article 24 must permeate the rest 
of that covenant, including article 17, so as to spare children 
297. See Costello-Roberts, 1993 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 174. 
298. [d. 
299. See App. No. 10592/83,9 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 278. 
300. See supra notes 285-87 and accompanying text. At a subsequent stage of the 
same case, the European Commission refused to reach the merits on whether the 
child applicant should prevail on his article 8 claim. See supra notes 283-91 and ac-
companying text. 
301. The privacy claim under article 8 of the European Convention took an inter-
esting twist in X et al. v. Sweden, 1982 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 36 (Eur. Comm'n on 
H.R.). In that case, parents challenged Sweden's statutory prohibition of corporal 
punishment in tandem with its criminal law on assaults as violative of article 8 as 
well as other articles of the European Convention. See id. at 43, 45-46. The Court 
held that in extending criminal liability for assault to ordinary parental physical chas-
tisement of children, Swedish law did not contravene the "right to respect for private 
and family life" within the meaning of article 8. See id. at 49. 
302. Cf. Sohn, supra note 256, at 20 (stating that "European jurisprudence throws 
light not only on the provisions of the European Convention, but also on the similar 
provisions in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights"). 
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"from being subjected to acts of violence."sos Furthermore, since 
the Convention of the Child is understood to forbid all corporal 
punishment of children, its prohibition may be understood to 
retrospectively affirm that the privacy guarantees of these 
other international human rights instruments have the same 
prohibitory meaning as well. S04 
5. The Provision Protective of Physical and Mental Health-
No mention has been made thus far of any specific provisions of 
the Economic Rights Covenant although that treaty was previ-
ously enumerated as among the international instruments 
germane to corporal punishment of children. The truth is that 
there is only one relevant provision, but it is nonetheless po-
tentially quite important. Article 12, paragraph 1 of the 
Covenant provides for the recognition of the "right of everyone 
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health."s05 As detailed in Part III of this Article, 
corporal punishment of children is likely to impair either 
physical or mental health or both and, therefore, would con-
travene article 12's right to health. This reading becomes even 
more plausible inasmuch as article 12 may be informed by ar-
ticle 24, paragraph 3 of the Convention of the Child. It will be 
recalled that article 24, paragraph 3 of the Convention of the 
Child requires states parties to "abolishO traditional practices 
prejudicial to the health of children,"s06 one of which may be 
corporal punishment.s07 It is therefore arguable that article 12 
of the Economic Rights Covenant necessitates the elimination 
of corporal punishment because, as a traditional practice 
prejudicial to children's health, such punishment also is an ob-
stacle to children's enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health. S08 
303. General Comments Under Article 40, Paragraph 4, of the Covenant, U.N. 
GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 35th Sess., 891st mtg., General Comment 17 (35) 3/(art. 24), 
'lI'I3, 5, U.N. Doc. CCPRlC/211Add.7 (1989); cf. Santos Pais, supra note 189 (remarking 
that the antidiscrimination policy of the Convention of the Child militates against 
tolerance of corporal punishment of children). 
304. See Santos Pais, supra note 189. 
305. Economic Rights Covenant, supra note 233, art. 12(1), at 8. 
306. See Convention of the Child, note 142, art. 24(3), at 13. 
307. See supra notes 226-30 and accompanying text. 
308. Cf. Santos Pais, supra note 189 (discussing that the Convention of the Child 
draws upon the norms of preceding international human rights instruments and fur-
ther clarifies their meaning). 
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C. Summation 
This survey should leave no doubt that many international 
human rights instruments touch upon corporal punishment of 
children. But what, after all is said and analyzed, is the prin-
ciple that emerges as a matter of international law? A 
synthesis of the aforesaid documents, taken together, ulti-
mately yields the international law principle that all corporal 
punishment of children is prohibited---even though a few iso-
lated treaty provisions have been interpreted in a less absolute 
manner. To recapitulate, the Convention of the Child une-
quivocally prohibits all corporal punishment of children;309 
arguably the Torture Convention31O and the American Conven-
tion,311 as well as a host of provisions in the Universal 
Declaration,312 the Civil and Political Rights Covenant,313 and 
the Economic Rights Covenant,314 may be construed to do the 
same. In contrast, article 7 of the Civil and Political Rights 
Covenane15 and article 3 of the European Convention316 have 
been interpreted to prohibit some, but not all, corporal pun-
ishment of children; a semantic analysis would arguably allow 
for a similar reading of analogous provisions in the Universal 
Declaration.317 These interpretations and analyses of articles 7 
and 3 do not, however, change the fact that an absolute bar to 
all corporal punishment of children may be found and does 
exist in international law. 
Finally, it would be a distortion of modern human rights law 
to suggest that the Universal Declaration, the Civil and 
Political Rights Covenant, the Economic Rights Covenant, the 
American Convention, the European Convention, and the 
Torture Convention are the only international law documents 
addressing the legal status of corporal punishment of 
children.318 The reason that this Article focuses on the 
309. See supra notes 191, 193-230 and accompanying text. 
310. See supra notes 257-72 and accompanying text. 
311. See supra notes 250-52, 273-74, 293-95, 302 and accompanying text. 
312. See supra notes 249, 252, 256, 290, 294,295 and accompanying text. 
313. See supra notes 291, 294-95, 302 and accompanying text. 
314. See supra notes 305-08 and accompanying text. 
315. See supra notes 253-56 and accompanying text. 
316. See supra notes 275-91 and accompanying text. 
317. See supra notes 290, 294 and accompanying text. 
318. See, e.g., Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, Dec. 9, 
1985, art. 1, 25 I.L.M. 519, 521 [hereinafter Inter-American Convention) (committing 
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aforementioned instruments is twofold. First, the United 
States is a party to the Civil and Political Rights Covenane19 
and to the Torture Convention,320 a fact which should enhance 
their credibility with Americans. Second, an impressive 
number of American international law scholars credit these 
six instruments with having attained the status of customary 
international law.321 Indeed, the Universal Declaration, the 
states parties to prevent and punish torture); id. art. 6, at 522 (committing states 
parties to take effective measures to prevent and punish cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment); African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 24-
27, 1981, art. 4, 21 I.L.M. 59, 60 (1982) [hereinafter African Charter] (asserting that 
"[h]uman beings are inviolable" and that "[e]very human being shall be entitled to 
respect for his life and the integrity of his person"); id. art. 5 (enunciating that 
"[e]very individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a hu-
man being" and that "[a]l1 forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly 
... torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohib-
ited"); id. art. 6 (protecting every individual's right "to the security of his person"); id. 
art. 16(1), at 61 (affirming that "[e]very individual shall have the right to enjoy the 
best atta4lable state of physical and mental health"); id. art. 18(1) (stating that "[t]he 
family ... shall be protected by the State which shall take care of its physical ... and 
[moral health]"); id. art. 18(3), at 62 (proclaiming that "[t]he State shall ... ensure the 
protection of the rights of ... the child as stipulated in international declarations and 
conventions"); American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. I, O.A.S. 
Res. xxx, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogota, 
Mar. 30-May 2, 1948, art. I. reprinted in PAN AMERICAN UNION, FINAL ACT OF THE 
NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN STATES 39 (1948) [hereinafter 
American Declaration] (providing that "[e]very human being has the right to ... secu-
rity of his person"); id. art. V, at 40 (stating that "[e]very person has the right to the 
protection ofthe law against abusive attacks upon his ... private ... life"); id. art. VII 
(declaring that "all children have the right to special protection, care and aid"); id. art. 
XVII, at 42 (positing that "[e]very person has the right to be recognized everywhere as 
a person having rights and obligations, and to enjoy the basic civil rights"); id. art. 
XXIX, at 44 (stating that every person has the obligation "so to conduct himself in 
relation to others that each and every one may fully form and develop his personal-
ity"); id. art. XXX (imposing the duty on every person "to aid, support, educate and 
protect his minor children"). 
319. During the Carter administration, the United States signed the Covenant. 
See Scaperlanda, supra note 256, at 1019 n.272. "On June 8, 1992, the United States 
deposited its instrument of accession to the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights." William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights: Is the United States Still a Party?, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 
277, 277 (1995). Three months later the Covenant went into force for the United 
States. See id. 
320. See supra note 177. 
321. See Florentino P. Feliciano, The Application of Law: Some Recurring Aspects 
of the Process of Judicial Review and Decision Making, 37 AM. J. JURIS. 17, 50 (1992) 
(maintaining that customary international law is embodied in the Universal Declara-
tion, the Civil and Political Rights Covenant, the Economic Rights Covenant, the 
European Convention, and the "Inter-American Conventions"); John P. Humphrey, 
The International Bill of Rights: Scope and Implementation, 17 WM. & MARy L. REv. 
527, 529 (1976) (asserting that the Universal Declaration has become customary in-
ternationallaw); Richard B. Lillich, Invoking International Human Rights in Domestic 
Courts, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 367,396 (1985) (making the point that at least articles 3, 5, 
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Civil and Political Rights Covenant, and the Economic Rights 
Covenant have been especially esteemed as a veritable 
International Bill of Rights. 322 
Customary international law is binding as federal common 
law in the United States.323 The fact that some of these inter-
national instruments, or pertinent portions ofthem,324 constitute 
federal common law capable of being interpreted to prohibit 
corporal punishment of children may, therefore, be of some 
moment for the United States as a country which has not yet 
ratified the Convention of the Child. However, the current en-
forceability of these instruments in state and federal courts as 
federal common law presents difficult and complex questions 
that are beyond the scope of this Article.325 
7,9,12, and 13 of the Universal Declaration and articles 7, 9,10, and 12 of the Civil and 
Political Rights Covenant reflect customary international law}; Scaperlanda, supra note 
256, at 1014-15 (stating that "many would argue" that all or portions of the Universal 
Declaration and of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant are "embedded in customary 
internationallaw"); Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights 
of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 17, 32 (1982) (indicating that the 
principles laid down in the Universal Declaration, the Civil and Political Rights Cove-
nant, the European Convention, and "inter-American instruments" have, generally 
speaking, become a part of international customary law); Nadine Strossen, Recent US. 
and International Judicial Protection of Individual Rights: A Comparative Legal Process 
Analysis and Proposed Synthesis, 41 HAsTINGS L.J. 805, 817 (1990) (stating that the 
human rights values in the Universal Declaration and in the Civil and Political Rights 
Covenant are customary international law); Christopher J. Borgen, Note, The Theory and 
Practice of Regional Organization Intervention in Civil Wars, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 
797,820 (1994) (contending that the Civil and Political Rights Covenant "is taking on the 
mantle of customary international law"); see also MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 173, at 
327 (noting that the Universal Declaration has become customary international law and 
that the Civil and Political Rights Covenant and the Economic Rights Covenant "createlJ 
the expectations comprising customary internationallaw"). But see Suzanne M. Bernard, 
An Eye for an Eye: The Current Status of International Law on the Humane Treatment of 
Prisoners, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 759, 768 (1994) (declaring that the Civil and Political Rights 
Covenant has not yet become customary international law); Humphrey, supra, at 533 
(intimating that the Civil and Political Rights Covenant and the Economic Rights Cove-
nant were not customary international law in the 1970s because "they [applied) only to 
those states that ratiflied) them"}. 
322. See MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 173, at 320-22; Louis Henkin, Preface to THE 
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CML AND POLITICAL RIGHTS ix 
(Louis Henkin ed., 1981); Sohn, supra note 321, at 19. 
323. See supra note 183. 
324. For example, the late Professor Richard Lillich was of the opinion that articles 
3,5,7,9, 12, and 13 of the Universal Declaration and articles 7, 9, 10, and 12 of the Civil 
and Political Rights Covenant constitute customary international law. See Lillich, supra 
note 321. As discussed in the text above, articles 3, 5, and 12 of the Universal Declaration 
and articles 7 and 9 of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant may be interpreted to 
prohibit corporal punishment of children. See supra notes 243-45, 251-56, 290, 294-95. 
325. Compare THEonoR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS 
CUSTOMARY LAw 114-15, 119-32 (1989) (observing that although "it has not been easy 
to extend the reach of international human rights in the United States through the 
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The enforceability of a prohibition of corporal punishment of 
children as it is manifested in articles 7 and 17 of the Civil and 
Political Rights Covenant and article 16 of the Torture Con-
vention is equally problematic even though the United States 
is a party to these treaties. Putting aside the thorny issue of 
whether these treaties should be self-executing,326 it is the case 
application of customary law," this law is self-executing in American courts and should 
be further promoted), and Lillich, supra note 321, at 368--69, 393,412-15 (stating that 
while customary international law should be enforceable in domestic courts and that 
some courts have responded accordingly, in the near future these courts are more 
likely to use customary law to inform the federal Constitution and statutes), with 
Gordon A. Christenson, Customary International Human Rights Law in Domestic 
Court Decisions, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 225, 225--26 (1995--96) (noting that U.S. 
federal courts are reluctant to incorporate customary international law as directly 
applicable federal law), and Strossen, supra note 321, at 815--16, 818-23 (remarking 
that while customary international law has occasionally been judicially enforced in 
the United States and while there is support for the view that such law should be 
controlling, relatively few courts have actually implemented this approach), and Mar-
garet Hartka, Note, The Role of International Law in Domestic Courts: Will the Legal 
Procrastination End?, 14 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 99, 99, 124-25 (1990) (mentioning 
that the judiciary has failed to properly use customary international law). 
326. Enforceability may turn on whether the Civil and Political Rights Covenant 
and the Torture Convention are self-executing or non-self-executing. If the Covenant 
and the Convention were self-executing, they would be enforceable, barring other 
legal obstacles; if the Covenant and the Convention were non-self-executing, they 
would be unenforceable without federal implementing legislation. See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 111(3) (1987) 
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS]; see also Lillich, supra note 321, at 
368; John Quigley, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
Supremacy Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1287, 1297-1300 (1993); Strossen, supra note 
321, at 812-13. 
Interestingly, some commentators opine that the terms of the Civil and Political 
Rights Covenant are inconsistent with non-self-executing status and urge that the 
judiciary should hold the Covenant to be self-executing. See Jordan J. Paust, Avoiding 
"Fraudulent" Executive Policy: Analysis of Non·Self-Execution of the Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1257 passim (1993); Quigley, supra, at 1300-
10; cf. Richard B. Lillich, The United States Constitution and International Human 
Rights Law, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 53, 68--69 (1990) (claiming that many of the provi-
sions in the Civil and Political Rights Covenant "appear to be self-executing in 
character," but expressing concern that a Senate declaration that the treaty is non-
self-executing would be given "great weight"). But see Mathias Reimann, A Human 
Rights Exception to Sovereign Immunity: Some Thoughts on Prinz V. Federal Republic 
of Germany, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 403, 416 n.70 (1995) (stating that the Covenant is not 
self-executing); Jaleen Nelson, Comment, Sledge Hammers and Scalpels: The FBI 
Digital Wiretap Bill and Its Effect on Free Flow of Information and Privacy, 41 UCLA 
L. REV. 1139, 1150 n.56 (1994) (stating that since the Covenant is not self-executing, 
U.S. courts will not enforce it). This is a view that has also been articulated with re-
spect to the Torture Convention. See Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The 
Scope of U.S. Senate Control over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 571, 631-32 (1991) (stating that it is likely that the Torture "Convention 
will be deemed self-executing"). But see 136 CONGo REC. S17492 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 
1990) (statement of declarations to which the Senate's advice and consent is subject, 
announcing that articles 1 through 16 of the Torture Convention are not self-
executing); Message of the President Transmitting the Torture Convention, S. TREATY 
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that the United States has made a reservation in relation to 
the Civil and Political Rights Covenant's article 7 (the clause 
forbidding torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 
or punishment) and to the Torture Convention's article 16 (the 
clause forbidding cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment). Such reservations undoubtedly would impede 
article 7's and article 16's respective enforceability in relation 
to corporal punishment of children.327 The reservation to the 
Civil and Political Rights Covenant states that, "[t]he United 
States considers itself bound by Article 7 to the extent that 
'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment' means 
the cruel and unusual treatment or punishment prohibited by 
the Fifth, Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States.,,328 The reservation to article 16 of 
the Torture Convention is, in substance; of the same import.329 
In Ingraham v. Wright330 (which is examined more thoroughly 
in Part IV), the U.S. Supreme Court held, among other things, 
that corporal punishment of students by school personnel does 
not contravene the Eighth Amendment.331 In fact, in giving its 
DOC. No. 100-20, at 1, 2 (1988); Stewart, supra note 262, at 467-68 (taking the posi-
tion that articles 1 through 16 of the Torture Convention are not self-executing). 
327. "A reservation ... modifies the relevant provisions of the agreement as to the 
relations between the reserving and accepting state parties but does not modifY those 
provisions for the other parties to the agreement inter se." RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS, supra note 326, at § 313(3); see also id. at § 314 cmt. a (noting that a res-
ervation modifies the treaty); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Reflections on the Ratification of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by the United States Senate, 
42 DEPAUL L. REv. 1169, 1175 (1993) (stating that reservations leave provisions of 
treaties "internationally binding yet nationally unenforceable"); Quigley, supra note 
326, at 1289-90 (remarking that a reservation exempts the nation making it from a 
particular treaty provision "so long as the reservation is not incompatible with the 
object and purpose of the treaty"). 
328. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL 
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POUTICAL RIGHTS, S. EXEC. REP. No. 102-23, at 22 (1992). 
329. The reservation to article 16 of the Torture Convention provides: 
The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following reservations: 
(1) That the United States considers itself bound by the obligation under Article 
16 to prevent "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment," only in-
sofar as the term "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" 
means the cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited 
by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States. 
136 CONGo REc. S17491 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of reservations to which 
the Senate's advice and consent is subject). 
330. 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (5-4 decision). 
331. See id. at 664. 
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rationale for the reservation to article 7, the American gov-
ernment specifically indicated that protection against corporal 
punishment should be considered excluded by its reservation.332 
Some commentators have theorized that the reservation to arti-
cle 7 is not valid.333 They are not alone in this opinion: eleven 
European countries have objected to the U.S. reservation to 
332. The pertinent rationale provided by the Bush Administration for the United 
States' reservation to article 7 of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant reads as 
follows: 
Because the [U.S.] Bill of Rights already contains substantively equivalent pro-
tections, and because the Human Rights Committee ... has adopted the view 
that prolonged judicial proceedings in cases involving capital punishment could 
in certain circumstances constitute such treatment, U.S. ratification of the 
Covenant should be conditioned upon a reservation limiting our undertakings 
in this respect to the prohibitions of the Fifth, Eighth and/or Fourteenth 
Amendments. This would also have the effect of excluding such other practices 
as corporal punishment and solitary confinement, both of which the Committee 
has indicated might, depending on the circumstances, be considered contrary to 
article 7. 
SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 328, at 12 (emphasis added.). 
333. Commentators have cited a number of grounds for finding the reservation 
invalid. First, some commentators have advanced the notion that the American reser-
vation to article 7 is incompatible with the object and purpose of the Civil and 
Political Rights Covenant and therefore is not valid. See, e.g., Michael H. Posner & 
Peter J. Spiro, Adding Teeth to United States Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights: The International Human Rights Conformity Act of 1993, 42 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 1209,1216-17,1226-27 (1993); Schabas, supra note 319, at 291. This theory 
relies on the principles of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which pro-
vides that a reservation to a treaty is not valid if the reservation is "incompatible with 
the object and purpose of the treaty." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 19(c), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1969) !hereinafter 
Vienna Convention]; see also RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 326, 
§ 313(1)(c) (reiterating the Vienna Convention principle). Second, at least one com-
mentator has noted with approval that the Human Rights Committee considers that 
article 7, as nonderogable customary international law, may not be the subject of a 
valid reservation. See Schabas, supra note 319, at 295, 308 (citations omitted). Finally, 
another analyst has contended that, as a general matter, reservations intended to 
reject international obligations rising above a nation's existing law are of doubtful 
validity and, perhaps, even of questionable constitutionality. See Louis Henkin, Com-
ment, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 
89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 343, 348 (1995). This contention is highly relevant since the 
United States' reservation to article 7 is designed precisely to limit article 7 to the 
parameters of constitutional law under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. See supra note 328; cf Ved P. Nanda, The United States Reservation to the Ban 
on the Death Penalty for Juvenile Offenders: An Appraisal Under the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1311, 1331-32 (1993) 
(suggesting that because it is incompatible with the object of the Civil and Political 
Rights Covenant, the United States' reservation to the Covenant's ban on capital 
punishment of juveniles is invalid); Paust, supra note 326, at 1277-78 (theorizing that 
the reservation to article 7 of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant should be 
treated as meaningless because in interpreting domestic law "our reading of [the Fifth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments] ... can be conditioned by ... the Covenant"). 
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article 7,334 and the Human Rights Committee concluded that 
the reservation is invalid as well.335 As might be expected from 
this reaction, the reservation to article 16 of the Torture Con-
vention has also been the object of scholarly criticism.33s 
This short digression into the problems of enforceability is 
offered to help set the relevant international law in historical 
context. But, lest the thread be lost, it bears reiteration that 
the point is not whether these international instruments are 
or are not enforceable in the United States. Rather and again, 
the point is simply that since the principle has been estab-
lished in the international arena and especially under the 
Convention of the Child that corporal punishment of children 
is prohibited, this principle should at least be taken into ac-
count if the United States is to formulate a position on this 
matter that is sophisticated and has legitimacy before the rest 
of the world.337 The status of international law on corporal 
punishment of children, like the laws in jurisdictions that pro-
hibit such punishment, is offered as information that provides 
a more empirically sound context and more realistic parame-
ters within which Americans can reconsider the issue. 
334. See Schabas, supra note 319, at 277, 310. 
335. See Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Art. 40 of the 
Covenant, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Human Rts. Comm., 
53rd Sess., 1413th mtg. '114, U.N. Doc. CCPRlCn9/Add. 50 (1995) (stating that the 
committee believes the U.S. reservation to article 7 is incompatible with the object 
and purpose of the Covenant). 
336. See Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 326, at 629--30; cf. Schabas, supra note 
319, at 282-84 (likening the reservation to article 16 of the Torture Convention to the 
reservation to article 7 of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant and intimating that 
the former is as objectionable as the latter). 
337. A nation's fulfillment of international human rights law standards correlates 
with its prestige and legitimacy as an enlightened world leader. See Loms HENKIN, 
THE AGE OF RIGHTS 74 (1990) (offering that the United States' failure to live up to the 
standards of international human rights instruments has been "resented as arrogant" 
and "derided as hypocritical"); Paust, supra note 326, at 1283 (remarking that the 
policy of non-self-execution vis·a-vis the Civil and Political Rights Covenant has seri-
ously dishonored the United States); Scaperlanda, supra note 256, at 1016 (opining 
that the United States has expended "a large measure of moral capital in the world 
market place" because of its historic reluctance to become a party to the major inter-
national human rights covenants); David P. Stewart, United States Ratification of the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Under· 
standings, and Declarations, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 1183, 1183-84 (1993) (stating that 
American adherence to the Civil and Political Rights Covenant would enhance the 
United States' international role in promoting the rule of law and democratic ideals). 
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III. POLICY REASONS WARRANTING A LEGAL PROHIBITION OF 
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN 
The fact that seven other countries and Minnesota prohibit 
subabuse corporal punishment of children and that 
international law supports such a prohibition should be highly 
persuasive in reconsidering policy on the subject. Still, 
prohibiting all sub abuse corporal punishment of children would 
represent a veritable sea change in Americans' traditional 
approach to the subject, especially as it relates to punishment 
within the family. In order for a proposal of such far-reaching 
proportions to be taken seriously, this Part offers psychological 
and sociological data and theories as well as philosophical 
considerations demonstrating that a ban on all corporal punish-
ment of children would significantly improve individual lives 
and the condition of society as a whole. Because there are 
ample bases for prohibition, this Part also examines the 
question of whether legal reform is advisable or whether 
reliance exclusively on other means of changing public 
attitudes would be more appropriate. 
Incidentally, in laying out the policy rationales for prohibit-
ing corporal punishment of children, the author is not 
unmindful that some may object to prohibition on the grounds 
that it does not take cultural or racial identities of families 
into account as extenuating circumstances.338 For instance, 
many Mrican-Americans contend that '''strong discipline' in 
the form of corporal punishment is necessary to keep children 
out of trouble in an environment where trouble lurks on every 
block. Some also argue that corporal punishment is just a part 
of black culture.,,339 Professor Murray Straus refutes this ar-
gument by making three points. First, he notes that corporal 
338. The argument that there should be a culturally and/or racially based exemp-
tion to a ban on corporal punishment of children is undermined by the fact that this 
form of discipline is common in different cultures. For example, before the Swedish 
prohibition on corporal punishment of children, the Swedes had a tradition of harsh 
physical chastisement of their children. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying 
text. Likewise, the English still frequently use corporal punishment on children. See 
NEWELL, supra note 18, at 53-55, 97-101. Also many immigrant parents in the United 
States prefer to use corporal punishment when their children misbehave. See Celia W. 
Dugger, A Cultural Reluctance to Spare the Rod, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 1996, at Bl. 
339. STRAUS, supra note 2, at 117; see also Hyman, Corporal Punishment, supra 
note 3, at 119-20 (stating that many Mrican-American parents believe that physically 
chastising their young children will spare the latter from getting into trouble later in 
life and from experiencing brutalization by the authorities). 
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punishment became a part of black culture in response to a 
history of slavery and oppression and suggests that "the con-
tinuation of that aspect of black culture interferes with 340 . progress towards equality." Second, he argues that corporal 
punishment is not an essential element of strong discipline 
and does not ultimately help people defend their honor. 341 
Third, he suggests that those successful Mrican-American 
adults who were corporally punished as children have not 
flourished because of corporal punishment, but, rather, in spite 
of it and due to other parenting strategies.342 
This Article purposefully declines to recommend a relativis-
tic approach. If this decision is misguided, let it be known that 
it is born out of concern for the welfare of all children and so-
cial groups rather than out of insensitivity to multiculturalism 
issues. The decision is predicated upon the tautology that hu-
man beings share the quality of being human. They have it in 
common to flinch from pain; they share psychological reactions 
to being rendered simultaneously helpless and maddened by 
the use of force against which there is no redress.343 As this 
Part will show, these are reactions that may be ruinous for 
people across the spectrum of nationalities and races.344 These 
are also reactions that mirror a universal human hunger for 
right treatment and for a respect that acknowledges each per-
son's humanity.345 It is not far-fetched, therefore, to suggest 
that abolition of corporal punishment of children may actually 
serve rather than disserve the cause of diversity by strength-
ening all children's protection from violence and from the 
dehumanization of undergoing violence, regardless of any par-
ticular child's background or identity.346 
340. STRAUS, supra note 2, at 117. 
341. See id. 
342. See id. 
343. See infra notes 34~5, 368-84 and accompanying text. 
344. See infra notes 368--405 and accompanying text. 
345. See infra notes 406-27 and accompanying text; see also THOMAS HOBBES, 
LEVIATHAN 106, 149 (Herbert W. Schneider ed. 1958) (describing the respect that peo-
ple naturally seek from each other); IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 54, 56 
(W. Hastie trans., Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1974) (1796-97) (urging that people 
should regard themselves as an end rather than a means and that every person ought 
to be his or her own master by right). 
346. The international human rights instruments discussed in Part II of this Arti-
cle may also be interpreted to contribute toward equalizing the status of all children 
to that of adults insofar as protections against violence are concerned. See supra Part 
II. 
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1. Psychological and Sociological Reasons for Prohibiting 
Corporal Punishment of Children-Respected theoretical con-
structs and accumulating data indicate that corporal 
punishment jeopardizes children while they are children and 
that such punishment has lasting deleterious effects upon 
reaching adulthood. The harm done represents personal loss 
and pain for the individuals who undergo corporal punishment 
but it also may exact a considerable toll on a society-wide 
scale. While it would be impossible within the confines of this 
Article to give a comprehensive description of these phenom-
ena, even a superficial foray into the theories and data 
establishes a persuasive policy basis for reform directed to-
ward prohibiting corporal punishment of children. Persuasive 
but not perfect. At the outset of this discussion, it should be 
candidly acknowledged that there is some controversy among 
health and child care professionals over whether light or mod-
erate spanking does any actual harm.347 Nevertheless, this 
Article will take the position, in company with most experts on 
the subject, that, on balance, persuasive policy reasons for a 
prohibition exist. The various theories and data, considered in 
total, make it apparent that the overwhelming evidence of the 
injurious effects of corporal punishment of children is accom-
panied by almost no evidence of lasting benefits.348 Moreover, 
corporal punishment may be challenged on moral grounds. 
347. For commentators acknowledging the existence of the controversy, see Ed-
wards, supra note 5, at 990-94; Hyman, Corporal Punishment, supra note 3, at 118-
20; Kenelm F. McCormick, Attitudes of Primary Care Physicians Toward Corporal 
Punishment, 267 JAMA 3161, 3163-65 (1992); Murray A. Straus et al., Spanking by 
Parents and Subsequent Antisocial Behavior of Children, 151 ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRICS 
& ADOLESCENT MED. 761, 762-64 (1997); and Fredric P. Nelson, A Letter Supporting 
Physical Discipline, NEWSLETTER OF THE SECTION ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT (Am. 
Acad. of Pediatrics, Elk Grove Village, Ill.), Sept. 1993, at 1,1-3. A recent article takes 
the position that parents who are authoritative (rather than authoritarian) in their 
parenting and who have established a "warm, engaged rational parent-child relation-
ship" may use spanking without any adverse consequences. See Diana Baumrind, 
Parenting: The Discipline Controversy Revisited, 45 FAM. REL. 405, 412 (1996). How-
ever, an even more recent article reports on a study showing that parental corporal 
punishment causes an increase in children's antisocial behavior regardless of the 
warmth and cognitive stimulation parents provide. See Straus et aI., supra, at 764-67. 
348. Although there is some evidence that corporal punishment may have "an 
immediate deterrent effect" on children's misbehavior, see Hyman, Corporal Punish-
ment, supra note 3, at 119, there is also data showing that any deterrent effect is 
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Turning first to the damage which physical chastisement 
may work during childhood, it appears that there are a num-
ber of potential adverse effects. Corporal punishment may 
cause children to exhibit increased physical aggressiveness.349 
Worse still, for both the child-victims and society at large, chil-
dren who are corporally punished also tend to have less 
capacity for empathy.350 Coupling aggressiveness with lack of 
empathy creates a propensity to hurt others without compunc-
tion. This correlation of corporal punishment with childhood 
aggression and lack of empathy is no minor consideration in 
an era when the incidence of youth violence has reached unac-
ceptably high levels.351 
fleeting, see id.; infra notes 353--54 and accompanying text. See also LEACH, supra 
note 11, at 224 (stating that smacking children cannot change their behavior and that 
such punishment does not even produce momentary regret in the child because he or 
she is "so overwhelmed by [feelings of] pain and indignity"); SAMALIN, supra note 1, at 
73-74 (mentioning that experience shows corporal punishment to be ineffective); 
SEARS & SEARS, supra note 1, at 150 (explaining that during and immediately after 
the spanking, the child is so preoccupied with the pain and humiliation involved in 
the punishment that he or she loses sight of the reason for the punishment). But see 
Baumrind, supra note 347, at 412 (theorizing that spanking can be productive in 
shaping children's behavior if it is administered by authoritative, warm parents). 
349. See LEACH, supra note 11, at 224 (stating that smacking children contributes 
to turning them into bullies); JANE NELSEN ET AL., POSITIVE DISCIPLINE A-Z: 1001 
SOLUTIONS TO EvERYDAY PARENTING PROBLEMS 164--65 (1993) (pointing out that 
spanking children encourages them to hit others); SAMALIN, supra note 1, at 73; 
RoBERT R. SEARS ET AL., PATTERNS OF CHILD REARING 266 (1957); SEARS & SEARS, 
supra note 1, at 154 (explaining that the more frequently a child is given physical 
punishment the more likely it is that she will behave aggressively toward other family 
members and peers); SPOCK, supra note 11, at 152; STRAUS, supra note 2, at 22, 100; 
FELICITY DE ZULUETA, FROM PAIN TO VIOLENCE: THE TRAUMATIC RooTs OF DE-
STRUCTIVENESS 218 (1993); J.L. Caldwell, Parental Physical Punishment and the Law, 
13 N.Z. UNIV. L. REv. 370, 384 (1989); Leonard D. Eron, Parent-Child Interaction, 
Television Vwlence, and Aggression of Children, 37 AM. PSYCHOL. 197,203,208 (1982); 
Norma D. Feshbach, The Effects of Vwlence in Childhood, 2 J. CLINICAL CmLD 
PSYCHOL. 28, 29--30 (1973); Herman, supra note 2, at 32-35. But see JAMES DOBSON, 
THE STRONG-WILLED CHILD: BIRTH THROUGH ADoLESCENCE 34-35 (1978) (contending 
that reasonable corporal punishment administered by a loving parent inhibits chil-
dren's misbehavior); Baumrind, supra note 347, at 410, 412-13 (opining that corporal 
punishment does not cause children to become more aggressive or delinquent). 
350. See PHILIP GREVEN, SPARE THE CmLD: THE RELIGIOUS RooTs OF PuNISHMENT 
AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF PHYsICAL ABUSE 127-29 (1991) (explaining that 
children who are hurt by their parents develop immunities to empathy); Feshbach, 
supra note 349, at 30; see also ALICE MILLER, BREAIaNG DOWN THE WALL OF SILENCE 
88 (Simon Worrall trans., Dutton Books 1991) (describing how beatings by his parents 
during childhood were a factor causing Hitler's later disregard for human life). 
351. See Daniel Goleman, Early Vwlence Leaves Its Mark on the Brain, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 3, 1995, at C1 (mentioning that the rate of violence among teenagers has 
been rising precipitously); Camille Sweeney, Portrait of the American Child, 1995, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 8, 1995, § 6 (Magazine), at 53 (reporting that although crimes of violence 
decreased nationally between 1985 and 1995, arrest rates for violent crimes commit-
ted by children ages 10 to 17 doubled between 1983 and 1992). Indeed, it appears that 
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Ironically, corporal punishment, which often is the result of 
parental concern, may actually hamper relations between par-
ents and their children.352 This impairment .of the parent-child 
bond is not only unfortunate but, it appears, is quite unneces-
sary: there is considerable data indicating that corporal 
punishment does not, in any consistent way, deter misbehavior 
or encourage good behavior on the part of children.353 Most ex-
perts agree that corporal punishment does nothing to fulfill 
the disciplinary goal of developing a child's conscience so as to 
enable him or her to behave well without parental prodding. 354 
Physical attacks on a child intended to inflict pain generally 
do just that-they cause the child to feel physical pain and an 
accompanying terror of that pain.355 As an invasion of their 
bodily integrity, children may find the experience "humiliating 
and degrading."356 Experts have also found that corporal 
corporal punishment is associated with juvenile delinquency. See NEWELL, supra note 
18, at 43-46; STRAUS, supra note 2, at 108-09. 
352. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 123-27; SEARS & SEARS, supra note I, at 
148-49 (stating that hitting devalues the parent-child relationship); STRAUS, supra 
note 2, at 153-54; Herman, supra note 2, at 18; Jan Hunt, Ten Reasons Not to Hit 
Your Kids, in MILLER, supra note 350, app. D at 169; Lawrence S. Wissow, & Debra 
Roter, Thward Effective Discussion of Discipline and Corporal Punishment During 
Primary Care VtSits: Findings from Studies of Doctor·Patient Interaction, 94 PE· 
DIATRICS 587, 587 (1994). But see J. RICHARD FuGATE, WHAT THE BIBLE SAYS ABOUT 
... CHILD TRAINING 111 (1980) (maintaining that proper use of physical chastisement 
is the only way to foster family fellowship); Roy LESSIN, SPANKING: WHY, WHEN, How? 
22-23 (1982) (asserting that a truly loving relationship between parent and child may 
necessitate spanking). 
353. See LEACH, supra note 11, at 224; NEWELL, supra note 18, at 16-21; SEARS & 
SEARS, supra note I, at 154 (explaining that spanking doesn't work because it does not 
promote good behavior, creates a distance between parent and child, and contributes 
to a violent society); STRAUS, supra note 2, at 149-51; Caldwell, supra note 349, at 
384-85; Edwards, supra note 5, at 1020; Herman, supra note 2, at 27-32; McCormick, 
supra note 347, at 3161~2. But see FuGATE, supra note 352, at 127-130 (arguing that 
physical chastisement helps children to be obedient). 
354. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 19; SAMALIN, supra note I, at 74; STRAUS, su-
pra note 2, at 100, 144; Anthony M. Graziano & Karen A Namaste, Parental Use of 
Physical Force in Child Discipline: A Survey of 679 College Students, 5 J. INTER-
PERSONAL VIOLENCE 449, 449, 458 (1990); McCormick, supra note 347, at 1361; 
Kathryn D. Perkins, Parents'Dilemma: 10 Spank or Not, THE SACRAMENTO BEE, June 
5, 1994, at AI; Murray A Straus, Remarks at the International Seminar on Worldwide 
Strategies and Progress Towards Ending All Physical Punishment of Children 
(Dublin, Ireland, Aug. 22, 1996). But see FuGATE, supra note 352, at 186 (asserting 
that corporal punishment of children lays the foundation for the development of self-
control). 
355. See DOBSON, supra note 349, at 47; FuGATE, supra note 352, at 136; GREVEN, 
supra note 350, at 122-23; NEWELL, supra note 18, at 12; STRAUS, supra note 2, at 5, 
7,9-10; Feshbach, supra note 349, at 29-30; Graziano & Namaste, supra note 354, at 
450; Herman, supra note 2, at 21; McCormick, supra note 347, at 3162. 
356. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 12; see also JOSEPH GoLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE 
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 73-74 (1979); MILLER, supra note 11, at 17; SEARS 
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punishment may produce in children neurotic reactions such 
d . 357 'thd I 358 . t 359 t . 360 d' as epresslOn, WI rawa , anxIe y, enslOn, an, m 
older children, substance abuse,361 interference with school 
work,362 and precocious sexual behavior.363 Corporal punishment 
can cause serious physiological damage as· welV64 including 
somatic responses such as headaches and stomachaches.365 
Even more dangerous, corporal punishment of children is often 
the prelude to child abuse as more traditionally conceived.366 It 
& SEARS, supra note I, at 152 (explaining that children may feel anger, humiliation, 
and a sense of unfairness in response to corporal punishment). But see DOBSON, supra 
note 349, at 84 (arguing that corporal punishment can and should be used so as not to 
break the child's spirit). Some who favor corporal punishment of children see its value 
precisely in that it humbles the child. See, e.g., FUGATE, supra note 352, at 139. 
357. See HYMAN, READING, WRITING, AND THE HICKORY STICK, supra note 3, at 94, 
99-100; ALICE MILLER, THE DRAMA OF THE GIFTED CHILD 43 (1994); NEWELL, supra 
note 18, at 46; Herman, supra note 2, at 18; Wissow & Rater, supra note 352, at 588. 
358. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 129; HYMAN, READING, WRITING AND THE 
HICKORY STICK, supra note 3, at 94, 100; SEARS & SEARS, supra note I, at 148, 152. 
359. See HYMAN, READING, WRITING AND THE HICKORY STICK, supra note 3, at 94, 
99-100; GREVEN, supra note 350, 122-23. 
360. See HYMAN, READING, WRITING AND THE HICKORY STICK, supra note 3, at 95, 
100; cf Herman, supra note 2, at 39 (stating that corporal punishment causes children 
to obey their parents out of fear). 
36l. See HYMAN, READING, WRITING AND THE HICKORY STICK, supra note 3, at 96; 
NEWELL, supra note 18, at 46; Wissow & Rater, supra note 352, at 587; cf MILLER, 
supra note 357, at 97 (explaining that people who as children "repressed their intense 
feelings" may try to regain those feelings by means of drugs or alcohol) (citation omit-
ted). 
362. See HYMAN, READING, WRITING AND THE HICKORY STICK, supra note 3, at 96, 
99; Herman, supra note 2, at 39. 
363. See HYMAN, READING, WRITING AND THE HICKORY STICK, supra note 3, at 96. 
364. See id. at 1; LEACH, supra note 11, at 225; NEWELL, supra note 18, at 31-33; 
JORDAN RIAK, PLAIN TALK ABOUT SPANKING 3 (1994); Hyman, Corporal Punishment, 
supra note 3, at 114-16; Corporal Punishment in the Home: Commentary, NEWS-
LETTER OF THE SECTION ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT (Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Elk 
Grove Village, 111.), Mar. 1992, at I, 2; Wissow & Rater, supra note 352, at 587. 
365. See HYMAN, READING, WRITING AND THE HICKORY STICK, supra note 3, at 95, 
100. 
366. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 21-31; SEARS & SEARS, supra note I, at 149; 
STRAUS, supra note 2, at 81-87, 90-97; DAVID A WOLFE, CHILD ABUSE: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 51 (Developmental Clinical Psy-
chology and Psychiatry Series No. 10, 1987) (suggesting that child abuse may be 
caused by social structures which neither sanction nor provide alternatives to the use 
of corporal punishment); Richard J. Gelles, VIOlence Toward Children in the United 
States, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD ABUSE 53, 75 (Richard Bourne & Eli H. 
Newberger eds., 1979); Gibbons, supra note 32, at 112; Herman, supra note 2, at 40-
41; McCormick, supra note 347, at 3161; see also LEACH, supra note 11, at 224 (noting 
that use of corporal punishment on children has a tendency to escalate in intensity); 
Caldwell, supra note 349, at 381-82 (observing that corporal punishment can lead to 
child abuse); cf Brandt F. Steele, The Psychology of Child Abuse, 17 FAM. ADVOC., 
Winter 1995, at 19, 21 (stating that abusive parents tend to believe "in the educa-
tional value and necessity of using physical punishment as a disciplinary tool"). But 
see Demie Kurz, Corporal Punishment and Adult Use of VIOlence: A Critique of 
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is no secret that severe child abuse has become a deplorably 
pervasive problem in American society. 367 
The ill effects of corporal punishment on children's lives are 
reason enough to consider prohibition. However, as pathetic as 
the child's plight may be, some of the most ominous ramifica-
tions of corporal punishment of children are those that are 
manifested when children who have felt the rod reach adult-
hood. Analysis by respected psychologists and experts in 
related fields reveals that corporal punishment of a child is all 
too likely to produce an adult with lasting psychic suffering 
and maiming. The root cause of the ensuing adult disorders is 
that children are not permitted to vent the rage and humi1ia-
tion they feel upon being struck.368 They may not express these 
feelings for a variety of reasons. Looked at from a child's point 
of view, it is dangerous to react hostilely toward the very peo-
ple upon whom one is dependene69 and with whom one 
invariably identifies37°-especially if an outbreak of hostility is 
"Discipline and Deviance", 38 SOC. PROBS. 155, 155-57 (1991) (arguing that there is no 
convincing evidence for singling out corporal punishment as a major cause of child abuse 
without also considering gender, race and class). 
367. See Elizabeth Gleick, The Children's Crusade: A '60's-Style Campaign Aims to 
Put Kids First in This Year's Budget Battles and the Presidential Race, TIME, June 3, 
1996, at 31, 32 (reporting that in 1992 there were 850,000 substantisted cases of child 
abuse or neglect in the United States); Bob Herbert, In America: Turning Children's 
Rights into Reality, N.Y. TIMEs, May 27,1996, at 19 (relating that every seven hours an 
American child dies from abuse or neglect); Sweeney, supra note 351, at 53 (advising that 
from 1985 to 1994, the number of reported cases of child abuse nationwide increased 64 
percent); Who Stands for Children?, N.Y. TIMEs, June 1, 1996, at 18 (stating that each 
day nearly 8,500 children are abused or neglected in the United States). 
368. Children are likely to experience anger and a sense of degradation when they 
, are corporally punished. See'GREVEN, supra note 350, at 124-27,132; LEACH, supra note 
11, at 224; MILLER, supra note 350, at 92-94; SEARS & SEARS, supra note 1, at 147, 152; 
STRAUS, supra note 2, at 69; Herman, supra note 2, at 18. These reactions are especially 
understandable in light of the fact that children, even more so than adults, experience 
being physically struck as a profoundly traumatic event. See STRAUS, supra note 2, at 9-
10; Herman, supra note 2, at 21; cf MILLER, supra note 357, at 78-79 (discussing the 
intensity of feelings unique to young children). 
369. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 132 (describing how a child cannot afford to re-
act with anger towards a punitive parent "on whom he or she depends for nurturance 
and life itself"); MILLER, supra note 357, at 8; MILLER, supra note 2, at 6; J. KoNRAD 
STETl'BACHER, MAKING SENSE OF 8uFFERING: THE HEALING CONFRONTATION WITH YOUR 
OWN PAST 27-28 (1991). 
370. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 132 (theorizing that children suppress anger in 
response to hurtful discipline administered "by adults whom the child loves"); AllCE 
MILLER, BANISHED KNOWLEDGE: FACING CHILDHOOD INJURIES 98-105 (1988) (explaining 
that the child identifies so thoroughly with the punishing parent that the child is unable 
to comprehend when an iI\iustice is being done to him or her); AllCE MILLER, PICTURES 
OF A CHILDHOOD 4-5 (1986) [here~r MILLER, PICTURES] (suggesting that because 
children love their parents the former tend to absolve the latter from responsibility for 
cruelty to the children); STRAUS, supra note 2, at 163 (noting that it is difficult to 
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likely to be met with more intimidation and pain.371 It may also 
be inconceivable, especially to younger children, that the par-
ent's punitiveness could be wrong. 372 Nor can very young 
children and babies even accurately conceptualize what is 
happening to them so as to respond consciously to their pre-
d· t 373 lcamen. 
Despite its function as a natural defense mechanism, this 
quiescence does nothing to assuage the child's hurt and anger; 
to the contrary, such feelings must go somewhere and, ulti-
mately, many children have no alternative but to repress 
them.374 The psychologist Alice Miller has explained the dy-
namic as follows: 
If there is absolutely no possibility of reacting appropri-
ately to hurt, humiliation, and coercion, then these 
experiences cannot be integrated into the personality; the 
feelings they evoke are repressed, and the need to articu-
late them remains unsatisfied, without any hope of being 
fulfilled. 
. .. What becomes of this forbidden and therefore 
unexpressed anger? Unfortunately, it does not disappear, 
but is transformed with time into a more or less conscious 
hatred directed against either the self or substitute 
persons, a hatred that will seek to discharge itself in 
various ways permissible and suitable for an adult.375 
The repressed childhood fury does, then, "go somewhere"; 
after years of smoldering intrapsychically, the accumulated 
ire can emerge in some adults in the guise of personality 
acknowledge that corporal punishment is destructive because it means condemning 
one's own parents). 
371. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 123; LEACH, supra note 11, at 224; MILLER, 
supra note 350, at 55. 
372. See MILLER, supra note 11, at 59, 61, 74, 247--48; MILLER, supra note 350, at 
19-20,55. 
373. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 19; STETrBACHER, supra note 369, at 28; 
Herman, supra note 2, at 21. 
374. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 126; MILLER, supra note 11, at 7, 61; ALICE 
MILLER, THE UNTOUCHED KEy: TRACING CHILDHOOD TRAUMA IN CREATIVITY AND 
DESTRUCTIVENESS 159-60, 168 (1990) [hereinafter MILLER, UNTOUCHED KEy]; 
STRAUS, supra note 2, at 69; Herman, supra note 2, at 19. 
375. MILLER, supra note 11, at 7, 61. 
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disorders characterized by destructiveness either toward the 
self or toward others. 376 
A correlation has been drawn, for instance, linking repressed 
childhood anger with such inward-turning adult disorders as 
d . 377 b· ul· b h . 378 eli . t· 379 epresslOn, 0 sesslve-comp slve e aYlor, ssocla lon, 
and paranoia.38o Such childhood anger is also thought to con-
tribute to adult aggressiveness,381 authoritarianism,382 and lack 
376. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 128-74, 186-212; MILLER, supra note 350, at 
82, 94-95; SEARS & SEARS, supra note 1, at 153-54 (listing the negative long term 
effects of spanking such as psychological disturbances, aggressive behavior, and in-
creased rate of abusing a child or spouse); STRAUS, supra note 2, at 67-146; Herman, 
supra note 2, at 25, 36-39; Wissow & Roter, supra note 352, at 587-88. 
377. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 130-35; STRAUS, supra note 2, at 67-79; 
Herman, supra note 2, at 39; Wissow & Roter, supra note 352, at 588. If a child is un-
able to retaliate verbally in response to corporal punishment, an urge to punish in 
turn may be directed toward himself or herself upon reaching adulthood. Depression 
or even suicide are forms of such self-punishment. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 
131-32; STRAUS, supra note 2, at 77-79. 
378. When a child represses the anger he or she feels upon being corporally pun-
ished, this dynamic may cause resort to self-imposed rituals, rules, and controls to 
keep the repressed anger within bounds later in life. These rituals, rules, and controls 
are symptomatic of obsessive-compulsive behavior. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 
135-41. 
379. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 148-68. Dissociation may be manifested by 
hysterical trances, multiple personalities, or more benign dissociative states. See id. at 
148. The process of dissociation may occur when the anger and/or pain caused by cor-
poral punishment is so unbearable that the victim creates alternative selves to deal 
with such feelings or, in a more mild reaction, induces himself or herself to render the 
feelings distant and unconscious. See id. at 148; cf. MILLER, supra note 357, at 30-38 
(explaining that when a child is forced to adapt to parental dictates that are not 
geared to the child's needs, the child will split feelings of need from the rest of his or 
her psyche and submerge such feelings). 
380. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 168-74; cf. MILLER, supra note 350, at 86-87, 
108-{)9, 111 (indicating that paranoia, such as that exhibited by Adolf Hitler and Ni-
colae Ceausescu, may result from beatings and harsh discipline in childhood). The 
etiology of paranoia may be in the child's continuing fear of pain caused by corporal 
punishment. The child is imbued with a continuing sense of endangerment and of a 
need for vigilance. See STETI'BACHER, supra note 369, at 16, 18 (pointing out that 
physical attacks on a child can lead to "a constant state of readiness to ward off per-
ceived dangers"). However, because the child's anger at being so punished is 
suppressed, the anger persists into adulthood when it is displaced onto others who, as 
stand-ins for the punishing parents, also become objects of a now grown-up unreason-
able fear. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 168-69, 173. 
381. The anger repressed in childhood is acted out or repeated in adult life as ag-
gression against others who are perceived as surrogates for the once punitive parents. 
See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 126-27; MILLER, supra note 11, at 61, 65-66, 115-17, 
172; MILLER, supra note 350, at 91, 108; SEARS & SEARS, supra note 1, at 153-54; 
Herman, supra note 2, at 36; see also STRAUS, supra note 2, at 99, 103, 106, 110, 113-
15 (describing the linkages between corporal punishment and criminal behavior). 
382. The psychologist Alice Miller has explained that corporal punishment of chil-
dren can lead to their development into authoritarian adults in the following manner: 
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of empathy,383 conditions in which repressed anger is acted out 
at the expense of others. Not uncommonly these others are the 
adult's own children,. thereby perpetuating an intergen-
erational cycle of childhood trauma and adult neurosis or 
h . 384 psyc OSlS. 
Parental corporal punishment may adversely affect adult 
sexuality as well. Because a person whom the child loves is 
doing the hitting, the child may confuse love with being hurt. 
It appears that this fusion of love and pain can lead to a 
predisposition for sadomasochism when the child becomes an 
adult. 385 This may especially be the case because corporal 
punishment is often administered upon a child's buttocks,386 
The victims of such an upbringing ache to do to others what was once done to 
them. If they don't have children, or their children refuse to make themselves 
available for their revenge, they line up to support new forms of fascism. Ulti-
mately, fascism always has the same goal: the annihilation of truth and 
freedom. People who have been mistreated as children, but totally deny their 
suffering, use the mottoes and labels of the day .... They are consumed by the 
perverse pleasure in the destruction of life that they observed in their parents 
when young. They long to at last be on the other side of the fence, to hold power 
themselves, passing it off, as Stalin, Hitler, or Ceausescu have done, as 
"redemption" for others .... The unconscious compulsion to revenge repressed 
injuries is more powerful than all reason. That is the lesson that all tyrants 
teach us. 
MILLER, supra note 350, at 84-85; see also GREVEN, supra note 350, at 198-204; 
MILLER, UNTOUCHED KEY, supra note 374, at 50-52, 60, 62, 68, 149 (tracing the des-
potism of Stalin and other authoritarian personalities to beatings received in 
childhood and the lack of adult sympathy for the child's resulting pain); NEWELL, suo 
pra note 18, at 46; Herman, supra note 2, at 38-39 (stating that an "authoritarian 
personality" can be "correlated with past subjection to corporal punishment"). 
383. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 127-29 ("The parent who hurts a child while 
imposing discipline is teaching a lesson in indifference to suffering .... "); MILLER, 
supra note 11, at 79-83, 115; cf MILLER, supra note 357, at 34 (theorizing that when 
the child is forced to adapt to parental needs, through corporal punishment or other-
wise, a consequence is the impossibility of experiencing "consciously certain feelings of 
his own ... either in childhood or later in adulthood"). 
384. See MILLER, supra note 2, at 61, 211; MILLER, supra note 11, at 232, 247; 
MILLER, PICTURES, supra note 370, at 6-7; Herman, supra note 2, at 34-35; Steve 
Offner, New Light on Child Killings-Study Links 7blerance of Physical Punishment 
to Deaths, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Sept. 15, 1994, at P3. 
385. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 174-86; NEWELL, supra note 18, at 48-49; 
STRAUS, supra note 2, at 130-36; Herman, supra note 2, at 39. 
386. One writer recommends that "God has given parents the perfect area on 
which to administer a spanking-the child's bottom. It is a safe place because it is well 
cushioned, yet it is a highly sensitive area." LESSIN, supra note 352, at 75; see also 
DOBSON, supra note 349, at 47 (suggesting that when disciplining a toddler, "[t]wo or 
three stinging strokes on the legs or bottom with a switch are usually sufficient"); 
FuGATE, supra note 352, at 143 (stating that "[t]he rod should be used on the bare 
back, preferably on the buttocks"); GREVEN, supra note 350, at 184 (observing that 
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which are an erogenous zone.387 Thus, the basis is established 
for the child to merge love, pain, and sexual feelings into later 
masochistic sexual desires or other sexual perversions. 388 
Less obviously, there is evidence that corporal punishment 
during childhood may even impair adult capacities for 
economic achievement and success in employment.389 The 
theory is that corporal punishment is liable to engender certain 
characteristics, . such as passivity, withdrawal, depression, 
powerlessness, alienation, and/or decreased initiative and 
creativity, which may interfere with the ability to hold 
intellectually satisfying, lucrative occupations.39o 
The toll that childhood corporal punishment may take on 
individual lives is, therefore, multifaceted and baneful. The 
vitality and equilibrium of an individual's psychic life may be 
distorted and violated by corporal punishment in ways that 
cause lasting suffering and varying degrees of persistent dys-
function. This internal debilitation, in turn, has ramifications 
for a person's relations with others, impairing familial dy-
namics and personal achievement. 
That corporal punishment of children is a widespread prac-
tice in the United States391 means personal despair and 
suffering for the millions of men and women who have been 
subjected to such punishment-regardless of whether they are 
aware of the origin of their tribulations. This, of course, is bad 
in itself, but the tragedy does not end there. The fact is that 
corporal punishment is thought by some to have played a deci-
sive role in promoting man's inhumanity to man on a societal 
scale.392 Experts have found that criminals are typically people 
U[cJorporal punishment commonly focuses upon a child's buttocks, the anal area in the 
back being the most frequently beaten part of the body"). 
387. See DAVID BAKAN, SLAUGHTER OF THE INNOCENTS: A STUDY OF THE BATTERED 
CHILD PHENOMENON 113 (1971); GREVEN, supra note 350, at 184; TOM JOHNSON, THE 
SEXUAL DANGERS OF SPANKING CHILDREN 1 (1996); Hunt, supra note 352, at 170. 
388. See BAKAN, supra note 387, at 113; GREVEN, supra note 350, at 183-85; 
JOHNSON, supra note 387, at 3; RIAK, supra note 364, at 3; Hunt, supra note 352, at 
170. 
389. See STRAUS, supra note 2, at 137-46. 
390. See id. at 138-39. 
391. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text. 
392. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 199, 201-04, 206-07; MILLER, supra note 11, 
at 62, 66-75, 79-84, 86-91, 115, 139-97, 242-43, 264-65; NULLER, P1CTURES, supra 
note 370, at 18-19; MILLER, UNTOUCHED KEv, supra note 374, at 50-54, 62-68; 
MILLER, supra note 350, at 81-113; SPOCK, supra note 11, at 151-52; Herman, supra 
note 2, at 36-39. 
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who underwent corporal punishment in childhood.393 Crime, of 
course, is a nationwide problem of major concern in the United 
States.394 Regrettably, it is not hard to think of instances of 
more massive brutality than that perpetrated by the common 
criminal; the historical evidence comes all too readily to mind. 
Without even considering the wars and inquisitions of earlier 
eras, modern history provides a panorama of appalling car-
nage and mayhem: Nazi torture and extermination of Jews, 
Gypsies, and others;395 Stalin's persecution of kulaks and other 
dissidents in the then Soviet Union;396 American "napalming" 
of villages in Vietnam;397 the Khmer Rouge's butchery of more 
than one million Cambodians;398 the bloody strife between Tut-
sis and Hutus in Rwanda;399 Pinochet's murderous policies 
against the left in Chile;4°O and the internecine slaughter in 
former Yugoslavia.401 As we all know, the list could go on and 
on. But even these few selected examples raise perplexing 
questions. How do people come to such a pass that they can 
commit genocide and other atrocities against each other? 
393. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 194-98; MILLER, supra note 11, at 198-202, 
231, 249; NEWELL, supra note 18, at 43-46; STRAUS, supra note 2, at 99, 108-20; 
ZULUETA, supra note 349, at 219; Herman, supra note 2, at 39. 
394. See Michael Hedges, America's Crime Forecast Grim: Study Warns of Future 
Loaded with Hoods, Hurts, CIN. POST, Jan. 6, 1996, at A2 (discussing a study on crime 
that concluded only a minority of criminals are jailed and crime is predicted to get 
worse); Richard Liefer, Crime Study Paints a Dark Picture, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 6, 1996, at 
2 (reporting that violent crime is at an all-time high); Vwlent Crime Labeled "Ticking 
BombD , L.A. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1996, at A4 (explaining that crime levels remain at a his-
toric high and discussing a report that shows that a significant number of crimes are 
unreported). 
395. See Leon A. Jick, Holocaust, in 9 WORLD BOOK, supra note 129, at 296, 296; 
Mary Nolan, Nazism, in 14 WORLD BOOK, supra note 129, at 92, 92-93; James L. 
Stokesbury, World War II, in 21 WORLD BOOK, supra note 129, at 470, 486. 
396. See Albert Marrin, Stalin, Joseph, in 18 WORLD BOOK, supra note 129, at 824, 
826-27; James R. Millar, U.S.S.R., in 20 WORLD BOOK, supra note 129, at 28, 37. 
397. See JAMES W. GIBSON, THE PERFECT WAR: TECHNOWAR IN VIETNAM 146,367-
75 (1986). 
398. See HERBERT HIRSCH, GENOCIDE AND THE POLITICS OF MEMORY: STUDYING 
DEATH TO PRESERVE LIFE 141 (1995). 
399. See Raymond Bonner, Rwanda Facing Difficult Struggle for Rebirth, THE 
PATRIOT LEDGER, Dec. 30, 1994, at 4; Tom Davidson, 1994: Year in Review Throughout 
the World, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Dec. 31, 1994, at 3A; William John-
son, Hope and Despair; From Mandela's Election in South Africa to the Nightmare in 
Rwanda, 1994 Was a Year in Which Hope Grew a Little Taller than Despair, 
MONTREAL GAZETTE, Dec. 30, 1994, at B3. 
400. See JAVIER MARTINEZ & ALVARO DIAZ, CHILE: THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 
12-16 (1996). 
401. See Battles Rake Croatia as Envoys Meet, COURIER-J., (Louisville, Ky.), Dec. 
31, 1991, at 4A; Slobodan Lekic, Yugoslav Jets Pound Croatia City; Serbs Flee 
Mountain Strongholds, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 30, 1991, at 2; Strategic City Near Zagreb 
Under Heavy Fire, EDMONTON J., Dec. 30, 1991, at A4. 
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Where, one wonders, has their empathy and kindness gone? 
Why is there apparently an impulse to aggress in such mon-
strous ways and in such monstrous proportions? And, why is 
this aggression such a pervasive feature of the human condi-
tion historically and geographically? 
Given the complexity of societal evolution and tensions, it 
would be simplistic to suggest that anyone factor is totally re-
sponsible for all historical events involving mass cruelty. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting indeed that various types of cor-
poral punishment have been part of traditional child rearing 
practices in most parts of the globe-a shared experience 
across time, cultural barriers, and national borders.402 Moreo-
ver, corporal punishment of children can give rise to the very 
symptomology of aggressiveness, authoritarianism, and lack of 
empathy that characterizes societal acts of inhumanity.403 
Thus, the commonality of childhood corporal punishment and 
its adverse effects on adult personality closely parallel the in-
gredients needed for inhumanity on a grand scale. Corporal 
punishment of children may be a hidden but potent factor con-
tributing to man's continuing pitilessness and inclination for 
barbarism. Childhood suffering due to corporal punishment, 
taken in conjunction with other psychological, political, and 
economic dynamics, may help to account for the Hitlers, Sta-
lins, and Pol Pots of the world and all those masses of people 
who willingly followed them.404 In fact, adults who have been 
corporally punished in childhood tend to feel most comfortable 
in roles that, if they are not authoritarian, are alternatively 
blindly obedient.405 
In short, there is accumulating data as well as a sort of 
theoretical new thinking among psychologists, pediatricians, 
and other experts on human development that establish a 
402. See ZULUETA, supra note 349, at 212-18; John E.B. Myers, The Legal Response 
to Child Abuse: In the Best Interest of Children?, 24 J. FAM. L. 149, 157 (1985-86); Mason 
P. Thomas, Jr., Child Abuse and Neglect Part I: Historical Overview, Legal Matrix and 
Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. REv. 293, 298 (1972). To date, only seven countries have 
adopted legal measures (judicially or through legislation) against corporal punishment of 
children in the home. See supra notes 19-154 and accompanying text. 
403. See supra notes 381-83 and accompanying text. 
404. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 199, 201-04, 206-07; MILLER, supra note 11, at 
62,66-75,79-84,86-91,115,139-97,242-43,264-65; MILLER, supra note 350, at 81-
113; Herman, supra note 2, at 36-39. See generally HIRSCH, supra note 398, at 125-32 
(observing that mass murder results from the willingness to obey at all costs). 
405. See GREVEN, supra note 350, at 200-04; MILLER, supra note 11, at 70; Her-
man, supra note 2, at 37; cf. STRAUS, supra note 2, at 138-39 (observing that childhood 
corporal punishment may cause people to become passive and that it "teaches chil-
dren what to think, not how to think"). 
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scientific basis for concluding that corporal punishment of 
children is a source of grievous destruction. This destructiveness 
extends not only to the drama of individual lives, but also to 
that larger stage where societal dynamics are enacted. The 
implications of the data and expert analyses bear on the very 
evolution of human nature and on the future prospects for the 
human race. However, for those who are not persuaded by 
scientifically based reasons for prohibiting corporal punishment 
of childreri., there are philosophical and moral considerations 
which should inform further policy decisions on this issue. 
2. Philosophical and Moral Reasons for Prohibiting Corpo-
ral Punishment of Children-Regardless of the scientific 
studies and postulates, the argument can be made that corpo-
ral punishment of children should be prohibited simply 
because it is wrong. Three interrelated ideas demonstrate this. 
First, since it is wrong-indeed, even criminal-to hit adults, it 
is also wrong to hit less mature human beings who, although 
they are children, are nonetheless still human beings. Second, 
human dignity is offended when a child is struck; human dig-
nity is protected under international law and has been 
recognized as an important factor by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in cases decided under the U.S. Constitution. Third, permitting 
corporal punishment of children is tantamount to treating 
them as chattels, and no one should be another's chattel. 
The first point may perhaps best be illustrated by use of a 
hypothetical problem. If your adult neighbor engages in offen-
sive or even infuriating behavior, you would probably not swat 
him or her. If that neighbor has less than average adult physi-
calor mental abilities, you would probably be even less likely 
to use physical force as a dispute resolution technique. And, if 
you love that neighbor as if he or she were a family member, 
hitting that neighbor would seem inconceivable. Now imagine 
that the offender is your child-typically, a person of less than 
average adult abilities and a person you love as a family mem-
ber. Would you hit your childt06 
It is common knowledge that if you hit your adult neighbor 
to get him or her to cease annoying behavior, you could be 
prosecuted for assault and/or battery since each state has laws 
criminalizing such conduct.407 If hitting an adult is assault 
406. Cf Bitensky, supra note 112, at 25 (setting forth a similar hypothetical 
problem). 
407. Every state has statutes criminalizing conduct that would constitute an as-
sault and/or battery. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-20 to -22 (1994); ALAsKA STAT. 
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and/or battery, it would seem even more heinous when the 
victim is "a person of less than average adult abilities and a 
person you love as a family member," i.e., someone more 
vulnerable and beloved than the average next door neighbor. 408 
§§ 11.41.200-.230 (Michie 1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1203 to -1204 (West 1989 
& Supp. 1997); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-13-201 to -207 (Michie 1997); CAL. PENAL CODE 
§§ 240-41, 242-43 (West 1988 & Supp. 1998); COW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-3-202 to 
-204 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-59 to -61a (West 1994); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 611-613 (1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-504.1 (1996); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. ch. 784.011, 784.021, 784.03, 784.045 (Harrison 1991 & Supp. 1996); GA. CODE 
ANN. §§ 16-5-20 to -24 (1996 & Supp. 1997); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 707-710 to -712 
(1993); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-901 to -08 (1996); 720 ILL. COMPo STAT. 5/12-1, 5/12-2, 5/12-3, 
5/12-4 to 4.1 (West 1997); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-42-2-1 to -1.5 (West Supp. 1997); IOWA 
CODE ANN. §§ 708.1-708.2 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3408, 21-
3410, 21-3412, 21-3414 (1995); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 508.010-508.020, 508.025, 
508.030 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-33 to -38 (West 1997); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, §§ 207-208 (West 1983 & Supp. 1997); MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 27, §§ 12, 12A, 12A-1 (1996 & Supp. 1997); MAss. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 265, § 13A 
(Law. Co-op. 1992); MICH. COMPo LAwS ANN. §§ 750.81-750.82a (West 1991 & Supp. 
1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.221-.224 (West 1987 & Supp. 1998); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 97-3-7 (1994); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 565.050-.070 (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-201 
to -202 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-308 to -310 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 200.400, 
200.471, 200.481 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 631:1, 631:2, 631:2-a (1996); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-1 (West Supp. 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-3-1 to -5 (Michie 1994); 
N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 120.00, 120.05, 120.10 (McKinney 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33 
(1993); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-17-01 to -02 (1985 & Supp. 1997); Omo REV. CODE 
ANN. §§ 2903.12-.14, 5924.128 (Anderson 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 641-642, 
644-646 (West 1983 & Supp. 1998); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.160, 163.165, 163.175, 
163.185 (1995); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2701-02 (West 1983 & Supp. 1997); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS §§ 11-5-2, 11-5-3 (1994 & Supp. 1997); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-610, 16-3-
620 (Law. Co-op. 1985); id. at 22-3-560 (Law. Co-op. 1989 & Supp. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAws §§ 22-18-1 to -1.1 (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-101 to 
-102 (1997); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.01, 22.02 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998); UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-102, 76-5-103 (1995 & Supp. 1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1023-
1024 (1974 & Supp. 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1997); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A36.011, 9A36.021, 9A36.031, 9A36.041 (West 1988 & 
Supp. 1998); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-9 (1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.19 (West 1996); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 6-2-501 to -502 (Michie 1997). Assault and battery are statutory crimes 
in all American jurisdictions. However, the nomenclature affixed to these statutes can 
be confusing: 
This is not to suggest, however, that every jurisdiction has statutory crimes la-
belled both "assault" and "battery" .... In some jurisdictions, the attempted-
battery type of assault is prosecuted simply as an attempt to commit the crime 
of battery, and there is either no crime called assault ... or else the crime of as-
sault is limited to the placing of the victim in apprehension of a battery. 
In some jurisdictions there is no statutory crime of battery, but ... the crime of 
assault is defined to include what is usually classified as battery. 
2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw § 7.14, at 
299-300 n.2 (1986) (citations omitted). 
408. See Edwards, supra note 5, at 983 (stating that one could consider corporal 
punishment as a battery); CINDY S. MOEUS, Banning Corporal Punishment: A Crucial 
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Permitting corporal punishment of children when hitting 
adults is subject to criminal sanctions seems arbitrary and 
unjust.409 This is especially true in light of evidence showing 
that corporal punishment of children is ineffective as a child 
rearing technique,410 that such punishment has negative 
effects,411 and that there are alternative ways of guiding and 
. t t· hild 412 rns ruc rng c reno 
One of the reasons that corporal punishment of children 
seems unjust is not only the sense that children are being 
treated unequally in comparison to adults, but also because 
corporal punishment offends human dignity.413 The preservation 
of human dignity is a basic tenet of international human rights 
law414 and a federal constitutional value.415 Ai; such, human 
Step Toward Preventing Child Abuse, in CHILD ABUSE: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY SURVEY 
280, 280 (Byrgren Finkelman ed., 1995) (stating that if an adult hits another person, it is 
an illegal act---"unless that person is their child or student"); Gibbons, supra note 32, at 
112 (stating what is considered assault and battery on an adult is considered discipline 
on a child); see also DAVID ARCHARD, CHILDREN: RIGHTS AND CHILDHOOD 114 (1993) 
(arguing that the state sanctions reasonable corporal punishment of children by ex-
empting punishers from assault charges); Thomas, supra note 402, at 339 (noting that 
criminal cases reflect parents' exemption from prosecution when it comes to the right to 
use reasonable corporal punishment on children). 
409. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 12-16; STRAUS, supra note 2, at 10; Feshbach, 
supra note 349, at 28; Herman, supra note 2, at 10. But see Robert Blecker, Haven or 
Hell? Inside Lorton Central Prison: Experiences of Punishment Justified, 42 STAN. L. 
REv. 1149, 1230 & n.134 (1990) (asserting that because children are "intimate depend-
ents," their parents are entitled and obligated to corporally punish them even though in 
other contexts such adult conduct would be considered an assault). 
410. See supra notes 348, 353, 354 and accompanying text. 
411. See supra notes 349-50, 352, 355--66, 368, 376-85, 389-90, 392 and accompa-
nyingtext. 
412. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 15; supra notes 4&-50, 62 and accompanying text. 
413. The psychologist Alice Miller has stated that "[b)eatings ... are always de-
grading, because the child not only is unable to defend him- or herself but is also 
supposed to show gratitude and respect to the parents in return." MILLER, supra note 11, 
at 17; see also Cambria, Cass., sez. VI, 18 mano 1996, Foro It. II 1996, 407, 410, Transla-
tion, supra note 112, at 3 (reasoning that legal protections of dignity must be extended to 
forbid corporal punishment of children); NEWELL, supra note 18, at 15 (commenting that 
corporal punishment of children shows a "lack of respect for children as people"); SEARS 
& SEARS, supra note 1, at 147-48 (advising that corporal punishment devalues the child 
in his or her own eyes). 
414. See LoUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 7-9 (1990); Cohen, Corporal Punish-
ment, supra note 13, at 113-14; Jordan J. Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional 
Right: A Jurisprudentially Based Inquiry into Criteria and Content, 27 How. L.J. 145, 
146, 185-87, 192-93, 200 (1984); Oscar Schachter, Editorial Comment, Human Dignity as 
a Normative Concept, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 848, 848-49, 853-54 (1983); Ann I. Park, Com-
ment, Human Rights and Basic Needs: Using International Human Rights Norms to 
Inform Constitutional Interpretation, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1195, 1228-29, 1249 (1987); see 
also supra notes 212-16, 249-50 and accompanying text. 
415. See William Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contempo-
rary Ratification, 27 S. TEx. L. REV. 433, 433, 438-40 (1986); Alan B. Handler, 
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dignity should be a juridically recognized attribute of juveniles 
as well.416 Dignity may be violated by coercive physical attacks 
on the body.417 That the victim is smaller and that the coercion 
is inflicted by a caregiver does not change the nature of the 
violation and, therefore, its offensiveness to self-respect.418 
Perhaps one of the reasons that mankind has been slow to 
recognize corporal punishment's infringement on equality and 
dignity arises from the fact that children have been regarded 
Individual Worth, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 493, 495, 512, 515, 516-19, 521, 532-33 (1989); 
Paust, supra note 414, at 148-84; Charles Robert Tremper, Respect for the Human 
Dignity of Minors: What the Constitution Requires, 39 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1293, 1297, 
1305-11 (1988); Peter S. Adolf, Note, Killing Me Softly: Is the Gas Chamber, or Any 
Other Method of Execution, "Cruel and Unusual Punishment"?, 22 HAsTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 815, 829, 842-44 (1995); Paul V. Regelbrugge, Comment, Barbarism in the Plastic 
Bubble: An Application of Existentialist Theory to Capital Punishment in the United 
States, 1990 DET. C.L. REV. lOll, 1025, 1040. 
416. See Cambria, Foro It. II 1996 at 410-11, Translation at 3. (providing an ex-
ample of such judicial recognition); Cynthia Price Cohen, Developing Jurisprudence of 
the Rights of the Child, 6 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1, 19, 59 (1993) [hereinafter Cohen, De-
veloping Jurisprudence); Henry H. Foster, Jr., & Doris Jonas Freed, A Bill of Rights for 
Children, 6 FAM. L.Q. 343, 344-46, 353 (1972); Paust, supra note 414, at 174-75 & 
n.140; Tremper, supra note 415, at 1311-17, 1320-23; Santos Pais, supra note 189; cf 
Cohen, Corporal Punishment, supra note 13, at 113-15, 130 (asserting that the child's 
dignity is protected in certain international human rights instruments); Barbara B. 
Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1816-17 (1993) (concluding that legal relationships between 
adults and children should be predicated on respect for children as fellow humans). 
That the law should recognize the human dignity of minors does not mean that 
American law has always embraced this principle in the past. See Tremper, supra note 
415, at 1320-44; Woodhouse, supra. 
417. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 15; Natalie Abrams, Problems in Defining 
Child Abuse and Neglect, in HAVING CmLDREN: PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL RE-
FLECTIONS ON PARENTHOOD 155, 160 (Onora O'Neill & William Ruddick eds., 1979); 
Cohen, Corporal Punishment, supra note 13, at 113-15; Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing 
the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Vwlence as Torture 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REv. 291, 298, 309-11, 330, 340-41 (1994); Paust, supra note 414, at 168, 178-79; cf. 
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4, 10-11 (1992) (holding that excessive use of physi-
cal force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and inhuman punishment in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment even though the prisoner does not suffer serious 
injury); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580 (8th Cir. 1968) (stating that corporal 
punishment is "degrading to the punisher and to the punished alike"); Adolf, supra 
note 415, at 848 (arguing that infliction of unnecessary pain and physical violence in 
the execution process violates prisoners' dignity); Cohen, Developing Jurisprudence, 
supra note 416, at 65 (noting that respect for the child's physical integrity is "closely 
linked to concepts of human dignity"). But see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664, 
671 (1977) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to paddling children 
as a disciplinary technique in public schools). 
418. See MILLER, supra note 2, at 312-13 (remarking that beating children is hu-
miliating treatment); see also MILLER, supra note 11, at 17, 263 (commenting that 
corporal punishment of children is "always degrading" and that modern child rearing 
practices, including spankings, do not respect the child); GREVEN, supra note 350, at 
124-27; NEWELL, supra note 18, at 12-16. 
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as their parents' chattels.419 The underlying assumption ap-
pears to have been that if adults conceive children or gain 
legal custody of them, then those adults effectively own the 
children and may do to their progeny that which cannot be 
done to other people who are not "owned,,42°-including physi-
cally attacking children to coerce or enlighten. 
The concept goes back to earliest civilizations when it took 
on its most awful manifestations. For example, under the Code 
of Hammurabi, a father could legally sell, exchange, or even 
kill his children.421 The ancient Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans 
all had the legal "right" to kill their children.422 Even in the 
eighteenth century, infanticide was a common practice 
throughout Europe.423 For centuries parents have been per-
mitted to abandon and physically attack or c~use pain to their 
children with impunity.424 
Corporal punishment of children, which dates back to antiq-
uity,425 reflects children's continued classification as parental 
property. It is telling that as historically oppressed peoples 
have liberated themselves from being legally categorized as 
419. See JOHN HOLT, ESCAPE FROM CHILDHOOD 18, 26, 39, 47-48 (1974); Mary 
Martin McLaughlin, Survivors and Surrogates: Children and Parents from the Ninth 
to the Thirteenth Centuries, in THE HISTORY OF CHILDHOOD 101, 140 (Lloyd deMause 
ed., 1974); Michael S. Wald, Children's Rights: A Framework for Analysis, 12 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REv. 255, 256 n.5 (1979); Woodhouse, supra note 416, at 1810-12; Barbara 
Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?" Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Prop-
erty, 33 WM. & MARy L. REv. 995,997, 1002-03, 1036-38, 1040-51, 1112-14 (1992); cf 
Michael A. Slote, Obedience and Illusions, in HAVING CHILDREN, supra note 417, at 
319, 321-22 (analogizing parental authority to divine authority). But see Wald, supra, 
at 259 (opining that Americans are not inclined to treat children as the property of 
adults); cf MARy ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 36-41 
(1981) (asserting that parental control over children has diminished in the modern 
era); MICHAEL GROSSBERG" GoVERNING THE HEARTH: LAw AND THE FAMILY IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 283 (1985) (discussing how developments in domestic 
relations law have reduced parental power over children). 
420. See Martin Guggenheim, The Best Interests of the Child: Much Ado About 
Nothing?, in CHILD, PARENT, & STATE: LAW AND POLICY READER 27, 28 (S. Randall 
Humm et al. eds., 1994); Tremper, supra note 415, at 1318-19; Woodhouse, supra note 
419, at 1044-45; cf Onora O'Neill, Begetting, Bearing, and Rearing, in HAVING 
CHILDREN, supra note 417, at 25, 27 (describing the ways in which biological parents 
have disposed of their unwanted children). 
421. See Herman, supra note 2, at 5. 
422. See id.; see also Lloyd deMause, The Evolution of Childhood, in THE HISTORY 
OF CHILDHOOD 1, 25-28 (Lloyd deMause ed., 1974) (detailing the practice of infanti-
cide in early civilizations). 
423. See deMause, supra note 422, at 29. 
424. See id. at 32-4l. 
425. See Caldwell, supra note 349, at 371; deMause, supra note 422, at 17, 41-43; 
Edwards, supra note 5, at 984, 986-87; Herman, supra note 2, at 5-7; see also STRAUS, 
supra note 2, at 170 (stating that "[clultural norms that make violence by parents 
legitimate have been the predominant pattern ofhumanity"). 
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the property of others, such liberation typically has brought in 
its wake legal protection from physical chastisement. With the 
emancipation of Confederate slaves, Caucasians could no 
longer legally beat Mrican-Americans;426 likewise, American 
women ultimately achieved reform such that husbands could 
no longer legally beat their wives.427 History and logic would 
seem to dictate that if children were no longer regarded as pa-
rental chattels, they too would soon be spared the rod. 
As the above exegesis shows, corporal punishment of chil-
dren is harmful to individuals and society and is also morally 
objectionable in view of late twentieth century conceptions of 
decency and human worth. With such considerations at stake, 
Americans and, indeed, people everywhere, are faced with the 
responsibility of making a conscious policy choice of whether to 
take measures to prevent corporal punishment of children. For 
those, like this author, who favor prevention, the difficult ques-
tion remains as to how reform can most successfully be 
achieved. 
B. Means of Prohibiting Corporal Punishment of Children 
An obvious means of preventing corporal punishment of 
children is to educate people that such punishment is un-
acceptable. In Ireland, for example, the Irish Society for 
Prevention of Cruelty to Children (lSPCC) has been campaign-
ing to teach parents to use other disciplinary tactics in lieu of 
corporal punishment.428 This enterprise has been accompanied 
426. Indeed, "many abolitionists, loathing all forms of physical bondage and abuse 
of the powerless, also fought to end corporal punishment .... [Elducation~l reformers 
viewed the whipping of children in schools and at home as similar to the lashing of 
slaves." Stephen Nissenbaum, Lighting the Freedom Tree, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 25, 1996, at 
A17. For a further description of the lashing of slaves, see JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, THE 
SlAVE COMMUNITY: PLANTATION LIFE IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 251 (1979); 4 PAGE 
SMITH, THE NATION COMES OF AGE: A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE ANTE-BELLUM YEARS 
585,615-16 (1981); David Brion Davis, Slavery, in 17 WORLD BooK, supra note 129, at 
501,503. 
427. See SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 129 (1989); 
STRAUS, supra note 2, at 174; Herman, supra note 2, at 4; Frances E. Olsen, The Myth 
of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 835, 839-40, 853-54 
(1985). 
428. See IRISH SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, ANNuAL 
REPORT 1995 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Cian 
O'Tighearnaigh, Chief Executive, The Irish Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Children, Address at the International Seminar on Worldwide Strategies and Prog-
ress Towards Ending All Physical Punishment of Children (Aug. 22, 1996). 
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by a 12 percent reduction in the number of Irish adults who 
think slapping children is advisable.429 The Swedish government 
also has waged a strenuous education campaign against 
corporal punishment of children with the result that there has 
been a substantial reduction in the incidence of use and 
approval of parental corporal punishment in that country as 
well.430 However, neither the ISPCC nor the Swedish govern-
ment has seen fit to rely exclusively on education programs. It is 
noteworthy that the ISPCC is seeking to have the Irish 
Parliament enact a prohibition of corporal punishment of 
children 431 and that the Swedish government's education effort 
took place in the context of a legislative ban on all corporal 
punishment of children.432 Apparently, the ISPCC and the 
Swedish government concluded that law has a crucial role to 
play in ending corporal punishment of children. In this they 
are joined by the six other nations, in addition to Sweden, that 
have adopted legal measures explicitly aimed at forbidding 
such punishment.433 In fact, law can playa pedagogical role 
that enhances public awareness in decisive ways. 
Generally speaking, there is a pedagogical purpose inherent 
in virtually all law. Laws are made to be known;434 otherwise, 
they would be ineffective as an instrument of governance or 
restraint. The educational impact of law is perhaps most effec-
tually realized by the reciprocal interplay between law and 
social values. Law draws its content from the values of the 
people it governs. Law assimilates not only a society's values 
and priorities as they are, but also those values and priorities 
which comprise that society's goals and needs. It is in this lat-
ter initiatory phase that law has its most dramatic educative 
effect because it crystallizes and makes visible the norms 
which constitute a society's aspirations and ideals.435 
429. See IRISH SOCIETY FOR THE PREvENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, supra 
note 428; O'Tighearnaigh, supra note 428. 
430. See supra notes 23-32,37-50 and accompanying text. 
431. See IRISH SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, supra 
note 428; Mary Flaherty (Member of the Irish Parliament), Address at International 
Seminar on Worldwide Strategies and Progress Towards Ending All Physical Punish-
ment of Children (Aug. 22, 1996). 
432. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. 
433. See supra notes 19-154 and accompanying text. 
434. Robert H. Bork has observed that "[llaw is a public act." RoBERT H. BORK, 
THE TEMPl'ING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAw 144 (1990). See 
also GEORGE HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 135 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press, 
1967) (stating the importance of knowledge of the law). 
435. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 927, 
952 (W.D. Ross trans., Richard McKeon ed., 1941); Plato, Book VII, in THE LAws OF 
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Were Americans to make the policy choice of abolishing cor-
poral punishment of children, a strong argument can be made 
that the most efficacious way to achieve abolition would be to 
enact a prohibition that, in its pedagogical role, would com-
plement and enrich other educational strategies. Such a law 
should make clear, in the most explicit way, that prevention of 
corporal punishment of children is government policy. Unlike 
the Minnesota statutes on the subject,436 this law should be of 
sufficient comprehensibility to inform lawyers and laypersons 
alike that· corporal punishment of children is banned. If the 
law also involved legal repercussions for violators, it would 
leave no doubt that the policy is of paramount importance. Be-
cause of government's imprimatur and the possibility of 
liability, a prohibitory law of this nature may well be one of the 
most potent pedagogical tools available in this context. 437 
As mentioned above, hitting or otherwise physically 
attacking an adult is generally considered a criminal assault 
or battery, the precise terminology varying according to the 
PLATO 215-16 (Thomas L. Pangle trans. & ed., Basic Books 1980); David R. Barnhizer, 
Prophets, Priests and Power Blockers: Three Fundamental Roles of Judges and Legal 
Scholars in America, 50 U PITT. L. REV. 127, 162--63 (1988); Paul Brest, The Thirty-
First Cleveland-Marshall Fund Lecture: Constitutional Citizenship, 34 CLEV. ST. L. 
REv. 175, 177-179 (1986); Keith Burgess.Jackson, Bad Samaritanism and the Peda-
gogical Function of Law, 8 CRIM. JUST. J. 1, ~, 26 (1985); Susan Hedman, Expressive 
Functions of Criminal Sanctions in Environmental Law, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 889, 
891 (1991); Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 SUP. 
CT. REV. 127, 180; Anne Norton, Transubstantiation: The Dialectic of Constitutional 
Authority, 55 U CHI. L. REV. 458, 468--69 (1988); Philip Soper, The Moral Value of 
Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 63, 85 (1985). 
The classic case of government taking a pioneering role through the medium of the 
law is Brown v. Board of Education, 347 US. 483 (1954). It will be recalled that in 
Brown, the Supreme Court struck down de jure racial segregation in public elemen-
tary and secondary schools as inherently violative of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The civil rights movement which followed on the heels of 
this decision is a vivid testament to the leadership of the Brown Court in rejecting 
racial segregation as an acceptable part of American life. See MARTIN LUTHER KING, 
JR., STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM 195, 198--99 (1958). 
436. See supra notes 155-70 and accompanying text. 
437. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 104; Caldwell, supra note 349, at 387; Ed-
wards, supra note 5, at 1022; Herman, supra note 2, at 44-45; Gibbons, supra note 32, 
at 144. But see Paul H. Robinson, Are Criminal Codes Irrelevant?, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 
159, 166--67, 200 (1994) (arguing that much of criminal law's effect is thwarted be-
cause the laws are not adequately communicated to the average person). See generally 
Francis A. Allen, The Morality of Means: Three Problems in Criminal Sanctions, 42 U 
PITT. L. REV. 737, 739, 742, 748, 750--51 (1981) (examining how criminal law may be 
used to affect public attitudes toward criminalized behavior); Natalie Loder Clark, 
Crime Begins at Home: Let's Stop Punishing VICtims and Perpetuating Vwlence, 28 
WM. & MARy L. REV. 263, 275-79, 281 (1987) (contending that criminal prohibitions 
convey a pedagogical message that the proscribed conduct is not socially or morally 
acceptable). 
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jurisdiction.438 It would therefore be logical to enact a statute 
criminalizing corporal punishment of children and making 
violators potentially subject to the same criminal penalties as 
may be imposed for other assaults and/or batteries.439 To carry 
out the intended purpose, one possible version of such a 
statute might read as follows: 
(1) (a) Corporal punishment is defined as the use of 
physical force with the intention of causing a 
child to experience bodily pain so as to correct, 
control, or punish the child's behavior. 
(b) Any person who uses corporal punishment on 
a child shall be guilty of the crime of battery 
provided that such physical force would be a 
battery if used on an adult. 
(2) The penalties for conviction pursuant to subsec-
tion (1) shall be the same as those for conviction 
under any other criminal battery provision(s) or, 
in lieu thereof in appropriate cases, shall be a 
posttrial or postplea diversion program. 
(3) Nothing stated in subsections (1) or (2) herein 
shall preclude or limit further prosecution under 
any other applicable laws for the use of corporal 
punishment described in subsection (1). 
(4) The proscription set forth in subsection (1) shall 
not apply to the use of such physical force as is 
reasonably necessary to prevent death or immi-
nent bodily pain or injury to the child or 
others. 440 
438. See supra note 407 and accompanying text. 
439. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 104; Herman, supra note 2, at 44-45; Zimring, 
supra note 5, at 523-24, 527; cf. Caldwell, supra note 349, at 386-87 (arguing for an 
incremental approach beginning with a prohibition of corporal punishment in all 
schools followed by removal of parental corporal punishment as a defense to assault 
charges). But see Edwards, supra note 5, at 1020-22 (proposing that legislatures enact 
a ban on corporal punishment with respect to children under five years of age, but 
that violations of the ban should not be punished); Gibbons, supra note 32, at 144 
(noting that while a complete ban on corporal punishment would be most desirable, it 
may be more realistic first to attempt only a nationwide prohibition of corporal pun-
ishment in the schools). 
440. The proposed statute represents an amalgam of my own thinking and that of 
other commentators. In particular, see NEWELL, supra note 18, at 144-45; STRAUS, supra 
note 2, at 4-5 (providing a definition of corporal punishment); Herman, supra note 2, at 
42. The proposed statute has the virtue of assimilating the "crime" of corporally punish-
ing children as part of the criminal law on battery while retaining its specificity as a 
particular variant of such general law. See Zimring, supra note 5, at 537. 
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There are reasons for preferring a federal to a state statute criminalizing subabuse 
corporal punishment of children. Federal regulation provides for a broader base of 
expertise upon which to draw. See Tom Stacy, What's Wrong With Lopez, 44 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 243, 255 (1996). Moreover, if prohibition of corporal punishment of children is, as 
a matter of policy, desirable, then children across the nation should have the benefit of 
that policy choice rather than only those children fortunate enough to reside in states 
with more enlightened and activist legislatures. Federal regulation would provide 
uniform national standards and a policy consistently applicable to all children. See id. 
There is extant authority for the proposition that Congress may be empowered to 
enact such legislation under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The 
Clause provides that Congress shall have the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld Congress' power under 
the Commerce Clause to enact social welfare legislation regulating an intrastate 
activity which, taken by itself or as part of a class of like activities, substantially 
affects interstate commerce. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 
241, 253-62 (1964) (upholding Congress' enactment under the Commerce Clause of 
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 proscribing racial and other invidious 
discrimination by certain places of public accommodation in serving potential 
patrons). The Court has upheld such legislation even when it contained criminal 
penalties that would seem to regulate areas traditionally left to the states. See Perez 
v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150--57 (1971) (ruling that Congress had the power 
under the Commerce Clause to enact Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act 
which made intrastate loan sharking a federal crime). Moreover, the Court has 
historically refused to find that Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause power even 
when the legislation in question regulated arguably non-commercial intrastate 
activities-as long as they demonstrated a sufficient impact on interstate commerce. 
See Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118-29 (1942) (holding constitutional under the 
Commerce Clause that section of the Agricultural Adjustment Act limiting cultivation 
of wheat destined for the farmer's own home consumption). This precedent has been 
thought to imply that Congress can rely on its commerce power to regulate a range of 
local social problems, including domestic relations. See Stacy, supra, at 248; cf. 
Kathleen A. Burdette, Comment, Making Parents Pay: Interstate Child Support 
Enforcement After United States v. Lopez, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1469, 1518 (1996) (tacitly 
acknowledging that Congress' regulatory reach under the Commerce Clause extended 
to family law matters before United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), was 
handed down). 
While Heart of Atlanta Motel, Perez, and Fillbum are still good law, a 1995 decision 
by the U.S. Supreme Court has thrown into question congressional latitude to enact 
such legislation pursuant to the Commerce Clause. In United States v. Lopez, 115 S. 
Ct. 1624 (1995), the Court struck down, as exceeding Congress' Commerce Clause 
authority, a criminal statute that proscribed the "non-economic" intrastate activity of 
gun possession in and around schools. See id. at 1634. Although it is beyond the scope 
of this article to engage in an extended discussion of Lopez's significance, the decision 
seems, at the very least, to mean that it is no longer constitutional for Congress to use 
the Commerce Clause to regulate non-economic intrastate activities, no matter what 
their effect is on interstate commerce. See 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31. If this is not an over-
broad reading of Lopez, then it may signify that the states rather than Congress 
should assume the task of banning corporal punishment of children. Cf Stephen R. 
McAllister, Is There a Judicially Enforceable Limit to Congressional Power Under the 
Commerce Clause?, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 217, 241 (1996) (arguing that Lopez provides 
for heightened judicial scrutiny of Commerce Clause legislation that may intrude on 
individual liberties associated with raising a family); Stacy, supra, at 243--44, 248, 256 
(noting that while the scope of Lopez is uncertain, the decision appears to preclude 
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A statute drafted along these lines would not only be likely 
to achieve its pedagogical mission, but would also avoid 
sweeping within its ambit parent-child interactions that do not 
belong there. First, by enacting a provision expressly creating 
this new type of criminal battery, the statute would put every-
one on notice that corporal punishment of children is as 
unacceptable as hitting an adult. In order to bring the greatest 
clarity to this notice function, the proscription in subsection (1) 
employs both the shorthand term "corporal punishment" and a 
defmition of the elements of corporal punishment as "physical 
force [used] with the intention of causing a child to experience 
bodily pain so as to correct, control, or punish the child's be-
havior." This provision is preferable to merely removing 
corporal punishment as a defense to assault and/or battery, as 
has occurred in Minnesota, because insofar as it is a plainer 
and more emphatic repudiation the provision necessarily has 
greater didactic potential.441 
Second, even a cursory review of the law on assault and 
battery demonstrates that the traditional denomination of 
"battery"442 would be the most appropriate classification for 
criminalized subabuse corporal punishment of children. 
Although different jurisdictions use different nomenclature, 
Commerce Clause regulation of noncommercial intrastate activities in areas of tradi-
tional state law-making such as domestic relations). 
On the other hand, some commentators are of the view that Lopez is a narrow deci-
sion and will not "inaugurate a major change in the Court's inclination to uphold 
federal legislation." Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce 
Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 554, 554 
(1995); see Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REv. 674, 692, 694-95, 
727, 729 (1995). If the latter are correct or if Lopez is ultimately overruled, then it 
would be entirely appropriate for Congress to enact the ban on corporal punishment of 
children. As discussed in Part III of this Article, corporal punishment of children can 
cause increased crime and diminished earning capacity in adults as well as creating 
the conditions for political tyranny and even genocide. Thus, Congress could find that 
corporal punishment of children, when considered as a class of activities, substantially 
affects interstate commerce. 
441. The experience in Sweden is instructive in this regard. Corporal punishment 
of children was first removed as a defense to assault and battery and, subsequently, 
Sweden enacted a vaguely worded admonition on child supervision meant to convey 
the unacceptability of corporal punishment as a means of such supervision. However, 
these reforms did not edify the average Swede and left Swedish legal experts in disa-
greement over the laws' meaning. For this reason, the Swedish Parliament ultimately 
opted to enact an express prohibition of corporal punishment of children. See EK, su-
pra note 23, at 1-6; NEWELL, supra note 18, at 70-73; Olson, supra note 9, at 448-49; 
Ziegert, supra note 23, at 919. Austrians experienced similar difficulties with early 
vague laws intended to prohibit corporal punishment of children before enacting an 
explicit ban. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text. 
442. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 407, § 7.15, at 301. 
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i.e., some use "assault," the concept defining the crime remains 
the same-that what is proscribed is "unlawful application of 
force to the person of another" resulting in "either a bodily 
injury" or, in some states, a mere offensive touching.443 Under 
the modern approach exemplified by the Model Penal Code, in 
order to constitute assault, the attack must cause "bodily 
injury,'>444 defmed as, among other things, "physical pain, 
illness or any impairment of physical condition.»445 Even a 
"temporarily painful blow" to another will constitute a battery 
"though afterward there is no wound or bruise or even pain to 
show for it.,,446 The perpetrator must also have a particular 
mental state, which includes intent to injure or cause bodily 
pain.447 Subabuse corporal punishment, as defmed in this 
Article, is characterized by precisely these elements of 
battery:448 to state the obvious, corporal punishment is at least 
a temporarily painful blow, intended to modify behavior by 
causing bodily pain.449 
Third, the draft statute is preferable to creating a cause of 
action in tort against the punishing parent or other 
caregiver.450 To subject violators merely to civil liability would 
443. [d. § 7.15, at 301; see Miguel Angel Mendez, Essay, A Sisyphean Task: The 
Common Law Approach to Mens Rea, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 407, 411-12 (1995). 
444. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (1997); LAFAVE & ScO'lT, supra note 407, § 7.15, 
at 302. 
445. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.0 & 211.0. 
446. LAFAVE & SCO'lT, supra note 407, § 7.15, at 30l. 
447. See id. § 7.15, at 304. 
448. See Herman, supra note 2, at 42-43; Zimring, supra note 5, at 523-24; Gib-
bons, supra note 32, at 112; cf Caldwell, supra note 349, at 387 (aiming to have 
parental physical discipline governed by statutory assault provisions). In those juris-
dictions where corporal punishment is not akin to a legislature's definition of assault 
and battery, the proposed statute could be crafted to indicate that it covers a unique 
crime, and penalties could be assigned that are commensurate with an assault and 
battery crime. 
449. Battery encompasses and is generally preceded by assault-an attempt to 
commit battery or the placing of another person in reasonable apprehension of being 
made the target of a battery. See LAFAVE & SCO'lT, supra note 407, § 7.16, at 312; 
Mendez, supra note 443, at 410. Corporal punishment is, as a matter of course, pre-
ceded by the child's being placed in fear of receiving a blow. See supra note 355 and 
accompanying text. Therefore, it is logically possible to classify the threat of corporal 
punishment as an assault. Although entirely humane treatment of children (which 
would exclude threats of violence) is most desirable, this Article works toward that 
ultimate goal by taking a first step in proscribing the most palpable and physically 
painful child rearing practice-actual corporal punishment. The limited reform pro-
posed here represents an acknowledgment of American political realities. As such, the 
draft statute is conceived as a beginning rather than an end. 
450. The Restatement (Second) of Tbrts repudiates parental immunity from tort 
liability with the caveat that repudiation "does not establish liability for an act or 
omission that, because of the parent-child relationship, is otherwise privileged or is 
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be to convey the message that physically attacking children is 
not as objectionable as physically attacking adults-the opposite 
of the law's intended pedagogical purpose.451 The consequence is 
that the possibility of a tort suit would, by itself, perform the 
notice or pedagogical function less effectively than the possi~ 
bility of criminal prosecution.452 Then, too, civil liability is 
problematic in that it places the child in a more directly 
initiating and adversarial role with the offending adult, a 
posture that may not be emotionally or practically viable for 
the child.453 In a criminal case, the child's burden is 
substantially shifted to the state, which would initiate legal 
proceedings and take on the necessary adversarial functions. 
Fourth, the proposed statute makes intention of causing a 
child to experience physical pain an element of the crime for 
two reasons. First, the intent requirement is an element of 
battery. Second, this requirement distinguishes prosecutable 
conduct from acts that may cause pain for other purposes such 
as putting antiseptic on a cut or restraining a child from run~ 
ning into traffic.454 As an extra safeguard the proposed statute 
only proscribes physical force that would be a battery if used 
on an adult to make clear that other parental behaviors in re-
lation to the child, including disciplinary measures not 
not tortious." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G (1979). "Several jurisdictions 
have either expressly adopted this approach or supported its rationale." Sandra L. 
Haley, Comment, The Parental 7brt Immunity Doctrine: Is It a Defensible Defense?, 30 
U. RICH. L. REV. 575, 596 (1996). States differ as to whether they provide full, partial, 
or no parental immunity. See Caroline E. Johnson, Comment, A Cry for Help: An Ar· 
gument for Abrogation of the Parent·Child 7brt Immunity Doctrine in Child Abuse and 
Incest Cases, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 617, 628-52 (1993). Outside the context of such 
immunity, it is clear that conduct which constitutes criminal assault and battery may 
also give rise to civil liability. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A cmt. f. In 
those jurisdictions where there is no parental immunity or where there is a willing-
ness to adopt a new exception to parental immunity, civil liability could theoretically 
be provided in lieu of criminal sanctions for subabuse corporal punishment of chil-
dren. See Herman, supra note 2, at 44. 
451. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 104; Anne T. Johnson, Criminal Liability for 
Parents Who Fail to Protect, 5 LAw & INEQ. J. 359, 384-85 (1987); see also Zimring, 
supra note 5, at 537-38 (noting that criminal law can be used as an instrument of 
moral education if the law does not extend public tolerance for retributive effects too 
far); cf. Herman, supra note 2, at 44-45 (suggesting that only criminal sanctions for 
corporally punishing a child would sufficiently convey the "moral wrongfulness" of 
such a practice). 
452. See Henry M. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 401, 403-10 (1958); Herman, supra note 2, at 44; Michael P. Rosenthal, Physi· 
cal Abuse of Children by Parents: The Criminalization Decision, 7 AM. J. CRIM. L. 141, 
146 (1979); Zimring, supra note 5, at 536; see also Hedman, supra note 435, at 896 
(making this point in the context of environmental legislation). 
453. See Herman, supra note 2, at 44. 
454. See STRAUS, supra note 2, at 5. 
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involving painful physical force, do not constitute criminal 
conduct even though they may cause some mental pain to the 
child.455 For example, the disciplinary tactic of "time out" may 
cause and may be intended to cause mental pain but would not 
come within the meaning of the statute because directing an 
adult to sit quietly apart from others would not qualify as a 
battery. 
Fifth, the proposed statute requires that prosecutable use of 
physical force must be for the purpose of "correct[ing], con-
trol[ling], or punish[ing] the child's behavior" in order clearly 
to remove correction, control, and punishment as a defense. Of 
course, jurisdictions that enact the new statute would need to 
repeal any legislation making corporal punishment a defense 
as well as any other inconsistent laws. 
The above described draft statute is not woven from whole 
cloth. In substance it embodies aspects of the approaches 
adopted by those countries that have banned corporal 
punishment of children. It will be recalled that Sweden, 
Finland, Denmark, Norway, Austria, and Cyprus have each 
enacted statutes specifically directed at prohibiting corporal 
punishment of children;456 Italy has accomplished the same end 
by judicial decision.457 Most of the statutes are civil prohibitions 
without any mention of liability; but the fact is that in all of 
these countries the statutory basis exists for subjecting 
offenders to criminal prosecution for conduct that contravenes 
these civil prohibitions.458 The draft statute simply integrates 
the actual prohibition with the provision for criminal liability, 
the same pattern followed by the Cypriot statute.459 
It is true that bifurcating the prohibitory language from the 
liability language has some advantages. It emphasizes the 
pedagogical, exhoratory thrust of the prohibition and down-
plays the politically less palatable repercussive role of the law. 
Nevertheless, combining the two may be preferable in the 
United States as a format that is as familiar as it is unequivo-
cating, and, therefore, more accessible to the average 
American. Ours, after all, is not a legal system that makes 
laws merely to announce preferred policies without creating 
adjunctive enforceable rights, duties, or liabilities. 
455. See NEWELL, supra note 18, at 144. 
456. See supra notes 19-111 and accompanying text. 
457. See supra notes 112-17, 119-38, 140-54 and accompanying text. 
458. See supra notes 29, 56-60, 74, 82, 99-101, 111 and accompanying text. 
459. . See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text. 
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That the prohibition of corporal punishment would carry 
with it criminal penalties would transmit the message that 
such conduct is tantamount to and as intolerable as a battery 
against an adult. Naturally, an offender could be prosecuted 
under the new statute just as an offender could be prosecuted 
under any other criminal statute. The existence of criminal 
liability does not mean, though, that the main purpose of the 
statute would be to prosecute or to work any immediate deter-
rence through the imposition of penalties. As in Minnesota and 
the European countries that have banned corporal punishment 
of children,46o prosecutorial restraint probably would be the 
most advisable policy. There is precedent in the United States 
for such a policy with respect to, for example, minor assaults 
and batteries committed on adults.461 A conservative prosecu-
torial strategy would take cognizance of the fact that the new 
statute would proscribe what sometimes may be impulsive or 
habitual behavior that may initially be difficult for adults to 
control. 
Such a strategy would also further important objectives 
apart from effecting a curb on corporal punishment. In most 
cases it may be anticipated that children will be key govern-
ment witnesses; yet, giving trial testimony can be traumatic 
for children, especially if they are asked to testify against a 
parent.462 Nor would it be politically acceptable or a wise use of 
judicial resources to have the courts continually clogged with 
armies of parents undergoing prosecution for corporally pun-
ishing their children. On balance, then, the primary value of 
the proposed statute should be the pedagogic one of having the 
460. See supra notes 19-154 and accompanying text. 
461. See Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges: A Quan-
titative Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 246, 257 (1980); Herman, 
supra note 2, at 43; James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 
HARv. L. REV. 1521, 1531 (1981). 
462. See A'ITORNEY GEN. TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, FINAL REPORT 38-39 
(1984) [hereinafter A'ITORNEY GEN., FINAL REPORT); Mary Avery, The Child Abuse 
Witness: Potential for Secondary VICtimization, 7 CRIM. JUST. J. 1, 3-4 (1983); Douglas 
J. Besharov, Child Abuse: Arrest and Prosecution Decision-Making, 24 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 315, 353 (1986); Michael H. Graham, Indicia of Reliability and Face to Face Con-
frontation: Emerging Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
19, 21, 67 (1985); Lucy McGough & Mark L. Hornsby, Reflections upon Louisiana's 
Child Witness Vuleotaping Statute: Utility and Constitutionality in the Wake of Stin-
cer, 47 LA. L. REV. 1255,1256-58 (1987). But see Desmond K Runyan, The Emotional 
Impact of Societal Intervention into Child Abuse, in CHILD VICTIMS, CHILD WITNESSES: 
UNDERSTANDING AND IMPROVING TESTIMONY 263, 269-71 (Gail S. Goodman & Bette L. 
Bottoms eds., 1993) (finding that the testimony of children in juvenile court can have 
a salutary effect on the child witness). 
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state serve notice, through the potentiality of prosecution, that 
all corporal punishment of children must be avoided. 
Even in those rare instances where prosecution is instituted 
against parents for subabuse corporal punishment of their 
children, the consequences of a guilty judgment need not nec-
essarily take the form of fines or incarceration. There may be 
dispositions that are more conducive to family integrity and 
peace. Indeed, in some jurisdictions, certain criminal offenses 
occurring in the family milieu are often handled by means of 
diversion, a solution thought to promote such social policy 
ends.463 The idea behind diversion programs is to steer appro-
priate criminal defendants into rehabilitative services rather 
than subjecting such defendants to the more punitive aspects 
of the criminal justice system.464 Diversion would dovetail nicely 
with the pedagogical aims of a prohibition on corporal punish-
ment of children by assisting offenders to acquire more 
productive and humane parenting skills rather than by exacting 
retribution. Criminalization of corporal punishment and diver-
sion may even reduce the number of prosecutions of parents 
because, once such parenting skills become a legal necessity, the 
incidence of child abuse and neglect may diminish as well. 
Diversion of a case away from the regular course of the 
criminal justice system may occur either before and in lieu of 
trial, or after an adjudication or plea of guilty but before 
sentencing. Pretrial diversion channels the accused into a 
rehabilitative program after a complaint has been filed, such 
that formal proceedings cease and diversion disposes of the 
charges unless the accused does not comply with the program 
or commits another crime.465 Posttrial or postplea diversion 
463. See ATIORNEY GEN., FINAL REPORT, supra note 462, at 36; Besharov, supra 
note 462, at 355; Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 
HARv. L. REV. 1498, 1542-43 (1993) [hereinafter Legal Responses to Domestic Vw-
lencel; Johnson, supra note 451, 386-89; Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice 
System's Response to Battering: Understanding the Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 
WASH. L. REV. 267,325 (1985); Diane E. Reynolds, Note, The Use of Pretrial Diversion 
Programs in Spouse Abuse Cases: A New Solution to an Old Problem, 3 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 415,426 (1988). 
464. See ATTORNEY GEN., FINAL REPORT, supra note 462, at 35; Besharov, supra 
note 462, at 354-55; Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, supra note 463, at 1541-
43; Melissa Hooper, When Domestic Vwlence Diversion Is No Longer an Option: What 
to Do with the Female Offender, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 168,168 (1996); Reynolds, 
supra note 463, at 422-24. 
465. See ATIORNEY GEN., FINAL REPORT, supra note 462, at 35; RAYMOND T. 
NIMMER, DIVERSION: THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF PROSECUTION 4-5 
(1974); Besharov, supra note 462, at 355-56; Vorenberg, supra note 461, at 1531-32; 
Waits, supra note 463, at 324-26; Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, supra note 
463, at 1541-43; Reynolds, supra note 463, at 422-24. 
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occurs after the accused has been found guilty and substitutes 
a rehabilitative program for a more typical punitive sentence 
or imposes a rehabilitative program as a condition of 
probation!66 With respect to either type of diversion, failure to 
successfully complete treatment should result in a resumption 
of traditional criminal justice processes.467 
In the context of prosecuting parents or other caregivers for 
violating a criminal prohibition of subabusive corporal pun-
ishment of children, posttrial or postplea diversion would 
appear to be the most attractive alternative. Pretrial diversion 
has the distinct drawback that by effectively absolving the al-
leged perpetrator of any fmding that he or she is guilty, the 
message may be communicated to the community that corpo-
ral punishment is not as serious an offense as physically 
attacking adults.46B While posttrial or postplea diversion could 
convey the same message,469 such diversion has the advantage 
of allowing the judicial system to pronounce the defendant 
criminally liable before diversion occurs. This pronouncement 
packs more punch than pretrial diversion470 while still taking 
into account the interest in sparing families the practical and 
emotional hardships that may ensue from fmes or incarcera-
tion. However, in cases involving more persistent or egregious 
corporal punishment of children even posttrial or postplea di-
version may not be a serious enough response, and more 
orthodox, punitive sentences could be substituted. 
Thus, there exists both a sound rationale for and an arguably 
workable means of prohibiting subabuse corporal punishment of 
children. But, answering the why and how questions still 
leaves unaddressed the crucial issue of whether criminalizing 
466. See A'ITORNEY GEN., FINAL REPORT, supra note 462, at 35; Vorenberg, supra 
note 461, at 1531; Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, supra note 463, at 1541-42. 
467. See A'ITORNEY GEN., FINAL REPORT, supra note 462, at 35; Lisa G. Lerman, A 
Model State Act; Remedies for Domestic Abuse, 21 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 61, 140-41 
(1984); Waits, supra note 463, at 326. 
468. See Legal Responses to Domestic Vwlence, supra note 463, at 1543; Reynolds, 
supra note 463, at 427, 434; cf Hooper, supra note 464, at 170-71 (noting that because 
pretrial diversion does not require the defendant to admit to any wrongdoing, diver-
sion may be seen merely as a means of expunging the defendant's criminal record). 
469. See Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, supra note 463, at 1543. 
470. See supra notes 439, 451-52, 468 and accompanying text; see also A'ITORNEY 
GEN., FINAL REpORT, supra note 462, at 36 (observing that criminal sentencing "can 
strongly reenforce [sic] the message that [domestic] violence is a serious criminal 
matter"); Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, supra note 463, at 1548 (intimating 
that posttrial diversion is preferable to pretrial diversion in domestic violence cases 
because under the former system the defendant has to admit guilt or have been found 
guilty through adjudication). 
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such punishment would harmonize with the American legal 
system. This is, of course, a matter with which Europeans 
were not confronted when they adopted their respective bans 
on corporal punishment of children. It is, however, a decisive 
consideration for Americans. 
IV. ADDRESSING PROBLEMS RAISED UNDER THE US. 
CONSTITUTION BY THE PROHIiuTION OF 
CORPORAL PuNISHMENT OF CHILDREN 
That the prohibition of corporal punishment of children is 
an expedient or even urgent palliative for many personal and 
societal ills does not mean that it would also be legally viable 
under more paramount law. The US. Constitution is supreme 
such that no other laws may contravene its provisions and 
survive judicial challenge. m It is therefore necessary to 
analyze whether prohibition would be tolerable as a 
constitutional matter. 
The Constitution is silent on corporal punishment of 
children. Nor has the US. Supreme Court ever characterized 
such punishment as a constitutionally protected activity.472 The 
Court has addressed the subject of corporal punishment of 
children only with respect to its constitutional permissibility 
in the schools. In Ingraham v. Wright,473 the petitioners 
claimed, among other things,474 that the paddling administered 
471. The primacy of the US. Constitution derives from the Supremacy Clause, 
which provides as follows: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
US. CONST. art. VI, § 2; see Marbury v. Madison, 5 US. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803); 1 
RoNALD D. RoTuNDA & JOHN E. NowAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: 
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1.3, l.4(a}, 1.5 (2d ed. 1992). 
472. See Sweaney v. Ada, 119 F.3d 1385,1389-92 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that US. 
Supreme Court precedent has not accorded parents a clearly established federal con-
stitutional right to corporally punish their children). 
473. 430 US. 651 (1977) (5-4 decision). 
474. Petitioners also claimed that the paddling contravened procedural and sub-
stantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment as well as under the Eighth 
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments. See Ingraham, 430 US. 
at 658, 659 & n.12. The Court only decided the procedural due process and Eighth 
Amendment claims. See id. at 659 & n.12, 664, 671, 682-83. 
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as discipline by school personnel upon two junior high school 
students constituted cruel and unusual punishment in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.475 
The Court held that "the Eighth Amendment does not apply to 
the paddling of children as a means of maintaining discipline 
in public schools.»476 The Court's rationale was that the Eighth 
Amendment's reach should be limited to criminal punishments 
in keeping with the original intent behind the amendment.477 
The result is that elementary and secondary schools are not 
forbidden by the Eighth Amendment from corporally 
punishing students. States, however, are still permitted to ban 
the practice from educational facilities. In fact, as of this 
writing, at least twenty-three states have legislated such 
hib't' 478 pro 1 Ions. 
Prohibition of corporal punishment of children by parents or 
other adults in the family circle does not lend itself to so tidy 
an analysis. To the contrary, enactment of a prohibition of pa-
rental corporal punishment of children along the lines 
described in Part III of this Article could raise at least four in-
terrelated problems under the federal Constitution. First, such 
a prohibition arguably would violate parents' substantive due 
process right to rear their children as the parents see fit. Sec-
ond, the prohibition could be viewed as violating parents' free 
speech right to communicate with their children. Third, the 
prohibition could be interpreted to constrict parents' right of 
free exercise of religion insofar as physical chastisement is re-
ligiously based. Fourth, the prohibition may be regarded as 
infringing familial constitutional privacy rights. As will be 
475. The Eighth Amendment states that, "[elxcessive bail shall not be required, 
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." US. 
CONST. amend. VIII. 
476. Ingraham, 430 US. at 664. 
477. See id. at 664-71. The decision in Ingraham appears somewhat odd when 
considered in juxtaposition to Hudson u. McMillian, 503 US. 1 (1992). In the latter 
case, a prison inmate was beaten by security guards while he was handcuffed and 
shackled. See id. at 4. The guards punched him in the mouth, eyes, chest, and stom-
ach, and kicked him from behind. See id. As a result, the victim suffered minor 
bruises and swelling, some loosened teeth, and a crack in his partial dental plate. See 
id. The US. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the use of force to be 
excessive but refused to rule for the prisoner because his injuries were "minor," re-
quiring no medical intervention. See id. at 5. The Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that the use of excessive force against a prisoner may constitute an Eighth Amend-
ment violation even though the prisoner's injuries (which must be more than de 
minimis) are minor. See id. at 9-10. In contrast, a schoolchild who suffered injuries 
requiring medical attention after being paddled over 20 times was denied an Eighth 
Amendment claim in Ingraham: See 430 US. at 657. 
478. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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shown, there is a unitary analytical solution479 that is respon-
sive to and puts to rest each of these, or any other, 
constitutional dilemmas.48o 
A. Identification of the Constitutional Problems 
1. Substantive Due Process Concerns-The principle that, 
. by virtue of constitutional law, parents have the right to raise 
their children in accordance with parental beliefs had its 
inception in two cases decided in the 1920s, Meyer v. 
Nebraska481 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.482 In Meyer, a 
parochial school teacher challenged a Nebraska statute 
prohibiting the teaching of subjects in foreign languages or the 
foreign languages themselves to private and public school 
students who had not yet passed the eighth grade.483 The main 
purpose of the statute was to foster civic development, 
regardless of parental preferences, by limiting the education of 
children in foreign languages before they had learned the 
English language and American ideals.484 The Supreme Court 
ruled that Nebraska's prohibition, as applied to this teacher, 
violated the substantive due process doctrine that held sway 
479. My colleague, Professor Michael Lawrence, has used the term "unitary 
framework" in a manuscript on the negative Commerce Clause; my choice of the phra-
seology, "unitary analytical solution," in the text above may well have been influenced 
by reading his work. 
480. It may be apropos to point out here that school teachers could conceivably 
raise two of the constitutional arguments described above against prohibiting corporal 
punishment. That is, school teachers in general might argue that the prohibition im-
plicates their free speech rights while religious school teachers might argue that the 
prohibition implicates their free exercise rights as well. Teachers' claims will not be 
addressed separately from parents' claims because the logic of the unitary analytical 
solution applies to banning corporal punishment in schools as well as in families. See 
infra note 494 and accompanying text. 
Indeed, Part IV of this Article is not intended as an exhaustive search for all possi-
ble constitutional obstacles to a ban on corporal punishment of children; rather, it is 
hoped that by anticipating the more obvious constitutional objections this Part will 
inspire or provoke further analysis of the issue. Given the controversial nature of the 
proposed ban, the author is confident that other commentators will remedy any over-
sight in identifying additional constitutional barriers. 
481. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
482. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
483. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 396-97. 
484. See id. at 401. 
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at the time.485 The Court found that the statute ran afoul of the 
doctrine by interfering with the student's freedom to acquire 
useful knowledge, the parents' right to direct the upbringing of 
their offspring, the teacher's right to teach, and the parents' 
and teacher's right to contract with each other for the latter's 
instructional services.486 The Court indicated that such 
interference with due process rights could only pass 
constitutional muster if the interference was reasonably 
related to some legitimate governmental end.487 The Court held 
that the statute served no such end because Nebraska could 
show no emergency necessitating that its residents have a 
ready comprehension of political issues and because the 
statute served no other real purpose.488 
Two years later, in Pierce, the Supreme Court was con-
fronted with claims by two private schools that Oregon had 
violated substantive due process in enacting a law that re-
quired most school-age children to attend public rather than 
private schools.489 The Court invalidated the law on the theory 
that it was an arbitrary and unreasonable interference with 
the private schools' clientele and was destructive of the 
schools' property.490 The Court also offered as a rationale that, 
"[u]nder the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska," the Oregon statute 
485. See id. at 403. The Due Process Clause provides, in relevant part, "nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
In brief, substantive due process, as it was understood when Meyer was decided, is a 
theory fashioned by the U.S. Supreme Court mainly to protect economic liberty rights, 
such as the right to contract. Under the theory, states could not curtail protected eco-
nomic rights unless the curtailment represented an exercise of state police power in 
the interest of the general welfare. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw §§ 8-2 to -4 (2d ed. 1988). The theory was in vogue during the so-called 
Lochner era spanning 1897 to 1937. See id. Lochner u. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), for 
which the era was named, typifies the Court's application of substantive due process at 
the time. In Lochner, the Court struck down a state statute wbjch prohibited bakers 
from working more than 60 hours per week. See id. The Court's rationale was that the 
law interfered with the liberty of bakers and their employers to contract under the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See id. Both Meyer and Pierce involved 
infringements of traditional economic liberty rights as well as a more unusual sub-
stantive due process liberty right to be free of government impediments in the 
acquisition of private education according to parental preferences. See Meyer, 262 U.S. 
at 399-400; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 533; see also Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Founda-
tions for a Right to Education Under the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of 
the National Education Crisis, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 550, 580-81 (1992). 
486. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-403. 
487. See id. at 399-400. 
488. See id. at 401-03. 
489. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530--3l. 
490. See id. at 536. 
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"unreasonably interferes with the [substantive due process] 
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and 
education of children under their control."491 The Court expos-
tulated upon the Meyer doctrine: "The child is not the mere 
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his 
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize 
and prepare him for additional obligations. "492 
Parents were not litigants in either Meyer or Pierce. Neither 
case involved child rearing beyond parental decisions to obtain 
private educational instruction for the children concerned. 
These factors, taken in conjunction with the absence of analy-
sis of a parental child rearing right beyond a few conclusory 
sentences, leave some question as to whether the parents' .in-
terests in Meyer and Pierce were necessarily integral to the 
holdings in those cases. Arguably, any references in Meyer and 
Pierce to the parental prerogative of child rearing are, strictly. 
speaking, dicta.493 
Nevertheless, it may also be argued that the Court relied in 
both cases upon a link between the actual plaintiff educators 
and the affected parents such that restriction of the rights of 
both were presented as interdependent and inextricable.494 
Indeed, a common view espoused. by the U.S. Supreme Court 
and many commentators is that Meyer and Pierce posit in 
parents a constitutional child rearing righe95 --even though the 
491. Id. at 534-35. 
492. Id. at 535. 
493. See Andrew Jay Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Par-
ents and the State, 4 FAM. L.Q. 409, 418 (1970); Francis Barry McCarthy, The 
Confused Constitutional Status and Meaning of Parental Rights, 22 GA. L. REv. 975, 
988-90, 992 (1988); see also Robert B. Keiter, Privacy, Children, and Their Parents: 
Reflections on and Beyond the Supreme Court's Approach, 66 MINN. L. REv. 459, 488-
89 (1982) (suggesting that if parents' and children's interests were to collide, it is not 
clear that Meyer and Pierce would reinforce parental prerogatives); cf. Kearney, supra 
note 5, at 12 (hypothesizing that Meyer and Pierce may only posit rights in parents to 
make educational and religious choices for their children rather than positing a more 
general right to rear children). 
494. See McCarthy, supra note 493, at 986 & n.53. 
495. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555, 564 (1996); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 
US. 417, 445-47 (1990); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 US. 494, 505 (1977); 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 US. 645, 651 (1972); TRIBE, supra note 485, § 15-6; James G. 
Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents' 
Rights, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1371, 1418 (1994); John H. Garvey, Child, Parent, State, and 
the Due Process Clause: An Essay on the Supreme Court's Recent Work, 51 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 769, 805-07 (1978); Kearney, supra note 5, at 14; Keiter, supra note 493, at 488-
89; Kay P. Kindred, God Bless the Child: Poor Children, Parens Patriae, and a State 
Obligation to Provide Assistance, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 519, 525-26 (1996); Kleinfeld, supra 
note 493, at 415-18; McCarthy, supra note 493, at 986, 991; Sharon Elizabeth Rush, 
The Warren and Burger Courts on State, Parent, and Child Conflict Resolution: A 
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particular brand of economic substantive due process from 
which the right is derived has fallen by the wayside.496 This 
view of parental rights is a current and prevalent one and, 
therefore, is a force with which analysis must contend. It is 
also a view likely to be invoked by opponents of a proposed ban 
on parental corporal punishment of children. They, no doubt, 
will argue that a parent's or guardian's use of corporal 
punishment on his or her child is merely a facet of child 
rearing; therefore if parents have a constitutional right to be 
free of governmental interference in child rearing, then they 
must also have a constitutional right to be free of such 
interference in choosing the means of disciplining their 
children. 
2. First Amendment Concerns-Free Speech and Free 
Exercise of Religion-Although the Court predicated its 
decisions in Meyer and Pierce on the Due Process Clause and 
has repeatedly located parental rights in that clause,497 some 
writers are of the opinion that the child rearing right actually 
may fit more modernly under the Free Speech Clause498 and/or 
Free Exercise Clause499 of the First Amendment.soo The free 
speech/free exercise theory is conceived as having two dimen-
sions. One dimension is a purported parental right to live life 
through one's own children by using them as conduits for the 
Comparatiue Analysis and Proposed Methodology, 36 HAsTINGS L.J. 461, 46~3, 483, 
486 (1985); Woodhouse, supra note 419, at 1042, 1090-91; Deuelopments in the Law: 
The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1156, 1351 (1980); Michael J. Min-
erva, Jr., Note, Grandparent V£sitation: The Parental Priuacy Right to Raise Their 
"Bundle of Joy", 18 FLA. ST. U L. REv. 533, 541, 543-44, 548 (1991); Justin Witkin, 
Note, A Time for Change: Reeualuating the Constitutional Status of Minors, 47 FLA. L. 
REv. 113, 117-18 (1995). Some commentators have made the point that neither Meyer 
nor Pierce involved factual situations in which children's interests were opposed to 
those of their parents; thus, the effect of this precedent in relation to such situations 
is uncertain. See Keiter, supra note 493, at 492; Kleinfeld, supra note 493, at 418. 
496. See TRIBE, supra note 485, §§ 8-5 to -7; Keiter, supra note 493, at 489. 
497. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 US. 110, 120-30 (1989); Santosky v. Kramer, 
455 US. 745,753-54 (1982); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 US. 494, 499-505 
(1977); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 US. 645, 651 (1972). But see Woodhouse, supra note 416, 
at 1857 (arguing that Michael H. "suggests an attenuation of the adult-centric, indi-
vidualist model" and "respects the child's-eye view"). 
498. The Free Speech Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law ... 
abridging the freedom of speech." US. CaNST. amend. I. 
499. The Free Exercise Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law ... 
prohibiting the free exercise [ofreligion]." [d. 
500. See 3 RoTuNDA & NOWAK, supra note 471, § 18.26; TRIBE, supra note 485, 
§ 15-6, at 1320; Garvey, supra note 495, at 806-07; McCarthy, supra note 493, at 989; 
cf. Woodhouse, supra note 419, at 1091, 1115 (indicating that the Meyer opinion over-
looked the religious freedom and free speech issues, but also noting that Meyer and 
Pierce could lead to "vindication of First Amendment liberties"). 
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parents' secular and/or religious beliefs.50l The other dimension 
involves a parental right to communicate or pass on such 
beliefs to one's children for the latter's benefit. 502 
Opponents of a ban on corporal punishment thus may con-
tend that spanking and the like is expressive or symbolic 
conduct protected from governmental intrusion by the First 
Amendment.503 With respect to the Free Speech Clause, the 
argument might be made that spanking is a way of communi-
cating to children that some of their behavior is un-
acceptable,504 thereby molding the child's conduct to parental 
ideals and benefiting the child's maturation process. With re-
spect to the Free Exercise Clause, an argument might be 
fashioned that since certain religions are thought by some to 
condone parental corporal punishment of children;505 such 
punishment is a way for parents to live by their religious be-
liefs and to transmit religiously based values to their young. 
While there do not appear to be any relevant decisions by 
the U.S. Supreme Court that deal with parents' right to engage 
in free speech with their children, there are decisions by the 
Court treating parents' free exercise rights vis-a.-vis their 
children.506 The Court upheld the parents' claim in only one of 
these cases-Wisconsin v. Yoder. 507 In Yoder, Old Order Amish 
parents were convicted under and subsequently challenged 
that portion of a Wisconsin compulsory education statute that 
required parents to send their children to a public or private 
school for an additional two years after the eighth grade.508 
501. See Garvey, supra note 495, at 806; Woodhouse, supra note 419, at 1114-15. 
502. See Garvey, supra note 495, at 806--07. 
503. See 4 RoTuNDA & NOWAK, supra note 471, § 20.48 (noting that the U.S. Su-
preme Court has long recognized that speech may be nonverbal or symbolic); TRIBE, 
supra note 485, § 12-7. 
504. See Garvey, supra note 495, at 781-82 (suggesting that spankings are "not for 
retribution, but rather for providing information"). 
505. See DOBSON, supra note 349, at 235; FuGATE, supra note 352, at 79, 83-84, 
105-21; GREVEN, supra note 350, at 46-49; LESSIN, supra note 352, at 21-30. But see 
STEPHEN J. BAVOLEK, RED, WHITE & BRUISES: SPANKING IN THE U.S.A. 4-5 (1994) 
(contending that the Bible may be interpreted as not supporting physical chastise-
ment of children); SEARS & SEARS, supra note 1, at 150-51 (concluding that "nowhere 
in the Bible does it say you must spank your child to be a godly parent"); Adah 
Maurer & James Wallerstein, The Bible and the Rod (last modified Nov. 16, 1997) 
<http://silcon.com/-ptave/maurer3.htm> (making the case that the Bible may be un-
derstood to disapprove of corporal punishment of children). 
506. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 
158 (1944); Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hospital, 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.O. 
Wash. 1967), affd mem., 390 U.S. 598 (1968). 
507. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
508. See id. at 207-08. 
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These Amish parents feared "that by sending their children to 
high school, they would not only expose themselves to the 
danger of the censure of the church community, but ... also 
endanger their own salvation and that of their children."so9 
This fear had its roots in the Older Order Amish's literal 
interpretation of biblical commands to live apart from the 
world and worldly influences.slo 
The Court characterized the Amish parents' refusal to allow 
their children to partake of state sanctioned secondary 
schooling as religiously based parental conduct within the pro-
tection of the Free Exercise Clause.sll According to the Court 
this is the type ~f conduct that comes within the "charter of 
the rights of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their 
children" as announced in Pierce.Sl2 Because Wisconsin could 
not show that the Amish parents' religiously based conduct in 
relation to their children's education would ''jeopardize the. 
health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant 
social burdens,,,sI3 the Yoder Court held that the Free Exercise 
Clause prevented Wisconsin from forcing the Amish parents to 
send their children to a formal high school. S14 
There are aspects of Yoder that make it a likely source of 
precedent for the arguments of litigious parents who would 
object to prohibition of corporal punishment of children for 
religious reasons. Parents who wish to spank. may argue that, 
like the Amish, they are engaged in religiously based conduct 
with which government is trying to interfere;sls in fact, both 
the Amish and many parents who spank. for religious reasons 
rely upon a literal interpretation of the Bible as authority for 
their conduct.sl6 It should be noted, though, that in spite of the 
509. [d. at 209. 
510. See id. at 216-17. 
511. See id. at 219-20. 
512. [d. at 233 (referring to Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925». 
513. [d. at 234. 
514. See id. In Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 n.1 (1990), the 
Court, in dictum, described Yoder as a case that involves both the Free Exercise 
Clause and the substantive due process liberty interest of parents to direct the up-
bringing and education of their children. See 4 RoTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 471, 
§ 21.6, at 526. 
515. See infra note 520 and accompanying text. 
516. The Bible contains repeated references to parents' use of the rod on children. 
A few examples follow: "A Father who spares the rod hates his son, but one who loves 
him keeps him in order." Proverbs 13:24 (The New English Bible, Oxford Univ. Press 
& Cambridge Univ. Press 1970). "Do not withhold discipline from a boy; take the stick 
to him, and save him from death." Proverbs 23:13 (New English Bible). "Rod and rep-
rimand impart wisdom, but a boy who runs wild brings shame on his mother." 
Proverbs 29:15 (New English Bible). 
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analogy, Yoder will also prove problematic for those who wish 
to marshall it for such purposes. In reaching its holding, the 
majority made clear that the Court did not have before it a 
situation where parents' and children's interests were at 
loggerheads.517 If the decision is properly limited to its facts,518 
pro-corporal punishment parents would arguably be able to 
profit from Yoder only if they could show that their children 
did not oppose receiving corporal punishment. 
Another difficulty is that Yoder is legally aberrational. Yoder 
represents a break with the Supreme Court's longstanding 
observance of what some have seen as a belief/conduct 
dichotomy in its Free Exercise Clause cases whereby religious 
beliefs are accorded constitutional protections that are usually 
denied to religiously motivated conduct burdened by laws of 
general applicability.519 The fate of litigants favoring parental 
corporal punishment would thus depend upon the Court's 
517. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 230-32. Justice Douglas dissented in Yoder because, 
among other reasons, the majority failed to consider the rights of those respondents' 
children whose religious views in relation to high school education had not been can-
vassed. See id. at 241-46 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
518. See 4 RoTuNDA & NOWAK, supra note 471, § 21.8, at 548 (stating that in the 
absence of "an actual case involving ... a parent-child conflict, the Court refused to 
decide if the state's interest in the child would allow the government to require a par-
ent to send a child to school at the child's request over the religious objections of the 
parent"); William E. Brigman, Circumcision as Child Abuse: The Legal and Constitu-
tional Issues, 23 J. FAM. L. 337, 354 (1984-85); Matt Steinberg, Note, Free Exercise of 
Religion: The Conflict Between a Parent's Rights and a Minor Child's Right in Deter-
mining the Religion of the Child, 34 J. FAM. L. 219, 231 (1995-96); Robert M. O'Boyle, 
Comment, Voluntary Minor Mental Patients: A Realistic Balancing of the Competing 
Interests of Parent, Child, and State, 37 Sw. L.J. 1179, 1190 (1984) (noting that the 
Yoder majority opinion cannot be understood to reach the situation where children's 
and parents' interests are antagonistic). But see Dwyer, supra note 495, at 1387 
(interpreting Yoder as taking the position that parents' free exercise rights trump any 
conflicting interests of their children). Yoder may also be "read to limit parental rights 
over education largely to the Amish." David M. Smolin, The Jurisprudence of Privacy 
in a Splintered Supreme Court, 75 MARQ. L. REv. 975, 1014 (1992). 
519. See Joanne C. Brant, Not a Prayer for Curricular Reform After Lee v. Weis-
man, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 753, 754 & n.4 (1993); Marci A. Hamilton, The 
Belief/ Conduct Paradigm in the Supreme Court's Free Exercise Jurisprudence: A Theo-
logical Account of the Failure to Protect Religious Conduct, 54 Omo ST. L.J. 713,722, 731, 
750-52, 771 (1993); Ralph D. Mawdsley, Has Wisconsin v. Yoder Been Reversed? Analysis 
of Employment Division v. Smith, 63 ED. L. REp. 11, 13 (1990); see also 4 RoTuNDA & 
NOWAK, supra note 471, § 21.6, at 526 (summarizing that except for Yoder and cases 
dealing with unemployment compensation laws, "the Supreme Court during the 1963-
1990 balancing era ruled in favor of the government in every case in which an individual 
sought a free exercise clause exemption from a government regulation of the actions of 
persons within its jurisdiction" (emphasis added». But see TRIBE, supra note 485, § 14-13, 
at 1262 (concluding that the belief/conduct dichotomy "is not generally helpful in illumi-
nating the cases"). Professor Hamilton has stated that "Wisconsin v. Yoder is the single 
free exercise case that attempts to break through the belief/conduct paradigm." Hamil-
ton, supra, at 756. 
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willingness to depart again from its dichotomous precedent to 
extend the compass of the clause to conduct.52o As a 
consequence, while adherents of corporal punishment in the 
home will naturally gravitate to Yoder as constitutional 
authority for their position against governmental prohibition, 
their reliance, while not exactly misplaced, will be complicated 
by Yoder's factual and legal peculiarities. 
3. Family Privacy Concerns-Advocates of corporal 
punishment of children may also claim that a prohibition of 
parental discretion to mete out such punishment will invade 
constitutionally protected family privacy rights. They would 
presumably argue that parental choice of punishment, within 
the bounds of "reasonableness," is a private family matter in 
which the state cannot constitutionally interfere without a 
compelling reason. Meyer521 and Pierce522 are considered to be 
the U.S. Supreme Court's earliest pronouncements of familial 
privacy rights523 as well as of the parental child rearing right. 
Later, in Griswold v. Connecticut,524 a case involving a 
challenge to a statute prohibiting the use or abetment of the 
use of contraceptives by married couples, the Court more 
explicitly articulated the right to privacy as a function of 
"penumbras" and "emanations" of various amendments to the 
Constitution. 525 Because of its factual posture involving 
claimed rights of married partners, Griswold is commonly 
520. Such litigants might benefit from the atmosphere created by Congress' reau-
thorization and amendment of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act so as to 
include a rather obtuse section protecting parents from any federal requirement to pro-
vide their child with medical intervention that would be against the parents' religious 
beliefs. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-235, Title I, § 113(a)(1)(C), 110 Stat. 3064, 3079 (1996) (codified at 42 US.C.A § 5106i 
(West Supp. 1997». The statute also provides, among other things, that it may not be 
construed to require a state to find or to prohibit a state from finding abuse or neglect 
when a parent relies upon "spiritual means rather than medical treatment" in relation to 
the health needs of the child. Id. 
521. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US. 390 (1923). 
522. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 US. 510 (1925). 
523. See 3 RoTuNDA & NowAK, supra note 471, § 18.26, at 299; Marcia Mobilia Bou-
mil, Dispensing Birth Control in Public Schools: Do Parents Have a Right to Know?, 18 
SETON HALL L. REv. 356, 364-65 (1988); Naomi R Cahn, Civil Images of Battered 
Women: The Impact of Domestic Vwlence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REv. 
1041, 1083 & n.226 (1991); Garvey, supra note 495, at 805-{)6; Mark Hardin, Legal Barri-
ers in Child Abuse Investigations: State Powers and Individual Rights, 63 WASH. L. REv. 
493,531 & n.159 (1988); cf. TRIBE, supra note 485, § 11-3 (referring to Meyer and Pierce 
as within the line of cases setting the stage for later decisions upholding privacy rights). 
524. 381 US. 479 (1965). 
525. See id. at 481-86. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Douglas found a right 
to marital privacy within the zone of privacy located in penumbras created by emana-
tions from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. See id. at 484. 
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thought to have tied the privacy right to the family. 526 
According to some commentators, subsequent Supreme Court 
cases developing the right to privacy have further manifested 
a "constitutional right in family relationships"527 as a function 
of substantive due process526 or equal protection analysis. 529 
526. See Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TUL. L. 
REV. 955, 970 (1993); Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition: From Griswold to 
Eisenstadt and Beyond, 82 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1558 (1994); Yao Apasu-Gbotsu et al., Proj-
ect, Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual 
Activity, 40 U MIAMI L. REV. 521,569-70 (1986). But see June Aline Eichbaum, To-
wards an Autonomy-Based Theory of Constitutional Privacy: Beyond the Ideology of 
Familial Privacy, 14 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 361, 372-73 (1979) (opining that the 
Griswold opinion was ambiguous as to whether the privacy right applies to the mari-
tal institution or to the choice of individuals alone); Jane Rutherford, Beyond 
Individual Privacy: A New Theory of Family Rights, 39 U FLA. L. REV. 627, 635 (1987) 
(seeing Griswold as "paving the road to individual choice"). 
527. 3 RoTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 471, § 18.28, at 313. See Boumil, supra note 
523, at 364; Cahn, supra note 523, at 1083 & n.226; Marsha Garrison, Child Welfare 
Decisionmaking: In Search of the Least Drastic Alternative, 75 GEO. L.J. 1745, 1771 
n.1l6 (1987); Hardin, supra note 523, at 531; Keiter, supra note 493, at 465, 508; Kin-
dred, supra note 495, at 526; Page McGuire Linden, Drug Addiction During 
Pregnancy: A Call for Increased Social Responsibility, 4 AM. U J. GENDER & L. 105, 
125-26 (1995); Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 835, 847-48 (1985); Alicia C. Klyman, Comment, Family Law-
Hawk v. Hawk: Grandparent VISitation Rights-Court Protects Parental Privacy 
Rights over "Child's Best Interests", 24 MEMPHIS ST. U L. REV. 413, 420 (1994); Ann H. 
Zgrodnik, Comment, Smoking Discrimination: Invading an Individual's Right to Pri· 
vacy in the Home and Outside the Workplace?, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1227, 1250-51 
(1995). 
528. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 US. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion). Jus-
tice Scalia, joined by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
found that, in view of the historical sanctity of the unitary family, the unwed biologi-
cal father of a child born in wedlock has no substantive due process liberty interest in 
a parental relationship with the child even though he has previously maintained such 
a relationship with the child. See id. at 124. Justice Stevens, concurring, assumed for 
purposes of deciding the case that the unwed biological father has a due process lib-
erty interest in maintaining a personal relationship with the child. See id. at 133. 
Justice Brennan, who was joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, and Justice 
White, all dissenting, opined that the unwed biological father has a substantive due 
process liberty interest in a parental relationship with the child. See id. at 142-43, 
160; see also, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,753, 754 n.7, 758, 766, 768-70 
(1982) (holding that a fair preponderance of the evidence standard for governmental 
termination of parental rights violates procedural due process because such a low 
standard interferes with natural parents' fundamental liberty interest in the care and 
custody of their own children); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498-506 
(1977) (ruling that an ordinance which limits occupancy of a dwelling unit only to 
certain relatives and not to others violates the substantive due process liberty to 
make personal choices in matters of family life). 
529. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 US. 380, 381-82, 388-89, 394 (1979) (holding 
that a state law violates the Equal Protection Clause because it denies to unwed fa-
thers the same opportunity as was given to unwed mothers to block adoption of their 
children by withholding consent); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 537-38 (1973) (per 
curiam) (ruling that under the Equal Protection Clause a state may not deny illegiti-
mate children a judicially enforceable right to support from their biological fathers 
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"The integrity of the family unit has found protection in the 
Due Process Clause ... the Equal Protection Clause . . . and 
the Ninth Amendment.,,53o 
Or at least that is one point of view. Other commentators 
have taken the position that post-Griswold privacy cases link 
the privacy right to the individual more comfortably than to 
the family.531 In support of this thesis, they commonly refer to 
cases such as Eisenstadt v. Baird532 and Roe v. Wade,533 among 
others.534 In Eisenstadt, the Supreme Court struck down on 
equal protection grounds a state statute that prohibited 
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons while 
permitting distribution to married persons.535 The Court 
thereby imbued individuals, apart from their families, with the 
right to privacy, saying that "[i]f the right of privacy means 
anything, it is the right of the individual ... to be free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to 
bear or beget a child.,,536 In Roe, the Court held that each 
woman, regardless of marital status, has a qualified right to 
an abortion as part of her constitutional privacy rights.537 It 
may be anticipated that this individualistic orientation will 
not deter pro-corporal punishment parents from seeking 
support in the privacy right precedents; but an argument 
based on family privacy, at the possible expense of an 
while granting that right to legitimate children); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 
(1972) (deciding that the state's denial to unwed fathers of the hearing on fitness ac-
corded to all other parents whose custody of their children is challenged constitutes a 
violation of equal protection principles). 
530. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 (citation omitted). See S. Randall Humm, Comment, 
Criminalizing Poor Parenting Skills as a Means to Contain Vwlence by and Against 
Children, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1123, 1127-28 (1991) ("The due process and equal protec-
tion clauses of the fourteenth amendment, and the ninth amendment each provide the 
family unit with protection from unwarranted state intrusion.") 
531. See TRIBE, supra note 485, §§ 15-1 to -3, 15-20 to -21, at 1302-12, 1414-35; 
Dolgin, supra note 526, at 1543-46, 1554-55, 1558, 1569-70; cf Apasu-Gbotsu et aI., 
supra note 526, at 566, 580-89 (analyzing the Supreme Court's privacy cases as capa-
ble of being understood to recognize a right of personal autonomy). 
532. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
533. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
534. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Planned Par-
enthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
535. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 443, 453-55. 
536. [d. at 453. 
537. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-55. Complainant Jane Roe was single at the time of 
the Roe litigation. See id. at 120. 
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individual child's conflicting claim to bodily privacy, may 
appear dated and awkward even on its own terms.538 
B. The Analytical Solution to the Constitutional Problems 
It is not an oversimplification to suggest that there is a sin-
gle analytical solution to each of the identified constitutional 
arguments against the criminalization of corporal punishment 
of children. A unitary solution should suffice because the four 
constitutional arguments described above all suffer from the 
same defect. They assume that since corporal punishment is 
carried out by parents within the family setting and since such 
punishment has not already been made illegal in most states, 
then it must have a constitutional dimension. This reasoning 
ignores the possibility that corporal punishment of children is 
so inimical to humane values that it has no place in a civilized 
society's constitution. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled in Free Speech Clause 
cases that physical assaults and violence are not "by any 
stretch of the imagination expressive conduct protected by the 
First Amendment."539 These cases arose in extrafamilial factual 
538. There are readers who would probably respond that an attempt by pro-
corporal punishment parents to rely on family privacy rights would be neither dated 
nor awkward in light of Bowers u. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). In Hardwick, Mi-
chael Hardwick, a homosexual who had been charged under a Georgia statute 
criminalizing consensual sodomy, brought suit in federal court claiming that the stat-
ute unconstitutionally infringed his right to privacy. See id. at 187-91. The Court 
rejected his claim, holding that the Constitution does not confer a right to privacy that 
encompasses homosexual sodomy. See id. at 190-95. The Court refused to extend the 
right to privacy cases so far because, among other reasons, "[nlo connection between 
family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other 
has been demonstrated .... " Id. at 191. This characterization of earlier decisions has 
led some analysts to conclude that the Hardwick Court was breathing new life into 
the family privacy doctrine. See Elvia Rosales Arriola, Sexual Identity and the Consti-
tution: Homosexual Persons as a Discrete and Insular Minority, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. 
REp. 263, 267-68 (1992); Dailey, supra note 526, at 980. But see Dolgin, supra note 
526, at 1569-70 (intimating that Hardwick merely revived the rhetoric of family pri-
vacy jurisprudence); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Priuacy, 102 HARv. L. REV. 737, 762 
(1989) (suggesting that Hardwick can be understood as championing self-definition by 
the legislating community). 
539. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993) (unanimous decision). In 
Mitchell, an African-American was convicted of aggravated battery against a Cauca-
sian. See id. at 479-80. Defendant's sentence was enhanced under a Wisconsin statute 
that provided for enhancement where the defendant chose a victim because of the 
latter's race. See id. at 480. Defendant challenged the constitutionality of the statute 
under the First Amendment, claiming, among other things, that the statute penalized 
him for his bigoted thoughts rather than for his assaultive conduct. See id. at 481-83. 
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situations, but the basic principle should not change simply 
because the violence occurs at the direction of adults within 
the family. If it were otherwise, then the law of domestic rela-
tions could not prohibit husbands from physically chastising 
their wives540 or prohibit parents from committing child 
abuse. 541 Yet no one would think of proposing in this day and 
age that husbands and parents should be privileged to engage 
in this type of aggression by operation of the Due Process 
Clause, the Free Speech Clause, the Free Exercise Clause or, 
for that matter, any other provision of the Constitution. Like 
wife beating and child abuse, corporal punishment of children 
is so egregious in its effects and so ethically unpalatable that 
it should be outside the defmitional parameters of child rear-
ing, religious or other expression, or family privacy.542 It follows 
that if corporal punishment is no part of any constitutional 
right, legislatures may prohibit it without showing a compel-
ling interest or any other justification beyond what rational 
legislative discretion and wisdom dictates.543 
The Supreme Court held that Wisconsin could constitutionally single out for en-
hancement "bias-inspired conduct" because it inflicts greater harm than other 
assaultive conduct. See id. at 487-88. Integral to the Court's holding is the idea that 
the defendant's belief system motivating the violent act could not transform the vio-
lence into expressive conduct protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment. That is why the Court could conclude that Wisconsin's statute merely 
"aimed at conduct unprotected by the First Amendment." Id. at 487; accord NAACP v. 
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916-18 (1982); see also Daniel A. Farber, Fore-
word: Hate Speech After R.A. v., 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 889, 897 (1992) (opining 
that "physical assaults are wholly outside the First Amendment"); cf Thornburgh v. 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 792-93 n.2 (1986) 
(White, J., dissenting) (stating that parents' substantive due process liberty to raise 
their children should not be understood to extend to assaults committed upon children 
by their parents). 
540. See supra note 427 and accompanying text. 
541. See 2 DONALD T. KRAMER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN §§ 16.02-.04 (2d ed. 
1994); Besharov, supra note 462, at 323-24; Johnson, supra note 451, at 365-68; Gib-
bons, supra note 32, at 119. 
542. See Part III of this Article for a full discussion of the deleterious effects of 
corporal punishment of children. These effects indicate that corporal punishment's 
inclusion as any part of child rearing, free expression, free exercise of religion, or fam-
ily privacy is seriously misplaced. Moreover, in relation to the free exercise of religion, 
it should be pointed out that not all commentators think that the Bible mandates 
corporal punishment of children. See supra note 352 and accompanying text. See 
GREVEN, supra note 350, at 50-54; MAURER & WALLERSTEIN, supra note 505; SEARS & 
SEARS, supra note 1, at 150-51; cf PETER J. GoMES, THE GoOD BOOK: READING THE 
BIBLE WITH MIND AND HEART 33-51 (1996) (observing that the Bible necessarily is 
open to interpretation but that there is a danger of "an idolatry of scripture," which 
includes worshipping the text over the spirit of the Bible and conforming the Bible's 
meaning to prevailing culture). 
543. Of course, the conclusion that corporal punishment of children "is no part of 
any constitutional right" obviates the need for discussion as to whether a law 
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This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the U.S. Su~ 
preme Court has not held that under the Constitution familial 
or parent~child relations must be free of all and any govern~ 
mental regulation.544 In the Court's view, some governmental 
interference with each individual's personal liberty is the only 
means of avoiding anarchy. The Court has stated: 
But the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United 
States to every person within its jurisdiction does not im~ 
port an· absolute right in each person to be, at all times 
and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. 
There are manifold restraints to which every person is 
necessarily subject for the common good. On any other 
basis organized society could not exist with safety to its 
members. Society based on the rule that each one is a law 
unto himself would soon be confronted with disorder and 
anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under the op~ 
eration of a principle which recognizes the right of each 
individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his 
person or his property, regardless of the injury that may 
be done to others.545 
The Court has reiterated this principle in the parent-child con-
text, acknowledging "that the state has a wide range of power 
criminalizing such punishment should be held to a compelling interest standard in 
order to survive judicial scrutiny. This standard is only applicable when legislation 
impacts upon a fundamental constitutional right. See generally 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, 
supra note 471, § 15.7 (describing the compelling interest standard and the increased 
level of scrutiny in fundamental rights cases); 3 id. § 18.3 (describing the standards of 
review and illustrating the heightened standard used in fundamental rights cases). 
544. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 US. 261, 285-87 (1990) 
(upholding a Missouri requirement that family members-in this case, parents-
prove by clear and convincing evidence that an incompetent person would wish 
withdrawal of life support); Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 US. 18, 27-34 
(1981) (holding that the Due Process Clause cannot be understood to require the 
appointment of counsel for indigent parents in every parental termination 
proceeding); Parham v. J.R., 442 US. 584, 604 (1979) (stating that parents do not have 
absolute and unreviewable discretion to institutionalize a child); Gomez v. Perez, 409 
US. 535, 538 (1973) (per curiam) (ruling that a state may not deny illegitimate 
children the judicially enforceable right to support from their natural fathers when 
the state gives that right to legitimate children); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 US. 
158, 169-71 (1944) (upholding a Massachusetts statute prohibiting a child from street 
preaching in company with her custodial aunt); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 US. 
11, 30-34 (1905) (commenting upon state statutes that require vaccination of children 
as proper exercises of the police power); see also Keiter, supra note 493, at 485 
(remarking that the Court does not appear to embrace the idea of absolute parental 
authority over the child's life). 
545. Jacobson, 197 US. at 26. 
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for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting 
the child's welfare,',546 and that "the family itself is not beyond 
regulation in the public interest.,,547 
In fact, states routinely legislate so as to further child 
welfare by directing parents to engage in or to desist from 
engaging in various kinds of conduct. For instance, there are 
state laws requiring parents to have their children 
vaccinated548 and to provide their children with state-approved 
education,549 as well as laws prohibiting parental child abuse.55o 
There are also laws governing when children may drive, drink, 
vote, contract, or marry. 551 The Supreme Court has acknowl-
edged the government's inherent parens patriae power to 
intervene in the family and restrict parental conduct so as to 
protect children's well_being.552 Indeed, governmental regulation 
of the parent-child relationship is accepted practice in the 
United States. 553 That some child protection laws have on 
occasion been the subject of successful constitutional 
challenges by parents does not obviate the fact that extensive 
regulation of the family continues to coexist with parental or 
familial constitutional interests. 
Nor have parents always prevailed when they have chosen 
to litigate the constitutionality of such regulations. Rather, the 
546. Prince, 321 U.S. at 167. 
547. [d. at 166. 
548. See 2 KRAMER, supra note 541, § 24.08, at 451 (stating that "many states im-
pose the ... requirement that a child be immunized against smallpox, rubeola 
(German measles), and other communicable diseases as a precondition to being ad-
mitted to school"). 
549. See id. § 24.04 (discussing the rights of states to set educational standards); 
Bitensky, supra note 485, at 551 & n.6 (stating that every state has laws mandating 
school attendance for certain ages). 
550. See 2 KRAMER, supra note 541, §§ 16.02 to 16.22. 
551. See McCarthy, supra note 493, at 1012 & n.143. 
552. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (noting that the state 
"may restrict the parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulating or pro-
hibiting the child's labor and in many other ways"); see also John E.B. Myers, The 
Child, Parents and the State, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN AMERICA: U.N. CONVENTION ON 
THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD COMPARED WITH UNITED STATES LAw 87, 90 (1990) (pointing 
to Supreme Court language indicating limitations on parental rights); Johnson, supra 
note 463, at 363; Keiter, supra note 493, at 488. See generally Thomas, supra note 408, 
at 313-23, 326 (discussing the role of parens patriae). 
553. See Woodhouse, supra note 419, at 1038-41, for a concise review of the his-
tory of governmental regulation of the child-parent relationship. See also DAVID 
ARCHARD, CHILDREN: RIGHTS AND CHILDHOOD 151 (1993) (observing that in every 
society "there is always some limit set to acceptable rearing practices"); Wald, supra 
note 419, at 262 (mentioning that every state has adopted minimal standards for par-
enting); Humm, supra note 530, at 1129 (referring to the established governmental 
authority to intervene in the family to protect children from abuse). 
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Court has opted for a flexible approach that assesses, as a 
threshold matter, whether parents or guardians are claiming a 
. bona fide. constitutional right .. For example, although in Wis-
consin v. Yoder the Court upheld Amish parents' Free Exercise 
Clause challenge,554 the Court took an entirely different view of 
the Free Exercise Clause claim of a child's custodian in Prince 
v. Massachusetts. 555 In Prince, the custodial aunt of a nine-year-
old permitted the child to accompany her on the streets where 
they attempted to distribute Jehovah's Witnesses' publica-
tions.556 The aunt was charged with violating a Massachusetts 
child labor law that forbade such conduct; she asserted, among 
other things, that the state law abridged her and her niece's 
right to free exercise of religion.557 She also claimed that the 
state law unconstitutionally interfered with the Meyer-Pierce 
parental child rearing right under the Due Process Clause.558 
The Court, however, collapsed the latter claim into the former 
for the reason that, in this instance, the due process claim only 
extended as far as the free exercise claim. 559 
The Court noted that counterpoised against these claims 
stood society's interests in protecting the welfare of children.560 
The State's interest, said the Court, was "no mere corporate 
concern of official authority," but, rather, was "the interest of 
youth itself, and of the whole community, that children be both 
safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth 
into free and independent well-developed men and citizens."561 
The Court found that the child's street preaching, even under 
the supervision of her aunt, was dangerous.562 Not only would 
it create the same sorts of difficult situations that adult 
propagandizing may produce, but it might cause "emotional 
excitement and psychological or physical injury" to the child.563 
As such, the child's street preaching was not and could not be a 
part of the First Amendment564 "right to practice religion 
554. See supra notes 506-14 and accompanying text. 
555. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
556. See id. at 161-62. 
557. See id. at 160-61, 164. The aunt also claimed that the state law denied her 
and her niece equal protection of the laws, an argument not germane to the discussion 
in the text of this Article. See id. at 160. 
558. See id. at 164. 
559. See id. at 164 n.8. 
560. See id. at 165. 
561. 1d. 
562. See id. at 169-70. 
563. 1d. 
564. See id. at 170. 
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freely.,,565 On this basis the Court held that the state child labor 
law, as applied to the aunt and her ward, did not violate the 
Free Exercise Clause.566 Although the Court did not explicitly 
say so, necessarily this meant that the state law also did not 
violate the aunt's substantive due process child rearing right. 567 
Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hospital566 is similarly 
instructive. In this case, the plaintiffs were adult and minor 
Jehovah's Witnesses, suing on behalf of themselves and as a 
class action on behalf of Jehovah's Witnesses in the state of 
Washington.569 The plaintiffs alleged that Washington's 
Juvenile Court Law was unconstitutional in allowing medical 
care providers and judicial personnel to obtain court orders 
removing the children of Jehovah's Witnesses from the custody 
of their parents when the latter refused, on medical, religious 
or other personal grounds, to consent to blood transfusions for 
their children who had been placed in the care of a physician.570 
Although plaintiffs invoked several constitutional provisions as 
the basis for their challenge,571 the three-judge district court 
only addressed the plaintiffs' arguments under two provisions: 
the Free Exercise Clause and the Due Process Clause insofar as 
the latter bears on substantive parental rights.572 
The plaintiffs' contention under the Free Exercise Clause 
was that as Jehovah's Witnesses they understood literally the 
Bible's command that Christians must "'abstain from 
blood.' ,,573 To these Jehovah's Witnesses, the command meant 
that they and their offspring must refrain from receiving blood 
565. Id. at 166. 
566. See id. at 170. The Court also held that the challenged state laws did not 
violate equal protection principles. See id. at 170-71. 
The Prince Court noted that its holding was limited to the facts of the case. See id. 
at 171. This does not mean, however, that Free Exercise Clause claims can only be 
overridden when the religious expression or conduct occurs on the streets or in other 
places frequented by the general public. Cf. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990) (holding that Oregon did not violate the Free Exercise Clause by denying un-
employment compensation benefits to employees fired for ingesting peyote for 
sacramental purposes at a ceremony of the Native American Church of which the 
employees were members). 
567. See supra text accompanying notes 557-59. 
568. 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (three-judge district court), affd mem., 
390 U.S. 598 (1968). 
569. See id. at 499. 
570. See id. at 499-500. 
571. See id. at 500-01. Plaintiffs invoked their First Amendment rights of associa-
tion and free exercise of religion as well as the First Amendment's Establishment 
Clause; they also claimed, among other things, that they had been denied rights of 
family privacy and equal protection. See id. at 500-01. 
572. See id. at 504-05. 
573. Id. at 502 & n.8 (quoting Acts of the Apostles 15:20 and Leviticus 17: 10). 
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transfusions or they would face spiritual harm.574 They also 
argued that as parents they had the right to select medical 
treatment for their children.575 In plaintiffs' view, the Washing-
ton Juvenile Court Law thwarted Jehovah's Witness parents 
from living by these religious beliefs and exercising parental 
authority over medical decisions affecting their children.576 
The district court ruled that the Supreme Court's holding in 
Prince applied so as to require that the Washington law be up-
held as a "state intervention in the name of health and 
welfare.,,577 The court reasoned that the free exercise and pa-
rental child rearing rights do not include the right to expose 
children to illness or to make martyrs of them.578 The Supreme 
Court affirmed the district court's judgment in a memorandum 
disposition.579 
Thus, Prince and Jehovah's Witnesses exemplify the Court's 
willingness to put to one side plaintiffs' characterizations of 
the constitutional status of parental directives and to assess 
for itself whether those directives are given by constitutional 
right. The Court has not shied from repudiating that 
constitutional status where parental conduct would be likely 
to impair a child's psychological or physical well_being.58o Nor 
574. See id. at 502. 
575. See id. at 501. 
576. See id. at 501-02. 
577. [d. at 504-05. 
578. See id. at 504. 
579. See Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 390 US. 598 (1968) (mem.). 
580. It should be noted that the Prince Court expressly limited its holding to the 
facts of that case. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 US. 158, 171 (1944). Nevertheless, 
Prince still stands as a testament to the fact that the Supreme Court may approve of 
state interference to protect children even when parents argue the Constitution 
against that intervention. Indeed, the district court invoked Prince for precisely this 
purpose in Jehovah's Witnesses, 278 F. Supp. at 504-05. See also Parham v. J.R., 442 
U.S. 584, 604 (1979) (stating in dicta that constitutional parental child rearing rights 
do not give parents an absolute and unreviewable discretion to institutionalize a 
child). But see Dwyer, supra note 495, at 1382 (detecting a hint in Prince that "some 
lesser harm" may legally befall children when they are included in their parents' free 
exercise activities); Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Chil-
dren's Perspectives and the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REv. 11,37-38 (1994) (placing parental 
. power to administer corporal punishment within the parents' constitutional child 
rearing right). 
It is also interesting to note in this connection that in some of the cases involving 
the constitutionality of state imposed parental consent as a prerequisite to a minor's 
decision to obtain an abortion, the Court has favored the minor's interest over that of 
the parents. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 US. 622, 642-51 (1979) (plurality opinion); 
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 US. 52, 72-75 (1976). But see Planned Parent-
hood v. Casey, 505 US. 833, 899-900, 970-71 (1992) (plurality opinion) (upholding a 
parental consent provision). However, these cases are inapposite to a discussion of the 
constitutionality of governmental prohibition of corporal punishment of children be-
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is there any reason why this approach should be limited to 
claims only under the Free Exercise or Due Process Clauses. 
AI:, was mentioned previously, the Court has refused to protect 
violent behavior under the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment.581 If the use of violence against children, even in 
the name of discipline, would compromise their well-being, 
then Prince, Jehovah's Witnesses, and the free speech cases 
teach that parental claims of a right to engage in such conduct 
should fail no matter which provision of the Constitution is 
invoked to support the claim. 
AI:, Part III shows, enactment of a prohibition against sub-
abuse corporal punishment of children would constitute 
governmental interference with parental conduct to precisely 
this end of protecting the child's well-being. The prohibition 
has even more justification than the street peddling statute at 
issue in Prince because corporal punishment of children may 
have lasting adverse side effects for the persons punished as 
well as grave societal ramifications. It will be recalled that 
corporal punishment is assessed by many authorities as doing 
little to develop a child's conscience or to deter children's 
objectionable behavior over the long run.582 In contrast, a host 
of personal physical and mental ills, manifested during 
childhood and later in adulthood, have been traced to this 
practice.583 Corporal punishment may also be a factor 
contributing to people's capacity for brutality towards each 
other on a societal scale, either in the form of crime or of 
genocide and war.584 It would seem that alleviating afflictions 
of this ilk by deterring corporal punishment would ultimately 
preserve rather than violate the Constitution. Moreover, even 
if the studies and theories were to be dismissed as incon-
clusive or invalid, Part III also advances the idea that corporal 
punishment of children should be criminalized for the simple 
reason that it is morally wrong. It is morally wrong because a 
child, like any other person, should be able to live free from 
violence or the dread of violence. It is morally wrong because 
the child's human dignity and very status as a human being is 
cause in the abortion cases the state interference was patently in aid of parental 
authority and ran counter to the minor's constitutional right to an abortion. A ban on 
corporal punishment would restrict the extent of parents' powers. Moreover, this Arti-
cle takes no position on whether children have a constitutional right to be free of 
corporal punishment. 
581. See supra note 539 and accompanying text. 
582. See supra notes 348, 353-54 and accompanying text. 
583. See supra notes 349-50, 357--66, 376-85, 389-90 and accompanying text. 
584. See supra notes 393, 404 and accompanying text. 
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diminished when the child is struck as a matter of right.585 
Indeed, as discussed earlier, corporal punishment of children 
by any other name is, in its essential elements, a battery.586 If 
the Constitution does not immunize a stranger who hits 
another adult or even another person's child, then there can be 
no valid reason, based on the data and principles mentioned 
above, for the Constitution to immunize a parent who hits his 
or her own child. This should especially be the case in view of 
the Supreme Court's traditional sensitivity to the vulnerability 
of children and recognition that they may therefore deserve 
special solicitude from the law.587 
While a prohibition on all subabuse corporal punishment of 
children would unquestionably interfere with parental 
authority, this, by itself, is not necessarily un-American or un-
constitutional. American law does not treat the family as a 
domain for the unfettered exercise of parental power. On the 
contrary, the parent-child relationship is already subject to a 
certain amount of regulation as an ordinary, unremarkable 
incidence of living in a society that prides itself on respect for 
all individuals, adults or children. Some governmental inter-
ference with this relationship is constitutional and some is 
not. Even more than the state's interference with a child's 
street peddling in Prince, the prohibition of corporal punish-
ment of children will shield children from enduring physical 
and psychological damage; perhaps such a prohibition would 
also give new impetus to society's humane impulses. Further-
more, by steering parents towards more productive and 
healthful disciplinary techniques, the prohibition could also 
585. See supra notes 413, 417-18 and accompanying text. 
586. See supra notes 408, 439, 442-49 and accompanying text. 
587. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978) (holding that an 
FCC order regulating a radio program which contained pervasively sexual and excre-
tory language did not violate the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause because, 
although adults might have a constitutionally protected right to hear such materials, 
the broadcast was accessible in private homes and especially to children); Ginsberg v. 
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638-43 (1968) (upholding constitutionality of a New York 
statute prohibiting sale of "girlie" magazines to minors based upon the theory that for 
children's own good their freedom of expression is not coextensive with that of adults); 
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-70 (1944) (ruling that Massachusetts laws 
may constitutionally proscribe children's proselytizing on the streets without violating 
their right to free exercise of religion or to equal protection because "the power of the 
state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over 
adults"). 
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assist parents in their child rearing responsibilities-a proper 
and highly desirable legislative goal. 588 
CONCLUSION 
If all of our assumptions were valid, we would need neither 
to think nor to change. We could simply follow the practices of 
our forebears. History has shown, however, that assumptions, 
no matter how longstanding or prevalent, can be ill-advised 
and even immoral. At one time in the United States, slavery of 
Mrican-Americans was legal,5S9 and physical chastisement of 
wives was assumed to be every husband's prerogative.590 
Americans thought through these assumptions and ultimately 
repudiated them. The process was hardly a smooth one. The 
Civil War was fought, in part, over the legitimacy of slavery,591 
and a controversial women's liberation movement contributed 
to the recognition that wife battering is wrong.592 Although 
abolitionists and women's rights advocates prevailed, initially, 
their pleas must have struck many as bizarre and too extreme. 
But, what were radical ideas in one century became the norm 
in the next century with the help of legal reform and attitudi-
nal transformations. 
Like slavery and wife beating, corporal punishment of chil-
dren is symptomatic of a lack of regard for our fellow human 
beings. Like slaves in the antebellum South and wives before 
the advent of protective law reform, children in this country 
hold an anachronistic subhuman status insofar as they alone 
588. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) ("The legislature could 
properly conclude that parents and others, teachers for example, who have this pri-
mary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the support of laws 
designed to aid discharge of that responsibility."); accord Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 
622,639 (1979) (plurality opinion); see also James Lindfield, Stopping Spanking: The 
Parental Cessation of Corporal Punishment 21-34 (Jan. 1997) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (describing a 
study showing that cessation of parental corporal punishment improves the parent-
child relationship and parents' control over their children's behavior). 
589. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856); PETER KOLCHIN, 
AMERICAN SLAVERY: 1619-18773 (1993). 
590. See LoRRAINE DUSKY, STILL UNEQUAL: THE SHAMEFUL TRUTH ABOUT WOMEN 
AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA 26~3 (1996); OKIN, supra note 427, at 129. 
591. See KOLCHIN, supra note 589, at 201; SMITH, supra note 426, at 1175-89; Ga-
bor S. Boritt, Civil War, in 4 THE WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 614, 614 (1993). 
592. See LINDA GoRDON, HEROES OF THEm OWN LIvES: THE POIJTICS AND 
HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE: BOSTON 1880-1960, at 251 (1988); OKIN, supra note 
427, at 129. 
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may legally be made the object of violence in the absence of 
war or other armed conflict. We do not know what the world 
would be like if a generation of children grew up, with the 
benefit of adult guidance and discipline, but protected from 
this legalized everyday violence. Certainly the experience of 
childhood would be less painful and fearful. Perhaps the real-
ity of childhood would actually live up to its romantic billing as 
a time of playfulness and trusting innocence. More intriguing 
still, perhaps a generation raised without violence would have 
a greater capacity for compassion and rational reflection and 
less of an appetite for brutality and impulsive acts of anger. 
Dare we forgo the possibility, novel and strange as it may seem 
now, that a legal prohibition of corporal punishment of chil-
dren would someday help lead to a less brutish existence? It is 
not an awful chance to take, for other countries and even one 
of our own states have adopted such a prohibition and "society 
has not collapsed.,,593 If we dare to spare the rod, not only will 
civilization continue, but human mercy may more readily 
"droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven,,,594 befittingly digni-
fying child and adult alike. 
593. Flaherty, supra note 431. Irish Parliamentarian Mary Flaherty described the 
mission of a recent delegation of Irish legislators to Sweden as being to "see if 
[Swedish] society had collapsed" due to that country's prohibition of parental and 
other corporal punishment of children. [d. She noted that the delegation was able to 
bring home so favorable a report that two barristers were appointed to draft a new 
law prohibiting all corporal punishment of children in Ireland. [d. 
594. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1, 1.185 (George 
Lyman Kittredge ed., Ginn and Company 1945). 
